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TOTAL LOSS CLAIMS ON PIRATICAL CAPTURE 
 
EDWARD COLE  
 
 
 
 
 
Maritime piracy is a real contemporary peril. Somali piracy alone costs the 
shipping industry between $7-11bn annually
1
. Between 2007 and 2011, average 
ransoms paid to Somali pirates rose from $600,000 to $4.7m per vessel. Ransoms 
paid in 2011 to Somali pirates totalled $135m
2
. Piracy is not confined to the Gulf 
of Aden, but has recently proliferated throughout Indonesia, is increasing off the 
coasts of Guinea and Nigeria, and isolated incidents occur worldwide. An 
extensive, growing literature on the international criminal law of piracy questions 
where pirates might be prosecuted. Contrastingly, the insurance law concerning 
piracy attracts little academic attention.  
 
 A 2011 English Court of Appeal judgment (‘Masefield’) found that an insured 
could not recover for a total loss under its policy immediately following a 
capture. It was deemed not to have lost its property while it remained probable 
that the pirates intended to seek and accept a ransom payment, then release the 
property. Ship and cargo owners received little comfort, for the judgment 
effectively requires them to wait an uncertain time after capture before they might 
recover under a policy, and meanwhile support ransom negotiations. Insurers 
might welcome the relief from making prompt payments, and from having to deal 
themselves with the consequences of a capture. 
 
This judgment was not a foregone conclusion; English law historically allowed 
the insured to abandon instantly and recover for a total loss, despite a hope of 
recovery. This thesis outlines how English insurance law concerning capture 
developed, from the earliest reported authorities to Masefield. It questions 
whether Masefield followed established authorities, and argues that a 
presumption of total loss arises on a capture. 
  
  
12 July 2013   
  
                                                     
1
 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Piracy off the coast of Somalia; Tenth Report of Session 
2010–12’ , p 15. 
2
 Ibid. pp 3, 55. 
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Dean v Hornby, as reported in The Illustrated London News
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Was Rix LJ right to dismiss the claimant’s appeal in Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate 
Member Ltd
3
 (Masefield), holding that no presumption of ‘actual total loss’ arose on piratical 
capture under a marine insurance policy under English law? Secondly, was Steel J right to 
hold
4
, and Rix LJ to confirm, that piratical capture does not establish a ‘constructive total 
loss’? What were the commercial and policy consequences of Masefield’s claim failing? The 
growing academic and professional consensus is that Masefield settled the law; no 
presumption of ‘total loss’ either actual or constructive arises on capture5. It will be shown 
that although Rix LJ was right to dismiss the appeal as pleaded, his and Steel J’s rationes 
decidendi are problematic and provide unsafe precedent, as the claimant’s constructive total 
loss argument, differently pleaded, should have succeeded.  
This evolution of ‘total loss’, from its adoption by English courts in the Eighteenth Century to 
Masefield, attracts little academic attention. This contrasts to the criminal and international 
law on piracy, which has prompted lively academic debate concerning whether there is a right 
of ‘hot pursuit’ by a navy into Somali waters, what criminal offences apply, and which courts 
might have jurisdiction. Little academic discussion exists of total loss in insurance law. 
Commentary in insurance practitioners’ textbooks is largely direct quotation from post 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 cases, and it is suggested that because this academic analysis has 
not been done, these dicta are not understood by reference to their proper historical context, 
and are therefore misconstrued. There exist short ‘current awareness’ case commentaries by 
solicitors’ firms, and a several were published following Masefield, but these merely indicate 
contemporary opinion, and do not help analyse the decision. The rules underlying total loss 
originated in early continental treatises such as Emerigon, and were discussed in a variety of 
textbooks pre-1906. However, there has been almost no academic analysis of this topic since 
1906, despite the complexities of the caselaw. Even legal articles discussing the ethics of 
ransom payments do not deal with the insurance law issues
6
. Accordingly, this work is 
necessarily dependant on primary sources of law, as a detailed secondary academic 
commentary does not yet exist. Consequently an historically informed inquiry into the precise 
nature of capture in insurance law appears to be innovative. 
                                                     
3
 [2011] EWCA Civ 24, [2011] 3 All ER 554. 
4
 [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm), [2010] 2 All ER 593. 
5
 E.g. Robert Merkin and Kate Lewins, ‘Case Note: Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd; The Bunga 
Melati Dua; Piracy Ransom and Marine Insurance’ (2011) 35 Melb. U.L. Rev 717; Ashwin Nair, ‘Masefield AG 
v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd [2010] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 509’ (2010) 24 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 138. 
6
 E.g. Paul Lansing and Michael Petersen, ‘Ship-Owners and the Twenty-First Century Somali Pirate: The 
Business Ethics of Ransom Payment’ (2011) Journal of Business Ethics 201 at 507-516. 
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0.1 JUDGMENTS IN MASEFIELD 
0.1.1 FACTS 
The Bunga Melati Dua was a tanker owned by a Malaysian state shipping company. The 
value of the vessel and the cargoes shipped was about US$80m. The claimant owned two 
parcels of bio-diesel shipped on board, with a declared insured value of $13m. These were 
insured on ‘Institute Cargo Clauses (A)’ (‘ICC(A)’), covering, inter alia, theft of the cargo 
and piratical capture or seizure. 
Somali pirates captured her on 19 August 2008, killing one crewmember. Ransom 
negotiations between the shipowner and pirates began on 20 August. By 15 September 
Lloyd's List reported that negotiations were going well. On 18 September the claimant served 
a ‘notice of abandonment’ alleging that it had been, or appeared to have been, irretrievably 
deprived of the cargo (and likewise the shipowner of its vessel) and thus its cargo had been 
actually or constructively totally lost. The date of that notice was, by agreement, treated as the 
date of the issue of proceedings. 
Later, a ransom was paid. By 28 September 2008, the vessel had been released. She arrived at 
Rotterdam on 26 November 2008, where the cargo was discharged. The cargo had not 
deteriorated after capture, but had missed its market. The market for biofuel is seasonal and 
effectively closes after the end of September. Consequently the insured's bio-diesel had to be 
stored until the following year, when the parcels sold at a price substantially less than their 
insured values. The insured gave credit for the recovery made on sale, less expenses, and 
issued proceedings seeking the balance in the sum of about $7m. 
The insurers adduced expert evidence from a consultant providing security advice to the 
international shipping community. His evidence was that the safest, most timely and effective 
means to secure the release of a ship's crew in such circumstances had regularly proven to be 
to negotiate and subsequently pay a ransom. Somali pirates were not ordinarily interested in 
keeping the cargoes, and there was no risk of the cargoes being discharged. As a result, there 
would have been a ‘high expectation’ that upon the vessel’s release the cargoes would also be 
released. The vessel's detention for 41 days was close to the then average detention period of 
37 days and within the then known range of 21-68 days (though the known range has 
increased to 2 years, 9 months
7
). The insurer observed that the cargo had been recovered, as 
                                                     
7
 Nick Meo, ‘Longest Somali Pirate Ordeal ends for Iceberg-I Crew’, in The Telegraph, 29 December 2012 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/somalia/9770677/Longest-Somali-pirate-
ordeal-ends-for-Iceberg-1-crew.html). 
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was always likely, and argued that, effectively, the claim was not for physical loss, but for 
financial loss caused by delay and loss of/fall in the market, an excluded peril
8
. 
0.1.2 JUDGMENTS 
At first instance, Steel J held that no total loss, either actual or constructive, had occurred. 
Additionally, he held that public policy did not oppose ransom payments, so that a ransom 
payment was a ‘proper means’ that an insured was expected to use, where appropriate, to 
recover property. Masefield appealed, but abandoned its appeal against his findings on 
constructive total loss, limiting its appeal to actual total loss. Dismissing the appeal, Rix LJ 
held that, notwithstanding Dean v Hornby
9
, a presumption of actual total loss on capture did 
not arise. He ruled that, as in any hostage situation, the parties must ‘wait-and-see’ what the 
result of the capture actually was. In Masefield the property was eventually released; 
consequently there had never been a total loss. Additionally, he confirmed that no public 
policy discounts ransom payments as a ‘proper means’ of recovering property from pirates. 
As it could not establish a total loss by capture, Masefield’s loss was characterised as an 
excluded partial loss due to delay and/or a fall in the market
10
.  
0.1.3 POLICY ISSUE: PARTIES’ COMMERCIAL INTENTION 
Arguably, the result did not reflect the parties’ intention when fixing the policy. Both parties 
must have known, or inferred as common business sense, that for Masefield to earn a profit, 
the cargo had to arrive within the annual season for biofuel. Although the insured’s cargo was 
captured and its commercial relationships with intended buyers disturbed, it was 
uncompensated. Masefield suffered a further loss in storing the cargo until eventual sale. 
Although not party to the ransom negotiations, it was effectively bound to wait to discover 
whether they proved successful. Conceivably, as a ransom payment was made by the ship-
owners, a cargo interest becomes potentially liable for contributions to the ransom payment as 
general average, regardless of its wish to pay. The parties, by agreeing the ICC(A) clauses for 
the voyage, had expressly incorporated piracy risks in mind of the sort operative in Somalia. 
Other ICC policies, presumably for a lower premium, excluded piracy. All policies exclude 
delay: accordingly, it was not possible to purchase more comprehensive cover against piracy 
than the ICC(A) policy. The facts of the casualty had been predictable, conforming to known 
patterns of Somali piracy. Prima facie, the objective commercial intention of the insured - and 
                                                     
8
 Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 55(2)(b), codifying the rule established in Taylor v Dunbar (the Leopard) 
(1869) LR 4 CP 206 and Pink v Fleming (1890) 25 QBD 396 (CA); the insurer on ship or goods is not liable for 
loss proximately caused by delay, although the delay is caused by a peril insured against; cf. Halsbury’s Laws, 
vol 25 (2003) at 350.  
9
 (1854) 3 El &Bl 180 (1854), 118 ER 1108 (KB). 
10
 Masefield (n 4) at [13]. 
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other policy holders under ICC(A) clauses - was to have cover for exactly the sort of losses 
that occurred.  
 
0.2 LEGAL ISSUES ARISING FROM MASEFIELD 
 
Both judgments turned on the meaning of ‘total loss’ in a marine policy. A total loss is one on 
account of which the assured may recover from the underwriter the whole amount of his 
subscription
11, in return for ‘abandoning’ the subject matter (if anything survives) to the 
insurer. Total losses contrast to partial losses, payments to reimburse an insured for specific 
recoverable losses. As many standard-form policies restrict recovery for constructive total 
loss, Rix LJ’s judgment in Masefield raises the question; ‘when can an actual total loss on 
(piratical) capture occur?’ Both judgments raise the issue; ‘when can an insured establish a 
constructive total loss following (piratical) capture?’ 
These questions matter to policy holders. If they cannot recover for total loss, they receive 
little or no compensation from the insurer, regardless of their actual financial loss: the sums 
recoverable for a ‘partial loss’ are comparatively small, if not totally excluded. The authorities 
provide no example of a partial loss by ‘piracy/capture’ after capture and recapture. Losses 
arising from these perils, absent physical damage, fall within ‘delay’, an excluded peril. The 
authorities therefore concern whether a total loss occurred. Further, both cargo and ship-
owners foreseeably remain contractually liable to third parties, in which the capture puts them 
in breach, and a late payment following ‘wait-and-see’ might be as commercially injurious as 
a non-payment. An insured might have to pay salvage charges, which might include ransom 
payments. These policy reasons are grounds for criticism of the judgments. Conversely, 
supporting the judgment s in Masefield, the authorities indicate that ransom payments have 
tended to be small in relation to the potential loss suffered. 
The growing consensus is that Masefield settled the law: an insured, under English law, must 
‘wait-and-see’ if he is ‘irretrievably deprived’ of the subject matter before recovering for a 
total loss. In summary; ‘mere seizure of a vessel or cargo by pirates is insufficient to ground a 
claim in either actual or constructive total loss’12. Some commentators erroneously go 
further, stating that piracy cover is excluded entirely from these policies, so that a specific 
                                                     
11
 Arnould, 17
th
ed, 28-01. 
12
 E.g. Michael Underdown ‘Case Notes; Masefield AG v Amlin Corporate Member Ltd’ (2010) 21 ILJ 62 
(referring to the first instance judgment). 
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war/piracy risks clause must be purchased
13
. As Masefield was eventually reunited with its 
cargo there is considerable logic in the judgments, which apparently follow established 
authority
14
. However, in their proper context, these authorities are doubtful. 
 
0.3 CAPTURE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW 
 
The ‘contemporary’ law on capture is twofold: (a) the ‘unlikelihood’ test for constructive total 
loss, and (b) the ‘wait-and-see’ approach for actual total loss. What is the authority for these 
contemporary tests? 
0.3.1 THE ‘UNLIKELIHOOD’ TEST FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS ON CAPTURE 
The idea that a claimant must demonstrate that it is ‘unlikely’ that the property can be 
recovered to establish a constructive total loss originates in Storey J’s dictum in the United 
States case of Peele v Merchants Insurance Company (Peele)
15
:  
“…the right to abandon exists, whenever from the circumstances of the case, the ship, 
for all the useful purposes of a ship for the voyage, is, for the present, gone from the 
control of the owner, and the time when she will be restored to him in a state to 
resume the voyage is uncertain, or unreasonably distant, or the risk and expense are 
disproportionate to the expected benefit and objects of the voyage
16
.’ 
This was widely copied in English and American textbooks. It was taken as the classic 
definition of a constructive total loss from Arnould’s early editions, and remains in the 17th 
edition
17
. It was paraphrased in discussions concerning arrest or embargo, and was 
erroneously stated to derive from Emerigon: 
‘There is a right of abandonment in all cases where there is an apparent probability 
that the owner’s loss of the free use and disposal of his ship, once total, by the arrest 
or embargo may be of long, or, at all events, of very uncertain continuance
18’. 
Selective quotation of textbooks suggests that ‘uncertainty’ was the settled test of constructive 
total loss (then ‘total loss without abandonment’) on capture. Polurrian v Young19 established 
                                                     
13
 E.g. Christopher Douse ‘Combating Risk on the High Sea: An Analysis of the Effects of Modern Piratical 
Acts on the Marine Insurance Industry’ 35 Tul. Mar. L.J. 267 (2010x2011) at 279-80. 
14
 Masefield (n 3) at [77]; The authorities principally relied on were Polurrian v Young [1915] 1 KB 922 (CA), 
(1913) 84 LJKB 1025, [1914-15] All ER Rep 116, Marstrand Fishing Co Ltd v Beer (the Girl Pat) [1937] 1 All 
ER 158 (KB), and Kuwait Airways Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co (KAC v KIC) [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 (QB) 
(reversed on other grounds [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 481 (HL)). 
15
 (1822) 19 Fed. Cas. 102. 
16
 Peele at [111]-[112]. 
17
 17
th
 ed at 29-01. 
18
 Arnould (1848) p.1077. 
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that the new statutory test was ‘unlikelihood’ of recovery, modifying this earlier test of 
‘uncertainty’. In Masefield, this was applied by Steel J, and endorsed by Rix LJ. It appears to 
be settled law (e.g. Arnould (17
th
 ed) 29-04ff). 
However, a proper reading of the authorities reveals that no test of ‘unlikelihood’ was applied 
before 1906. First, Goss v Withers (the David and Rebeccah)(‘Goss’)20, the earliest and still 
the leading English case on capture on a valued policy, permitted a total loss where there was 
a strong hope of recapture and restoration. The right to claim was ‘not suspended’, i.e. there 
was an instant right to abandonment on capture
21
. Polurrian was therefore based on an 
incorrect understanding of the common-law of capture. Indeed, textbooks and cases record a 
‘prima facie right of abandonment’ and an ‘instant right of abandonment’ on capture. This 
makes little sense where there is a settled test of ‘unlikelihood’ of recovery, and none where a 
‘wait-and-see’ approach applies. Chapters 1-3 investigate the law before and in 1906. Chapter 
4.2 questions how the modern law of constructive total loss has modified the pre-1906 law 
and argues that there was between 1756 and 1906 a presumption of total loss on capture, 
which should survive as the contemporary law. 
 
0.3.2 THE ‘WAIT-AND-SEE’ APPROACH TO ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS AFTER CAPTURE  
Where capture does not establish a constructive total loss, the courts have indicated actual 
total loss only occurs if property is destroyed, though severe damage might suffice. A ‘wait-
and-see’ approach was described by Rix LJ as the ‘classic response to a hostage situation’. 
This approach originated in Dawson's Field (1972)(unreported), Kuwait Airways Corp v 
Kuwait Insurance Co
22
 (KAC v KIC)(cf. Scott v Copenhagen Reinsurance Company (UK) 
Ltd
23
), and initially applied to aircraft. It does not appear in maritime law before Masefield. 
Interestingly, ‘wait-and-see’ was explicitly rejected by Mansfield LCJ in Goss v Withers. 
Accordingly, Masefield, in its historical context, is an innovative case, and ‘wait-and-see’ is a 
novel approach to determining an insured’s position. Indeed, ‘wait-and-see’ presupposes that 
hostage-and-ransom is an innovative peril, not covered by ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’. 
The ‘wait-and-see’ approach creates commercial uncertainty. It is unclear what events finally 
prove loss, short of later physical destruction or severe damage, which might be long delayed 
                                                                                                                                                                     
19
 (The Polurrian) [1915] 1 KB 922 (CA), (1913) 84 LJKB 1025, [1914-15] All ER Rep 116 
20
 (1758) 96 ER 1198, (1758) 2 KENY 325, (1758) 2 BURR 683. 
21
 (1758) 2 BURR 683 at 696. 
22
 [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 664 (QB), [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 481 (HL). 
23
 [2003] EWCA Civ 688. 
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or never occur
24
. The ostensibly pragmatic ‘wait-and-see’ approach is not necessarily the 
most commercially desirable one; courts should help commerce, and offer more assistance to 
parties involved in litigation than simple observation. Chapter 4.3 explores the ‘wait-and-see’ 
doctrine and its proper application to capture situations. Many of the disadvantages of the 
approach to actual total loss fall away if a presumption of constructive total loss is recognised 
and applied. 
Together, ‘wait-and-see’ and the exclusion for delay – if no presumption of constructive total 
loss applies - effectively deprive an insured of cover on the voyage or time, not simply the 
physical subject matter. Without wait-and-see, the insured could in principle abandon 
immediately and recover from the insurer the expected value of the cargo as if the voyage had 
not been interrupted, and the cargo had arrived in time. Wait-and-see requires the insured to 
delay until the situation is clarified, and precludes him from claiming any loss to compensate 
for any delay if there is ultimately recapture or release. Effectively, this nullifies one 
significant part of the insurance. Arguably, the purpose of insurance is to share the risk of an 
individual shipowner with shipowners as a body; here that purpose is defeated because 
although insurance on voyage/time is nominally taken out, it is rendered ineffective in all 
circumstances short of destruction, although possibly a capture lasting a year might suffice 
(see 4.2.5). 
 
0.3.2 RANSOM 
Finally, by refusing to discount ransom payments as a proper means of recovering property, 
Masefield requires an insured to support the process of ransoming stolen property from 
pirates. An insured might have good reason not to wish to negotiate ransom, either because of 
commercial pressures, a moral stance, or most importantly, for foreign-domiciled entities (in 
particular, American companies), so as not to infringe their domestic anti-terrorism laws in 
supporting the process of ransom. A separate issue arises concerning whether ransom should 
be a proper means of recovering property. This issue appears settled from earlier authorities, 
e.g. Goss, which discounted ransom at a time when it was a legal means. It appears to conflict 
with the instant right of abandonment which arguably remains good law. However, there is 
insufficient space to properly consider the issue here.  
 
                                                     
24
 Compare Rix J/LJ’s comments in KAC v KIC (n 21) and Masefield (n 4) concerning whether condemnation 
by a prize court establishes actual total loss. 
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CHAPTER I  ORIGINS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS 
 
 
When, in insurance law, has an insured ‘lost’ his property? It will be shown that in the pre-
1906 law a presumption of total loss arose immediately following capture. Before 1756, it 
was thought that property law or prize law would determine the issue. Roman property law is 
briefly introduced to explain the frequent references in early cases. The presumption of total 
loss entered modern insurance law in three judgments of Mansfield LCJ, specifically 
excluding these property rules from capture claims on policies, creating a separate law of 
insurance. The presumption contrasts to the ‘wait-and-see’ approach originating in Dawson’s 
Field applied to ‘deprivation of possession simpliciter’, and applied in Masefield. Its origin 
must be set out at length, as its existence has been entirely overlooked in contemporary cases. 
An understanding of why the law abandoned a ‘wait for condemnation’ approach is essential 
to properly analyse the decisions post 1906. 
 
1.1 ROMAN LAW 
 
Roman property law developed doctrines permitting the transfer of title on capture in war, but 
preventing legal transfer on theft/piracy. Gaius’s Institutes provided ‘Capture from an enemy 
is another title of property by natural law
25’, and later ‘…what a man had captured from the 
enemy was held to be most distinctly his own
26’. Justinian’s code confirmed a captor took 
legal title to enemy property captured; ‘Things again which we capture from the enemy at 
once become ours by the law of nations
27’. This introduced time: the property passed 
immediately. Comparison was impliedly drawn with ownership of captive wild animals. 
Ownership ended the moment they appeared to make good their escape. Accordingly, an 
enemy took good legal title immediately on capture: a re-captor took good title to property by 
the same doctrine. 
Under Roman law, piratical capture differed from enemy capture. Pirates gained neither legal 
‘ownership’ nor legal ‘possession’ of captured goods or persons28, despite taking factual 
possession or control. Whately cites the doctrine of postlimity; “Ea quae piratae nobis 
eripuerunt, non opus habent postliminio, quia jus gentium illis non concedit ut jus dominii 
                                                     
25
 Gai Institutiones, trans. E. Poste, 4th ed., (Oxford 1904), Book 2, s 69. 
26
 Ibid. Book 4, s 16. 
27
 The Institutes of Justinian; Bk II s. 17. (in  Moyle, J. B.; The Institutes of Justinian, 5th ed., Oxford, 1913). 
28
 Whatley, A.T. ‘Historical Sketch of the Law of Piracy’ 3 Law Mag. & Rev. Montly J. Juris. & Int'l L. Both 
Leg. Prof. Home & Abroad 4th ser. 618 (1874) at 622. 
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mutari possint
29
." The same principle was applied to the case of people taken by pirates "a 
piratis capti liberi permanent”’. It followed that where goods were re-captured, they would 
be restored to their rightful owners – the re-captor took nothing30.  
Roman property law, following the revival of civil law in late medieval Europe, underpinned 
mercantile law. However, its general principles were modified by municipal laws. Frequently, 
these specified a proportion of the value of the property recovered as owed to the re-captors 
as salvage, (e.g. the English Prize Acts), or exceptionally granted the property to the re-captor 
if the pirate had kept it for more than 24 hours (e.g. Venetian law). The rules were later 
simplified
31
. Nevertheless, the classical Roman law rule that property should be restored to 
the original owner after piratical capture, to the total exclusion of the re-captor, endured
32
. As 
discussed in Goss, property law created uncertainty for insurance; when is property lost if an 
owner’s entitlement to its return endures indefinitely? Mansfield LCJ excluded these 
problematic property laws; insurance law substituted its own presumptions
33
. 
 
1.2 PROPERTY LAW EXCLUDED 
 
Where the subject matter is destroyed or irreparably damaged
34
 identifying a total loss is 
straightforward. The difficulty lies where property may be simply lost to its owner. In s 57 of 
the 1906 Act, the words ‘irretrievably deprived’ contrast to the previous two possibilities in 
that section; the subject matter may survive in specie, even undamaged. Section 60(2) 
concerns loss of ‘possession’. But what does ‘deprivation’ or ‘loss of possession’ mean? 
Possession means either actual physical control or legal entitlement in property law. 
However, an owner’s continuing legal entitlement is unhelpful; a thief or pirate has not 
respected it (although it might become relevant if property were adjudicated in a prize court, 
and it does govern whether notice of abandonment is necessary). Consequently, it was ruled 
in Goss v Withers that property law was excluded in answering the question of when an 
insured totally lost his property for insurance purposes. The reason why was that property law 
                                                     
29
 Digest. do capt et Postl. Revers, Digest. xlix., xv. 19: ‘What pirates have seized from us have no need of 
reassignment because the law of nations does not enable them to change rightful ownership’. 
30
 Citing Grotius 11, xvii. 9; iii., ix. 16. 
31
 Bykershoek, p.36. 
32
 Whateley, at 622ff. 
33
 See Chapter II; Goss v Withers (n 21). 
34
 The law struggled to define a shipwreck (in earlier cases, naufragium). Various tests were devised, such as 
whether it became a ‘mere congeries of planks’; sunken but substantially intact ships caused difficulties in 
insurance law. Initially, these were actual total losses, but as salvage technology advanced, ships sunken in 
shallow water became constructive losses only. The language therefore evolved from ‘destruction’ to ‘loss of 
possession’. This change did not alter laws on capture. 
10 
 
did not answer simply when an owner lost his property on capture that sufficiently satisfied 
commercial certainty
35
. 
In Goss the plaintiff held two policies, one covering the vessel, the other her cargo of fish, 
from Newfoundland to a European port. England was at war with France. The vessel was 
captured by a French privateer but recaptured eight days later. During the capture, the fish 
started to spoil, and the ship was damaged in a storm. The plaintiff heard news of her capture 
and recapture simultaneously, and instantly abandoned alleging a total loss. The court 
considered whether the plaintiff had lost his interest in the ship on the capture, whether she 
had never been lost at all, and whether the property had been restored. Counsel for both 
parties argued the case under prize and/or property law.  
The insurer argued that property passed in the case of enemy capture only on condemnation 
by a prize court. Mansfield took on judicial notice that in prize proceedings between owner 
and re-captor/vendee before the Court of Admiralty, capture was never ‘complete’ until 
condemnation. Legal property never passed before condemnation; indeed, a prize court could 
order restoration with compensation. Settled property law provided that on recapture, even 
several years and/or re-sales later, the owner retained legal ownership throughout
36
 and had 
the right to take possession subject to paying applicable salvage charges to the recaptor under 
municipal laws. Absent judicial condemnation, statute provided that ‘the ius postliminii is 
perpetual’37 – ‘postlimity’ applied even to ‘enemy’ captures. After enemy capture, a judgment 
was an event that the owner could expect to determine whether he retained or lost his 
property. Theoretically, captures in European waters would be adjudicated quickly. The 
system worked well for owners, and it suited major European states to support prize law. The 
starting point for insurance law was prize: condemnation transferred the property from owner 
                                                     
35
 The Bamburi [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Law Reports 312 at 316. 
36
 Mansfield LCJ cited a prize law case in the time of King Charles II, heard before Sir Richard Floyd, restoring 
a ship in the possession of the enemy for fourteen weeks, because there was no condemnation, and also The 
East-India Company v. Sands, cited in the Ruth (n 131) where an owner had good title against a vendee ‘after a 
long possession, two sales and several voyages’. In the Ruth it was said “the law is clear that not the length of 
time, but the bringing intra praesidia into a place of safety is that which divests the property”. The rule that an 
owner continued to have good title was, inter alia, restated, obiter by the Privy Council in Our Sovereign Lady 
The Queen v Augustus McCleverty (1871) 17 ER 229, and seems to have been well accepted. On property on 
capture generally, Our Sovereign Lady confirmed that a pirate might lawfully have his own property. It seems 
that a pirate’s own property could be condemned by the Admiralty Court, after which it would vest in the 
Crown, as per The Marianna (1835) 3 Hag Adm 206. Property found on board a pirate ship, and condemned as 
droits of Admiralty, could be granted to the original owners upon a memorial to the Crown. In practice, 
inconsistently with the rights of any prior non-piratical owner, property captured was presumed to be prize, and 
all prize was the absolute property of the Crown, and there was no property in it before adjudication (per Re 
Banda and Kirwee Booty (1866) LR 1 A&E 109). This serves to illustrate the potential complexity of prize 
litigation, which did not necessarily produce quick or easy judgments. For insurance law, if an English prize 
court took possession of property, it was considered to have been removed from the original owner, pending its 
restitution.  
37
 Mansfield LCJ in Hamilton v Mendez (The Selby) (1761) 1 Black W 277 at 279, citing the Naval Prize Act 1743, 
29 G. 2 c. 34, s. 24. 
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to capture. Before condemnation property did not pass. Problematically, in Goss, there was no 
condemnation. Had there been no loss? 
In practice, the ‘wait-for-condemnation’ approach was imperfect. Enemy capture might not 
necessarily lead to a quick condemnation. Difficulties arose where vessels were captured on 
an outward voyage
38
, or distant from a prize court, resulting in long delays before 
condemnation. The English partially resolved this by establishing colonial Vice-Admiralty 
courts
39
, but it persisted in other jurisdictions. Consequently, prize law potentially left parties’ 
rights suspended indefinitely after capture. Moreover, pirates would not (and masters acting 
piratically, i.e. beyond their state-sanctioned jurisdiction, might not), lay captures before prize 
courts. This undermined the ‘wait-for-condemnation’ approach, as the capture might never be 
adjudicated. If insurance law followed prize, an insured would never be able to recover under 
his policy without condemnation. This would cause great injustice. Cases on wagering 
policies resolved this through the doctrine of the loss of the voyage (see 2.5).  The ‘wait-for-
condemnation’ approach (anticipating the post-1970s ‘wait-and-see’ approach) was 
consequently deemed inappropriate for insurance law, and was not adopted in wagering 
policy cases. Goss, the earliest authority on a policy for interest, established that ‘wait-for-
condemnation’ likewise did not apply to valued policies. What alternative was there to ‘wait-
for-condemnation following prize law? 
In submissions in Goss, counsel and Mansfield LCJ explored Roman property law, as part of 
the lex mercaturia, seeking doctrines identifying when property transferred by capture absent 
condemnation. The spes recuperandi was central to all these, but there was no consensus in 
contemporary treatises on the timing. One doctrine stated property passed to enemy captors 
after 24 hours
40
. Another stated when no spes recuperandi remained
41
. A refinement was that 
the spes recuperandi ended when the prize reached an enemy port (infra praesidia). Another, 
envisaging capture in battle, stated bringing into the enemy fleet ended the spes (infra 
classis)
42
. Another was that property law followed the terms of the Prize Acts: possession 
passed ‘when the battle, and pursuit were over’. Less specific was that ‘every effective 
                                                     
38
 (n 21), 3 Keny 325 at 333. 
39
 Sweeney J, ‘The Silver Oar and Other Maces of the Admiralty: Admiralty Jurisdiction in America and the 
British Empire’ (2007) 38 J. Mar. L. & Com. 159. 
40
 Citing Grotius.   
41
 Citing Bynkershoek. 
42
 Bynkershoek wrote that intra praesidia had a flexible meaning, either into a fleet or port as appropriate to the 
circumstances. The important point was that there was no spes recuperandi by physically recapturing the vessel. 
He admitted that the ’24 hour rule’ had been alleged, attributing its origin to an innovation of Grotius upon the 
Roman law. Bynkershoek argued against it being a workable rule, and admitted evidence to demonstrate that no 
state adhered to it as a matter of law, save once in 1624, where the judges had been ‘seduced by… Grotius’. See 
Bynkershoek, Cornelius, Quaestiones Juris Publici, Bk I, trans Du Ponceau, Peter Stephen; ‘On The Law of 
War’  American Law Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (1810), pp. 1-198 at Ch IV.,  3 Am. L.J. 1 (1810). 
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depravation of possession’ changed legal ownership. Yet another was that property passed if 
the vessel was on-sold by the captor. Evidently neither domestic nor international mercantile 
law was settled on when legal title passed after capture. The parties avoided mention of the 
further foreseeable complication that had the capture ever been ‘completed’, a re-captor might 
have been entitled to the ownership of the property, excluding the original owner
43
. 
Mansfield’s conclusion was that property laws did not help resolve the dispute with the 
insurer. After noting that the law of property was ‘quite uncertain’ as to the precise time that 
property might pass, he stated that the issue of legal property in the subject matter only 
mattered between owners and recaptors
44. Rather, ‘controversies between the insured 
materially differ from those between owners and re-captors’. Accordingly, the issue of 
whether legal ownership had ended did not arise for determination in an action on a valued 
policy: insurance law was distinguished from property law. 
In Hamilton v Mendez (The Selby)(1761), Mansfield LCJ repeated: 
‘…arbitrary notions concerning the change of property by a capture, as between the 
former owner and a re-captor or vendee, ought never to be the rule of decision, as 
between the insurer and insured upon a contract of indemnity…45’. 
This corrected advocates who misunderstood the rule in Goss, arguing that property itself 
passed immediately on capture. The law that, for insurance purposes, property law was 
immaterial has never been overruled. There is no authority for the proposition that this rule 
applied only to cases of imperfect capture by an enemy and not to pirates. It was repeated in 
this wide sense in pre-Act academic works, reflecting the settled understanding of the 
profession and insurance industry.  
Occasionally, advocates ignored this rule excluding property law. In the Selby
46
, the insurer 
argued, citing civil/property law authorities, that where the vessel had never been taken ‘in 
loco securo’, there was never a total loss; that a taking at sea could never be a total loss47. 
Rejecting that, Mansfield ruled, ‘by this capture, while it continued, the ship was totally 
                                                     
43
 ‘movable goods carried intra presaedia of the enemy, become clearly and fully his property, and 
consequently, if retaken, vest entirely in the recaptors. The same is to be said of ships, carried into the enemy's 
ports, and afterwards recaptured, so that no property or right to them remains in the former owner…’ 
Bynkershoek, (n 42). It followed that, where the capture had not been ‘completed’, following property law, the 
owner would be entitled to restoration without salvage (Ch XVII); the obligation in English law to pay salvage 
arose from Prize Acts, not the lex mercatoria.  
44
 The typical dispute was whether the owner had to pay salvage, Bynkershoek (n 42), p.133. 
45
 (1761) 1 Black W 277, 2 BURR 1198, (1761) 97 ER 787; 2 BURR 1198 at 1209. 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. at 1201, citing especially Roccius’s Notabilia, p 50, para 204, Magens, Essay on Insurances, vol 2, p. 
174ff. 
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lost’48. In Parsons v Scott (the Little Mary)(1810)49, counsel argued for a possible transfer of 
property on capture. These submissions were unsuccessful, and were not the ratio of any 
decision until after the Act
50
. Accordingly, whilst isolated dicta can be found seeking to refer 
to the insured’s continuing ownership, especially in submissions in earlier cases, they remain 
unpersuasive. Property law discussions on capture do appear in textbooks, but restricted to a 
prize law context. Consequently after Goss, total loss in insurance law became a separate 
branch of law to property and prize law. This distinction remains essential for insurance law 
to operate sensibly in cases of theft or piratical capture.  
Mansfield’s rule excluding property law was long the settled opinion of the courts. The House 
of Lords confirmed it in Anderson v Marten. The Earl of Halsbury stated, ‘in the present case, 
as in the case before Lord Mansfield, it is immaterial to consider when or if at all the 
property was changed…’51. The rule is the foundation for the insured’s ‘instant right of 
abandonment’ immediately on hearing of the capture. If the court must wait for the 
adjudication of property law, it would deny the insured this immediate right of abandonment. 
The courts never, until Masefield, suspended an insured’s right on the basis of his continuing 
legal entitlement: property law and the spes recuperandi were irrelevant (although it crept 
back in gradually, e.g. the High Court in The Romulus (see 2.1.1), Panamanian Oriental 
Steamship Corporation v Wright (1970)
52
 (see 4.3.3). Steel J reintroduced property law 
considerations into Masefield, which provides grounds for doubting his ruling on constructive 
total loss (5.2). If property law was irrelevant, how did the courts test whether cases of 
capture were cases of total loss? The answer was by a presumption of total loss. 
 
 
 
                                                     
48
 Ibid. at 1209. 
49
 (1810) 2 Taunt. 363, (1810) 127 ER 1118. 
50
 E.g., the exchange in defendant’s submissions in Lozano v Janson (n 146): counsel submitted, ‘[the loss] 
might have been total, had The "Newport" been captured as a prize, in which case the property in the goods 
would have been changed by the capture: but she was not taken as a prize. Moreover, the goods were taken 
merely ex necessitate, because they were in the ship; nor did the judgment of the Court at St. Helena change the 
property in them’. Crompton J. replied; ‘If the owner is ultimately deprived of the goods, it is quite immaterial 
whether or not the property in them was changed by the seizure.’ at [172]. 
51
 Although the judgment at first instance, and apparently submissions before the Court of Appeal, did rely on 
property law, by the suggestion that a condemnation ‘related back’ to the time of capture, so that property 
passed, for insurance purposes, from the moment of capture. While not disagreeing with this, the Court of 
appeal and House of Lords distanced themselves from this property law speculation, and gave judgment on 
insurance law grounds. 
52
 (1970) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 365, [1971] 2 All ER 1028 
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1.3 PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS ON CAPTURE ESTABLISHED 
 
Mansfield LCJ was the first judge to articulate the doctrine of total loss applicable to policies 
for interest. In Goss v Withers
53
 the ship was captured in the English Channel, where ‘English 
cruisers sailed daily in the hope of (re)capturing vessels’. Counsel for the insurer submitted 
that there had been a strong hope of recovery after capture, and attempted to distinguish 
capture in the Channel from capture upon the open seas, where the spes recuperandi was 
remote. The insured did not contradict that the spes was strong; it is reasonable to conclude 
that the insured conceded this. Mansfield LCJ accepted the strong spes. Had it been in issue, 
there might have been no total loss, or a ‘wait-and-see’. Accordingly, as it did not feature, it is 
reasonable to conclude ex silentio that the spes recuperandi was irrelevant, being part of a 
property not insurance law test
54
. Had it been in issue, Mansfield LCJ could not have stated 
that the ship was, while in the possession of the enemy, a total loss. Instead, having held that 
the question of property law was irrelevant to whether there was a total loss, Lord Mansfield 
CJ ruled: 
 
‘By the capture the insurers became liable, though never carried into port; and 
though there may happen a recapture afterwards, that will not vary the case, nor 
make any difference, as to the contract by which the insurer agrees to run the risk 
and indemnify the assured; and though the ship be never condemned, the contract is 
equally binding, ex. gr. A ship may be taken by a commission from a foreign State, 
between whom and us there is no war, solemn or otherwise, and in that case there 
can be no condemnation; so in the case of pirates. Yet a capture, in either of these 
cases, is, as between the insurer and insured, the same as a taking by an enemy at 
open war, &c.’55 
 
So Mansfield LCJ found that the insurers were liable for a total loss on capture, ignoring the 
property law rules. There was a total loss on piratical capture. There was a total loss even 
where a ship was taken by a non-enemy state, where the end result would probably be judicial 
restoration to the owner. He continued; 
 
‘Certainly here was a total loss at the time of the capture, and for eight days after; 
and it is as certain, that at that time the assured had a right to come upon the insurers 
as for a total loss, and if any thing should thereafter be recovered by re-capture, &c. 
to abandon to the insurers’56. 
 
Clearly, the spes recuperandi continued after a capture. However, that did not mean that a 
‘wait-and-see’ approach had to be followed; 
‘…no capture is so total a loss that it is impossible any-thing can be recovered; she 
may be re-taken, and, be it at ever so great a distance, a right accrues to the owner, 
                                                     
53
 (n 21). 
54
 (n 21); at 337-338. 
55
 2 Keny 325 at 342 
56
 2 Keny 325 at 344 
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paying salvage… this possibility shall not suspend the right the assured had to 
recover on the contract, but he might abandon his interest in such possibility to the 
insurer
’57
. 
 
So there was an ‘instant right of abandonment’ which was ‘not suspended’. Mansfield 
explained that he considered a ship while captured to be equivalent to a ship totally 
submerged, as it had ceased to exist, from the insured’s perspective58, because it was of no 
commercial utility while captured. Accordingly, Goss established a clear rule excluding the 
spes recuperandi as an issue between insurer and insured. The spes recuperandi did not fall to 
be argued on the balance of probabilities. ‘Wait-and-see’ was not applied. Accordingly, the 
insured suffered no delay by waiting for condemnation, and did not have to argue that 
condemnation was unlikely or even uncertain; both arguments potentially causing delay and 
increased costs. This judgment cannot be distinguished by interpreting the case as a 
constructive total loss as a result of the damage and high cost of repair (cf. a loss within s 
60(2)(i)(b) of the Act), for the judgment was written on the basis that the loss was and 
continued total. The loss was total while the capture subsisted, despite the strong spes 
recuperandi persisting. Further, the possibility of ransom (then both lawful and 
commonplace) was raised in argument, dismissed as irrelevant, and did not form part of the 
judgment. 
Mansfield’s second reported case of capture was the Selby (1761)59. The plaintiff held a 
policy on a ship on a voyage from Virginia to London. She was taken by a French privateer, 
but recaptured by the Royal Navy 17 days later. A month after the vessel was returned 
undamaged to England, the plaintiff abandoned to the insurer. In an interim judgment, a total 
loss was found. On appeal, it was found to have been converted to a partial loss by the 
recapture. Though dismissing the claim, Mansfield LCJ confirmed: (i) that the question of 
property law was irrelevant since ‘the ius postliminii is perpetual’; and (ii) that it was not 
controversial that ‘while the ship was in the hands of the enemy, it was a total loss60’. By 
asking whether the loss ceased to be total on recapture, he reinforced the rule that the loss was 
total while the capture subsisted. 
                                                     
57
 2 Keny 325 at 344 
58
 2 Keny 345; 2 Burr 698. The test of total loss on a shipwreck changed with time. At this time, shipwreck 
appears to have been a simple case of ‘total loss’: as salvage technology improved the test became an 
impossibility of raising the vessel (a constructive total loss, cf s 60), or whether the vessel was destroyed as a 
ship or a ‘mere congeries of planks’ (an actual total loss). This change occurred later than this statement, and the 
precise timing of that change is outside the scope of this work. 
59
 (n 44). 
60
 Ibid at 279. 
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Mansfield’s next relevant contribution was in Milles v Fletcher (the Hope)(1779)61. The ship, 
sailing to London, was captured by American privateers, but recaptured and taken to New 
York. Considering the recapture, Mansfield stated that ‘it continued a total loss’. This 
confirmed that he considered the vessel and cargo a total loss during the capture, in line with 
his previous decisions. In the circumstances the damage was so great that the cost of repairs 
exceeded 50% of her value, so falling within another rule established in Goss v Withers 
allowing a total loss to continue after recapture. He stated that the whole of the law on capture 
and recapture could be found summarised in Goss and the Selby
62
.   
Finally, in Kulen Kemp v Vigne (the Emanuel), which was a policy on a wager, Mansfield 
LCJ stated that an insured on a policy for interest could abandon for a ‘temporary capture’63. 
Mansfield LCJ referred to a presumption (“by construction”) of total loss on capture: 
‘In effect, there was only a temporary capture, and though by construction a 
temporary capture is such a loss, as that an assured upon interest is warranted in 
abandoning at the time, if he please
64’.  
The Emanuel provides a further obiter indication for the presumption of total loss, provided 
that a notice of abandonment has been given. It did not suggest the presumption of total loss 
on capture depended on the duration of the capture promising to be long or uncertain. The 
case further confirmed that the ‘loss of the voyage’ applied to valued policies (see 2.5).  
Accordingly after Mansfield LCJ, the starting point for the test on a valued policy was that a 
vessel was a total loss while it was in the captor’s possession. Capture simpliciter did not 
apparently generate litigation on this point. It can be inferred that insurers accepted losses, 
and did not resist or delay claims by arguing for a hope of recovery; settled law does not 
usually generate litigation. The reported cases only concern situations where recapture had 
occurred. It was clearly stated in Goss that it was possible for a loss, once total, to become a 
partial loss, or indeed no loss at all, by the property being restored to the possession of the 
insured. This does not undermine the presumption on a subsisting capture, as the spes was 
irrelevant while it persisted. The court looked only to the present facts, not to the future 
probabilities, however strong. The spes recuperandi was not raised again in relation to 
capture cases for over 100 years. Academic authorities, English and American, repeated 
Mansfield’s judgments in substance65. This presumption was settled law. 
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 (1779) 1 Doug 231, [1779] ER 151. 
62
 Ibid at 232. 
63
 (1786) 1 T.R. 304 at 309. 
64
 Ibid at 308. 
65
 E.g. Marshall (1802), p 423. 
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CHAPTER II  THE PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS APPLIED; 1786-1906 
 
 
The presumption of total loss introduced into English law by Mansfield LCJ was 
subsequently refined during the following century. This chapter considers judgments on and 
dicta from authorities on capture cases. The presumption of total loss was explained in three 
contexts: 
i) Capture simpliciter, establishing total loss; 
ii) Cases of recapture where the total loss continued; 
iii) Cases of recapture where a total loss became partial or no loss. 
The presumption interacted with three further relevant issues: 
iv) When the rights of the parties were to be treated as finalised; 
v) Whether the loss of the voyage continued to apply to valued policies; 
vi) Whether there were circumstances in which a plaintiff was required to litigate in a 
prize court to recover his property. 
This chapter incorporates early American jurisprudence on total loss claims following 
capture. The insurance laws of both states were identical on capture in the nineteenth century, 
save concerning when the parties’ rights finalised. American judgments were widely adopted 
by English academic writers, and cited in English courts. Since the survey of American cases 
evidences a presumption of total loss in US law, it reinforces the presumption in English law. 
This chapter concludes by summarising the presumption of total loss as applied immediately 
before the 1906 Act. This thesis recognises that wherever the insured is stated in cases to have 
‘right to abandon’, this means that an insured would recover for a total loss (explained at 2.4). 
 
2.1 CASES OF CAPTURE SIMPLICITER 
 
Capture simpliciter - capture without recapture or release by the date when the rights of the 
parties were assessed - was never litigated. This thesis suggests it was settled law accepted by 
insurers before the Act: a ship captured was a ship totally lost; the absence of litigation 
denying a total loss on the basis of a continuing spes strongly supports this conclusion. Obiter 
dicta and academic commentary reinforce this presumption of total loss. Arguably, these 
authorities included ‘deprivation of possession’ within ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’.  
18 
 
2.1.1 IN REPORTED AUTHORITIES 
Reinforcing the cases decided by Mansfield LCJ, in Dyson v Rowcroft (1803) concerning a 
cargo which had spoiled (a similar situation to Roux v Salvador
66
), it was observed: 
‘When the loss arises from capture, the commodity remains in existence in the hands 
of the enemy; and yet this loss is as much within the policy as a loss arising from the 
wreck of the ship
67’.  
Dicta in the Friendship (1816)
68
 strongly support that statement. In Kaltenbach v MacKenzie 
(1878), it was stated that:  
‘if he hears his ship is captured in time of war, it must be obvious to everybody, 
unless the ship is re-captured, it would be a total loss’69.  
This confirms the rule (though confining it to situations ‘in war’, contra established authority) 
expressed in Dean v Hornby that without more, a capture by pirates was a total loss. It was 
not, as applied in Masfield, a statement which required an investigation of the chances of 
future restoration.   
In Dean v Hornby
70
 the ship was insured on a time policy for one year ending April 1852. On 
her homeward voyage in December 1851, she was captured by pirates in the Straits of 
Magellan, but recaptured by the Royal Navy in January 1852. In April, the owners received 
intelligence of her seizure and recapture at the same time, and abandoned at once. The vessel 
was sold by the Prize master in August on the authority of the Admiralty Court, which held 
the proceeds pending the dispute between the owners and insurers
71
. The action was 
commenced in December. Campbell LCJ held that the owners could recover for a total loss. 
He said that once a ship was taken by pirates: 
‘then, in fact, a total loss has occurred.’… ‘The cases …[establish that]…once there 
has been a total loss by capture, that is construed to be a permanent total loss unless 
something afterwards occurs by which the assured either has the possession restored, 
or has the means of obtaining such restoration
72
. The right to obtain it is nothing; if 
that were enough to prevent a total loss; there never would in this case have been a 
total loss at all; for pirates are the enemies of all mankind and have no right to the 
possession’. 
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This critically important statement explained the rule in Goss that the spes recuperanti was 
not considered, as arising from the legal presumption that a capture would be permanent. 
Concurring, Coleridge J stated the simple rule, supporting the presumption of permanent total 
loss: 
‘There was a capture by pirates; and, if that were all, there would unquestionably be 
a total loss
73’.  
Dean v Hornby was cited by Rix LJ in Masefield, although the significance of the 
presumption set out in the case was perhaps overlooked, and Dean not put in context, because 
the earlier supporting authorities were not cited and their significance was not developed in 
argument (5.2). It was not appreciated that the possibility of ransom had been discounted in 
Goss.  Consequently, it was considered, erroneously, that in Dean, the insured had been 
required to demonstrate irretrievable deprivation, where in fact the court had not required this. 
In M’Iver v Henderson74, the ship was captured and released with a foreign crew, who 
barratrously defeated the subsequent voyage. Ellenborough CJ, considering the situation 
where there had not yet been a restoration, confirmed that the insured had then a right to 
abandon: 
‘It has not been disputed, nor can it with any colour of argument be contended, that 
on the 4
th
 of April 1814 there was not a sufficient ground for the abandonment of the 
ship, which was on that day made to the underwriters. The ship had been captured, 
plundered of thirteen out of sixteen of her guns, and of her stores, and possession of 
her was not restored till afterwards, i.e. on the 11th of May 1814.
75
 
This operated as a prima facie presumption, which the insurer could disprove only by 
evidencing that the capture had in fact ended. In Lozano v. Janson (1859)
76
, it was confirmed 
that there was a prima facie presumption of total loss in capture. Counsel argued: ‘At all 
events, the seizure did not prima facie constitute a total loss’. Crompton J replied, ‘I think that 
it did; and that the onus of shewing the contrary rests upon the underwriters’77. Similarly, in 
Mullett v Shedden (the Martha), Bayley J’s observation in argument that, ‘No circumstance 
has happened since the seizure to make the original detention less than a total loss’ supports 
the presumption of a total loss on capture and seizure
78
.  
                                                     
73
 (n9) at 192. 
74
 (1816) 4M. &S.575, (1816) 105 ER 947 (KB). 
75
 Ibid. at 583. 
76
 (1859) 2 E. & E. 160. 
77
 (1859) 121 ER 61 at 172. 
78
 (1811) 13 East 304, (1811) 104 ER 387. 
20 
 
Finally, the approach where there had been no recapture was illustrated by the House of Lords 
in Andersen v Marten (the Romulus)(1908)
79
. The insured vessel was captured on 26 February 
by the Japanese during the Russo-Japanese war while carrying coal to Russia. She was 
wrecked while in the custody of the captors. The Japanese Prize Court later condemned both 
vessel and cargo. The insured claimed loss by perils of the sea, which were covered under the 
policy. The insurers defended that claim alleging that she had already became a total loss by 
capture, which was not a risk covered. Loreburn LC noted that legal property had not passed, 
as she had not yet been condemned. He also noted that there was a spes recuperandi: ‘The 
owner still had a chance of recovering the ship and still remained so at risk that he might in 
law have insured her, and being insured already his policy was not necessarily at an end, 
though I cannot agree that he still retained possession
80.’ He nevertheless held, on 26 
February, ‘There was on that day a total loss which, as things were then seen, might 
afterwards be reduced if in the end the vessel was released
81’. 
The Earl of Halsbury took a similar approach, and stated that the idea of a total loss existing 
from the moment of capture had been the settled law for 150 years (since Goss), and that ‘it 
would be a bold thing to argue against a judgment of the full Court of King’s Bench presided 
over by Lord Mansfield
82’. He confirmed that the question of the change of property was 
irrelevant, and quoted from Goss, though it was his view that the decision of the prize court 
had been clearly predictable in advance. He concluded, ‘I should have thought that… it would 
have been impossible in an English Court to deny that there was a total loss to the owner on 
February 26
83’  The unfavourable spes supported the decision, but was not part of the test 
applied. 
Accordingly, the House of Lords in the Romulus
84
 confirmed the decision in Goss that spes 
recuperandi, which necessarily exists in relation to every captured ship, did not defeat a claim 
for a total loss on capture. The court did not assess the spes at all, neither as uncertainty nor 
unlikelihood. The approach was simply to ask whether the vessel remained captured. It had, 
and therefore it was a total loss. 
The presumption of total loss on capture was found in early American law. The policy 
considerations were expressed in Rhinelander v Insurance Company of Pennsylvania (the 
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Manhattan)
85
 and Mashall v Delaware
86
, which stated that the uncertainty involved with a 
capture situation justified an ‘immediate right of abandonment’. Neither case required the 
insured to prove an improbability of recovery while the capture subsisted. 
Care is needed not to be misled by dicta concerning property law in the Romulus. Although 
the House of Lords confirmed the judgments below, there ratio differs. Channell J decided 
the case on a property law basis, and ruled that the ultimate condemnation ‘related back’ to 
the time of the capture. His authority for this was, as he admitted, doubtful
87
. The Court of 
Appeal upheld his judgment, but distanced itself from his doctrine of ‘relation back’. It held 
that property law was immaterial, stating: ‘for the authorities, … shew that, as between the 
assurer and the assured, the question of the transfer of property is not, or is probably not, a 
material consideration’ (Cozens-Hardy MR88) and ‘In my opinion the doctrine of relation 
back is not involved in our decision in this case. The question is whether or not there was a 
total loss to the insured by reason of the seizure, and the fact that an authoritative 
determination of that matter could only occur at some future time appears to me not to affect 
in the least the question whether the loss occurred really at the moment of and by reason of 
the capture’ (Fletcher Moulton LJ89). Accordingly, the pre-Act authorities unanimously 
affirm that capture simpliciter, subsisting at the date of the action, was a total loss justifying 
an instant abandonment. The spes recuperandi was always ignored. The simple issue was 
factual possession/control at the time of the abandonment, and as in the Romulus, the rule was 
clear ‘The ship was a total loss from the moment she passed into the possession of the 
[captors]
90’. If possession or control was lost by that date, there was a total loss.  
 
2.1.2 IN ACADEMIC WORKS 
That presumption expressed in authorities was repeated in academic works. Marshall stated 
the presumption in substantially the same terms as in Goss:  
‘and the insurer is liable for a loss by capture, whether the property in the thing 
insured be changed by the capture or not. For a ship is lost by capture, though she be 
never condemned, or even carried into any port or fleet of the enemy. It can never, 
therefore, be a question between the insurer and the insured, whether the capture be 
lawful or not, or whether the property be changed by condemnation, or by being 
carried into an enemy’s port. A capture by a pirate, or under a commission, when 
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there is no war, does not change the property; and yet, as between the insurer and the 
insured, it is just upon the same footing as a capture by an enemy in open and 
declared hostilities: for whatever rule ought to be observed in questions of this sort, 
as between the owner and the recpator or his vendee, it can in no way affect the case, 
as between the insured and the insurer
91’.  
This explains the logical consequence of the rule excluding the property law test between 
parties to insurance policies; the right exists to claim total loss on capture regardless of the 
insured’s continuing property entitlement, or whether it has been adjudicated. It provides the 
additional example of a capture under a commission when there was no war. Ordinarily, this 
would lead to the captured vessel’s restoration by the captor’s prize court, but this expectation 
would not defeat or suspend the insured’s right to recover. Elsewhere Marshall stated: 
‘and in every case of capture the insurer is answerable to the extent of the sum 
insured, for the loss actually sustained. This may be either total, as where the ship or 
goods insured are not recovered again; or partial, as where the ship is recaptured or 
restored before abandonment; in which case the insurer is bound to pay the salvage, 
and any other necessary expense the insured may have been put to for the recovery of 
his property
92
. 
This extract is inconsistent with the court assessing the spes at the time of action brought. 
Either the subject matter had been recaptured, or it had not. If it had not, it was a total loss. 
Where captors had ‘possession’, because the free use and disposal had been ‘suspended or 
rendered uncertain’, the situation was construed as total deprivation93. This extract, which 
summarises the academic commentaries and the decisions in all situations where the insured’s 
property had not been recaptured by the date of the action, states that a subsisting capture was 
treated as a total loss with no enquiry into the likelihood of recovery.  
 
2.2 RECAPTURE BY DATE OF ACTION WHERE TOTAL LOSS CONTINUED 
  
There were two types of case where a ship was recaptured but a total loss continued. The first 
was where ‘possession’, lost by the capture, was not restored. The second was where 
possession was restored, but the loss continued.  
2.2.1 WHERE ‘POSSESSION’ WAS NOT RESTORED DESPITE RECAPTURE 
Recapture by a friendly ship did not necessarily restore possession to the insured. In Mitchell 
v Edie (the Lady Mansfield)
94
, the vessel, ‘… was not restored to the possession of the 
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insured, even though it was returned to a friendly port, as neither insured nor insurer had 
agents there’. In the Friendship (1816)95, the policy was on a cargo of wheat, fish and staves 
from Quebec to Teneriffe. The ship was captured on her return voyage, and her cargo was 
plundered. She was recaptured, and sent by the recaptors to Bermuda, where there was an 
embargo on the export of provisions due to famine. While in the possession of the recaptors, 
the goods spoiled. Ellenborough LCJ held that there had been a total loss by the capture. 
Although the goods had been recaptured, they did not exist in specie, as a result of their 
deterioration. She was afterwards retaken by another ship, in a damaged condition. It was held 
that there was a total loss. Lord Ellenborough said:  
‘This seems to me to be a case of total loss, and on this ground, that, by the capture, a 
total loss occurred in the first instance…[and the insured abandoned in time]’ 
 
Bayley J, concurring, stated the risk concerned the voyage to Teneriffe, and it followed that 
the goods and cargo had effectively never been redeemed from the capture. He said: 
‘At one period, doubtless there was a total loss, by the capture of the ship; 
circumstances might have intervened which would have changed this loss from a total 
into a partial loss… [in the circumstances] the ship and cargo never were effectually 
redeemed from capture; and the plaintiffs are entitled to recover as for a total loss’. 
 
Abbot J, also concurring, said: 
 
‘Capture operates as a total loss, unless it be redeemed by subsequent events… I do 
not consider an abandonment as having the effect of converting a partial into a total 
loss; but here the loss was total in the first instance, and continued so ever after.’  
 
 
Finally, Holroyd J stated that he was of the same opinion, and said: 
 
  ‘This was a total loss by capture, and has never ceased to be so’. 
 
 
The language in the Friendship supports the idea that a capture was presumed a total loss: if 
the action was brought while it lasted, the spes recuperandi was not investigated. The 
situation after recapture was different. In the Friendship the total loss continued on a separate 
ground: the destruction of the cargo, which could equally have been given as ratio. However, 
there was no suggestion in the Friendship that the rights of the parties were suspended 
because of the spes – it appears that the insured might have abandoned earlier and 
successfully claimed a total loss. The rule was that the possession had not been restored.  
 
In Holdsworth and another v Wise and others (1828), the vessel was abandoned at sea, as it 
appeared to be unseaworthy. She was recovered by the crew of another ship, who repaired 
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her, and sent her back to England subject to claims to salvage and repairs which exceeded her 
value. Bayley J did not address the likelihood of recovery in relation to capture or of salvage 
by another crew. He reinforced the rule that the total loss existed from the moment of capture, 
subject to subsequent events actually happening. He stated: ‘There are cases which shew, that 
the mere existence of a ship after a total loss and abandonment will not reduce it to a case of 
partial loss, … The ship must be in esse in this kingdom under such circumstances, that the 
assured may, if they please, have possession, and may reasonably be expected to take it.’ 
Crucially, the chance of restoration or recovery was not addressed. 
 
The issue of whether recapture necessarily led to restoration arose in Dean v Hornby. This 
was not, as might appear from the discussion in Masefield, a case on the likelihood of 
recapture on capture simpliciter. It was likely in Dean, as in Goss, that the already recaptured 
property (or the proceeds of sale) would be restored; the court would not assume that a British 
prize court might act unlawfully. This was irrelevant: ‘[w]hether the detainer was rightful or 
wrongful is immaterial: for the possession was taken away from the plaintiffs and never 
restored to them’96. Rather, recapture having already occurred, the issue was whether, on the 
day the action was brought, the assured had possessed the means of obtaining possession from 
the recaptors, where the ship was physically in the possession of the recaptors’ agent. The 
court unanimously held that it had not; the act of bringing the ship back to England was the 
act of the recaptor, and the vessel was out of the control of the assured throughout. The issue 
was therefore whether the total loss had been converted by later event of recapture into a 
partial loss. Concurring, Wightman J observed, ‘To make that so, the circumstances ought to 
be such as either to restore the possession to the assured, or to afford them the means of 
obtaining possession.’ The phrase ‘the means of obtaining possession’ was evidently meant to 
express the rule in Holdsworth and similar cases, that if the insured could pay prize to the 
recaptor, then he had the means of obtaining possession. This should not be confused with 
considering ransom on property held by captors in another country. 
Dean was cited by Masefield as the most helpful authority. However, arguably it is not the 
strongest authority. On analysis, it was a ‘The Martha’97 situation, where the recaptured ship 
had already been sold by the time of the action. The judgment ought to have been on the basis 
that she was an ‘actual total loss’ because by the date of the action she had been sold. The 
judgment did not adequately address the real issue; namely the factual situation at the time of 
the action. It was not a case of abandonment before a later restitution. Arguably, Masefield 
had available clear expositions of the law, and stronger authority, in Goss and the Romulus. 
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The real issue in Masefield was not whether possession was restored, but whether the 
possibility of future release on ransom payment defeated a presumption of total loss, where 
the capture subsisted at the date of the action. Release will inevitably have the effect of 
restoring possession; recapture will not necessarily do so as the property might remain in 
another’s control, or be sold. Accordingly, the facts of Dean were not similar to those in 
Masefield; other cases provided more appropriate precedent. Although Dean was cited in 
Masefield, neither judge adequately addressed what the real issues had been, or considered the 
state of the contemporary law.  
2.2.2 WHERE ‘POSSESSION’ WAS RESTORED, BUT TOTAL LOSS CONTINUED 
In Goss, considering the situation after recapture, Mansfield LCJ discussed entirely different 
tests of loss to those arising on the capture simpliciter. It was clear that the captured property 
could become a partial loss if it were restored to the owner, or indeed, it could become no loss 
at all. Nevertheless, on the recapture in Goss, he held that there was a continuing total loss 
because: (i) the insured had lost his voyage, (ii) the cost of repairing the ship was so high as 
not to be worth making, and (iii) as regards the insurance on the cargo of fish, it had spoiled 
so as to be worthless. In The Selby, after recapture, the court questioned whether the total loss 
had been reduced to a partial loss. Finding that on the facts it had, Mansfield noted that, 
although a total loss during capture, the ship was undamaged, and that the voyage had not 
been significantly interrupted. The salvage costs were only 1/8
th
 of the value of the vessel. 
Accordingly, the insured had had his property restored, and suffered a partial loss only. The 
rule was stated:  
‘It does not necessarily follow, that, because there is a re-capture, therefore the loss 
ceases to be total. If the voyage is absolutely lost, or not worth pursuing; if the 
salvage is very high; if further expense is necessary; if the insurer will not engage; in 
all events, to bear that expense, though it should exceed the value or fail of success; 
under these and many other like circumstances, the insured may disentangle himself 
and abandon, notwithstanding there has been a recapture’98.  
The treatment seemed to be this: there was a total loss on capture; on recapture the parties had 
to reassess whether there was still a total loss. The test on recapture and restoration of 
possession would become part of the statutory test of constructive total loss. 
In the Hope
99
, the cost of repairing the hull would, as in Goss, have been prohibitively high, 
and the cargo, also as in Goss, had been either physically destroyed or had decomposed
100
. 
Thus, where the ship or cargo had been returned undamaged, before proceedings issued, the 
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total loss would be at an end. Where, however, it was severely damaged, but required 
expensive repairs or was worthless, the total loss would continue, notwithstanding that the 
insured had or could have regained possession. In each of those three cases, the insured had 
purported to abandon after the capture had ended, and after giving a notice of abandonment. 
The question of the spes recuperandi was not an issue while a vessel was captured.  
After recapture and restoration of the property to the insured, the situations where a total loss 
could continue were primarily those where there had been damage to the property, as had 
been stated in the Selby. These situations were later codified in s 60 of the 1906 Act, and 
represent situations of constructive total loss. There are a great number of nineteenth century 
cases where a constructive total loss was found after a restoration of property. It is in the 
context of these other cases that the test of foreseeability, or a hope of inexpensive repair, 
appears to have been introduced to the test of ‘total loss’. This test did not originate in capture 
cases; its development is considered in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
 
2.3 RECAPTURE WHERE TOTAL LOSS WAS OVER 
 
Several cases illustrated situations where a recapture before the date of the action brought 
resulted in the loss being reduced to a partial loss or even no loss. In Parsons v Scott (the 
Little Mary)(1810)
101
, a vessel insured from England to Portugal and back was captured by 
the enemy French. It was liberated on payment by the master of ransom of $3,000, on 
condition of his returning English prisoners to England to be exchanged for an equal number 
of French. On news of the capture, but after the ship had been released, the owners abandoned 
the ship to the insurers. After her arrival at Portsmouth the captain refused to deliver her to 
the owners unless he were reimbursed the ransom money. The owners refused to pay the 
ransom costs, and claimed for a total loss. On appeal, the claim was dismissed. The payment 
of ransom to an enemy was by statute illegal
102
, and accordingly was not an expense that the 
master could claim from the owners. Therefore the owner was entitled to take possession 
without making the payment, so there was no loss. Lawrence J stated: 
‘[the authorities] assert generally, that wherever the voyage insured is defeated by 
any of the perils insured against, there is a total loss: but I find no authority which 
applies to the case where the ship was, or might have been in the hands of the owner, 
in the country where the owners reside. The passage from the Guidon, c 7, s 1, which 
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was the original authority on which Lord Mansfield relied in the case of Goss v 
Withers, does not apply to the ship…’. 
The rule, so far as it is recorded, was that as the ship was actually in safety at the time of 
abandonment (having been released by the French), there was no total loss. There was 
nothing (the insured not being required make the payment) which prevented him from taking 
possession once it had arrived in England. The case does not undermine the rule on capture 
simpliciter at the date of the action. There was no attempt in the Little Mary to investigate a 
speculative hope of recovery in the future. No submissions on that point were made in the 
case.  
 
2.4 WHEN ARE THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ASSESSED? 
 
2.4.1 ENGLISH LAW 
As some spes exists after any capture, the possibility usually remains of restoration. This 
creates tension between the requirement for certainty and swift resolution of the parties’ 
rights, and fairness to the insurer. The obvious difficulty was restoration after payment by the 
insurer. In the Selby,  Mansfield LCJ held, ‘And particularly I desire, that no inference may 
be drawn, “that in case the ship or goods should be restored after the money paid as for a 
total loss, the insurer could compel the insured to refund the money and take the ship or 
goods:”’ 103. Accordingly, restoration of property following judgment did not undo the total 
loss already determined. 
A grey area remained concerning restoration between notice of abandonment and judgment. 
In Bainbridge v Neilson (the Mary)(1808)
104
, where recapture occurred between abandonment 
and trial, Ellenborough LCJ indicated at an early hearing that the rights of the parties would 
become settled at the date of the notice of abandonment. However, both he and Le Blank J 
later held that the parties’ rights settled at the time of action. The question was whether it had 
in fact been recaptured by that date; the spes was not considered. Ellenborough applied an 
identical approach in Brotherston and Another v Barber (1816)
105
. The assured received 
intelligence of the vessel’s capture and served notice of abandonment before recapture. After 
recapture, the ship arrived at Liverpool partially damaged. Subsequently, the insured issued 
proceedings for a total loss. Ellenborough LCJ held the parties’ rights crystallised at the time 
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of the action, so there was only a partial loss. His judgment recognised that a spes 
recuperandi existed in a capture situation: 
‘… In cases of capture a spes recupcrandi exists: it is not as if the ship were sunk to 
the bottom; there must be always a greater or less degree of probability that she may 
ultimately be recovered; of which advantage the assured certainly ought not to be 
ousted. By notice of abandonment the assured made an offer which remained 
executory; and in this suspended state of things considering this as a contract of 
indemnity the assured had a right to look to intervening accidents which might 
chance to restore them de integro to their former situation.’106  
Both parties, more usually the insurer, might look for restoration in fact before the date of the 
action. There was no investigation into future chances from the date of action. He continued: 
‘But what has been done here to preclude either the assured or underwriter from 
availing themselves of intervening events?[The Mary] and other cases have 
determined that the assured may be remitted to his situation de integro by the 
recapture; and certainly unless we are to consider this as a wagering contract 
instead of a contract for indemnity the reason of the thing requires that it should be 
so: for the value of the things abandoned to the underwriter might in some instances 
infinitely exceed and in others fall short of the sum insured. … plaintiffs must stand, 
in regard to their claim for indemnity, in the position in which subsequent events have 
placed them at the time when they come to demand it that is when the action is 
brought.’107   
 
Bailey J concurred: 
 
‘Now, capture is an event which may or may not terminate in a total loss: if it 
continue and terminate in a total loss, the assured will be entitled to his full 
indemnity; but if the capture be only temporary and the loss partial it would be 
against the spirit as well as letter of the contract to hold the underwriter bound to 
take to the subject matter insured, and to allow the assured, who stipulates only for 
indemnity, to come upon the underwriter for the whole amount of his subscription, 
while the subject matter insured subsists in perfect safety. … notice of abandonment 
is no more than a proposal on the part of the assured; which the underwriter may 
accept, and then there will be a new agreement between them binding on both 
parties. But while the transaction rests in abandonment only on one side, the 
underwriter's responsibility may vary, and cannot amount to a total loss, if by 
subsequent events it has become otherwise at the time of action brought. It is 
unnecessary to give any opinion as to how the case might be, if the loss continuing 
total at the time when the action is brought, became a partial loss only at the time of 
trial. It is enough here that the thing remained in safety to the assured at the time 
when this action was brought and the loss was only temporary
108’. 
 
This does not introduce a requirement for the insured to plead that recovery was unlikely on 
capture. An insured only had to demonstrate that the peril still subsisted at the time of the 
action. The rule was that the parties’ rights were finalised, and were to be assessed at the time 
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of the issue of the writ. The courts did not investigate future events. A temporary capture in 
this extract was one which had ended, not one which looked like it might end in the future, 
though selective quotation from academic works suggested that. Legal certainty and fairness 
to both parties required that the courts did not assess the spes. An identical approach was 
followed in Cologan and another v The Governor and Company of the London Insurance (the 
Friendship)(1816)
109
. It was confirmed in Holdsworth and another v Wise and others (1828), 
although the court erroneously considered that the rights ought to have finalised at the time of 
abandonment
110
. Bayley J, finding the vessel was totally lost, said: 
 
‘capture or the necessary desertion of the ship constitutes a total loss…if at one 
period of time there was a total loss and an abandonment before news of the vessel’s 
safety had been received, her subsequent return does not entitle underwriters to say 
that it was no longer a total loss’. 
 
By Ruys v Royal Exchange Assurance Corporation (1897)
111, it was held that it was ‘settled 
law that the rights of the parties had to be ascertained as at the date of the action brought’. 
This remains the contemporary law. The rights of the parties are assessed at the date of the 
action, which can be by agreement taken to be the date of the notice of abandonment, as was 
the case in Masefield. In none of the cases cited for this principle was there any suggestion 
that the spes recuperandi be assessed at any point. The question was whether, in fact, the peril 
had ended by the date of the action.  
 
2.4.2 AMERICAN LAW 
It is useful to note that the American courts, seeking greater certainty, took the date of the 
notice of abandonment as the date on which the obligations between the parties crystallised. 
Storey J, as he then was, expressed the reasons in Peele v Merchants Insurance Company
112
: 
 
‘With us, an abandonment once rightfully made, is conclusive between the parties, 
and the rights flowing from it are not divested by any subsequent events, which 
change the situation of the property, and make that, which was a total loss at the time 
of abandonment, a partial loss only. And the right of abandonment is to be decided by 
the actual facts at the time of the abandonment, and not merely by information of the 
assured; and consequently, if the facts do not then warrant it, no prior or subsequent 
events will give it any greater efficacy. This is the established doctrine, as I take it, of 
all, or at least of the principal commercial states
113… and has been solemnly settled, 
upon the fullest deliberation, by the supreme court of the United States…114. Whether 
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this decision has given entire satisfaction to the profession, is more than I can 
presume to say; and whether at a future time it may be fit to undergo a revision, as 
has been intimated at the bar, I pretend not to determine. I can only say, that the 
decision already made, is conclusive upon my present judgment; and so far as I have 
been able to comprehend the grounds on which it rests, it appears to me founded on 
sound reasoning, public convenience, and the great principles of equity, which 
regulate the contract of insurance. The rule in the English courts is, as we all know, 
very different’.  
 
This summarises both American and the English law well and concisely. 
 
2.5 LOSS OF THE VOYAGE 
 
 Marine insurance has a dual nature; a policy covers both the subject matter itself and the 
voyage
115
. The law struggles with this dual nature, especially when applied to the vessel 
rather than goods. Although the modern law on policies for interest effectively begins with 
Goss v Withers (1758)
116, earlier cases established the idea of the ‘loss of the voyage’ in 
addition to the physical loss or destruction of the property as a part of marine insurance. 
 
2.5.1 WAGERING POLICIES  
The earliest English insurance cases concerning capture were wagering contracts, where the 
assured was not required to hold an interest in the subject matter. They are typically identified 
by the term ‘interest or no interest’ or by not assigning the benefit of salvage to the insurer. 
Occasionally, policies intended to be for interest became wagering policies through drafting 
error.  
In Dapaiba v Ludlow
117
, the concise report records an action of assumpsit on a wager. The 
vessel was captured by a Swedish pirate. Nine days later she was retaken by an English ship. 
Proceedings were issued while she was still at sea, after which the recaptor took her into an 
English port. The court held the insurer liable to pay. It was said that the interruption of the 
voyage was enough to allow the plaintiff to recover his damage: 
‘And though the ship was here retaken, yet the plaintiff received a damage, for his 
voyage was interrupted ; and the question is not whether the plaintiff had his ship and 
did not lose his property, but what damage he sustained…’ 
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Dapaba established that, for wagering policies, a loss occurred whenever the voyage was 
interrupted (surprisingly, it was later cited in Pole v Fitzgerald (the Goodfellow)
118
 for the 
opposite proposition). Insurance law was not concerned merely with property, but also with 
the voyage. Assurances protected trade, not static property, and the ‘loss of the voyage’ was 
how that commercial dimension was expressed.  
In Pond v King (the Salamander)
119
, the insurance covered a cruise of three months on a 
privateer. She was captured by the French, subsequently recaptured, and taken to a port in 
neutral Spain. Lee LCJ, in the King’s Bench, contrasting English law with civil law, said: 
‘the insurance is to be understood for the voyage for three months, and in common 
sense it cannot be otherwise; so whenever the voyage is broken or interrupted it is at 
an end. Safety during the three months is what is meant, but it appears the ship was 
taken and detained within that time, and that the plaintiff was hindered in his cruise; 
and this, by our law, is a total loss to the plaintiff’.  
The owner did not pay salvage, which would have ensured the return of the vessel; the terms 
of the policy prevented the insured from paying it. The Salamander confirmed Dapaba that 
the interruption of the voyage allowed the insured to recover the value stated in the policy, i.e. 
a total loss.  
Similarly, in Dean v Dicker (The Dursley)
120
, the insured ship was captured by a Spanish 
privateer, and kept for eight days in a Spanish port before being cut out by an English vessel. 
Lord Lee CJ held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover on the wager for a total loss
121
. 
Likewise, in Whitehead v Bance
122
, there was a wagering policy on a voyage, in the course of 
which the ship was taken by a French privateer and carried into port for twelve days before 
being recaptured by an English ship and restored to the owner, who paid the salvage and sold 
the ship. The plaintiff was able to establish a loss of the voyage, and recovered accordingly. 
Those four authorities record the rule for wagering policies that if the voyage is interrupted, 
there was a total loss of the insurance regardless of whether the property is restored.  
That rule, specifically The Salamander, was contradicted by the Goodfellow
123
. There, the 
crew’s barratry prevented the vessel from leaving its home port to commence the voyage. 
Willes LCJ in the Exchequer stated that the loss of a voyage would not enable the insured to 
recover as for the loss of the vessel. He held that the notion of insurance ‘for a voyage’ was 
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absurd. In his view, it would be a ‘double insurance’, and a policy to insure a voyage would 
be ‘illegal and unreasonable’. Necessarily, he distinguished the established cases. He noted 
that the policy in Pond prevented the insured from paying the salvage necessary to recover it 
– although it was back in England, the insured was not capable of recovering the property 
without forfeiting the policy. He stated that Depaba was authority for the proposition that 
there was no insurance on the voyage, though that interpretation is incompatible with the 
surviving report. Overall, Willes’ interpretation was that the issue was whether the ‘ship’ 
were deemed lost, not whether the ‘voyage’ was lost. In the House of Lords, Lord Hardwick 
Chancellor confirmed that the ‘cruze’ itself was not covered by the insurance. The 
Goodfellow was cited in 1814
124
 as authority that a claim for total loss could not be 
established on a policy covering a ship where it was undamaged, though that later case has 
been doubted
125
. The Goodfellow, though a House of Lords authority, seems to conflict with 
other authorities establishing there could be a loss of voyage on a marine policy.  
The law on wagering policies is distinguished from later policies on interest. Mansfield 
observed in Goss that in the wagering cases, because:  
‘the insured had no interest, so there could be no indemnity; and the only question 
was, whether the event had happened; and to determine this, it was necessary to set 
up something as making a total loss between third persons, though the ship was safe, 
in order to determine the question upon the wager’. 
The law banned wagering policies on the grounds of public policy
126
 by statute in 1745
127
. It 
is apparent in Goss that Mansfield LCJ distinguished wagering from valued policies and 
reached his decision on independent grounds. Occasionally, an error of drafting could mean 
that a policy took effect as a wager, not a policy for interest (e.g. The Emanuel, see 3.2.1), so 
the older law of wagers cannot be ignored. As previously explained, they remain important 
for the contemporary law because they were the means by which the doctrine of the ‘loss of 
the voyage’ entered English law. 
Decisions on wagers were divided as to whether an interruption to voyage completed before 
action constituted a ground for the insured to allege loss of the wager. Dapaba, The 
Salamander, The Dursley and Whitehead all support the idea that the mere interruption was a 
total loss of the wager. The Goodfellow is authority that the interruption alone is not. It was 
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supported by Spencer v Franco
128
, where no report survives, and dicta in Kullen Kemp which 
was ultimately decided on unrelated grounds (deviation). It is arguably too simplistic, given 
that both lines of authority were cited with approval in judgments on valued policies, to argue 
that Pole, being a House of Lords case, overruled the earlier decisions and settled the law
129
; 
it is more realistic to acknowledge that there were two conflicting lines of authority. Marshall 
(1802) attempted to reconcile Dapaiba with Pole by suggesting that Mansfield must have 
been mistaken in thinking that the policy was a wager policy, and argued that it was plain, 
from the judgment, that the court considered the plaintiff to have an interest in the ship
130
, but 
this analysis appears incompatible with the surviving report. This conflict of early authority 
contributes to the contemporary uncertainty over whether it is possible to claim for a ‘loss of 
a voyage’ on a ship, or just on cargo, and what that means in practice131. 
2.5.2 VALUED POLICIES  
Authorities on wagering policies were divided as to whether a claim could be made for the 
loss of voyage on a ship, where she physically survived and was recaptured. Eventually, the 
majority view on wagering policies prevailed, following De Paiba v Ludlow
132
. The earliest 
cases, e.g. Goss, and textbooks on valued policies suggest, contra the Goodfellow
 133
, that 
there could be a loss of voyage on a ship. Marshall noted the various dicta in Cazalet v St 
Barbe134: 
‘In the case of Jenkins v Mackenzie though the ship was brought into port yet the 
capture as between the insurer and the insured was a total loss. The true way of 
considering this case is that it was an insurance on the ship for the voyage and if 
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either the ship or the voyage be lost it will be a total loss but here neither was lost. 
The case of [the Selby (n 59)] is decisive
135’.  
There was no total loss in the Little Mary (1810)
136
. The ship-owners argued that the voyage, 
for a cargo of salt which had a seasonal market, had been lost. This was rejected; ‘[the 
authorities] assert generally, that wherever the voyage insured is defeated by any of the perils 
insured against, there is a total loss: but I find no authority which applies to the case where 
the ship was, or might have been in the hands of the owner in the country where the owners 
reside. The passage from the Guidon, c 7, s 1, which was the original authority on which Lord 
Mansfield relied in the case of Goss v Withers, does not apply to the ship…’. In Goss v 
Withers, it had been held that the voyage had been lost both on ship and cargo. It was stated 
that the case was ‘even stronger’ as for the cargo, but Mansfield also found a loss of the 
voyage on the ship. Nevertheless, Lawrence J in the Little Mary, following the arguments in 
the Goodfellow, found that there could not be loss of the voyage on the vessel. 
Some early authorities considered the speed at which the goods could be brought to the 
destination port relevant to the loss of the voyage. In Goss, Mansfield LCJ noted that by the 
arrival, the ‘lent-season for the sale of fish was over’137. In Manning v Newnham138 he said 
that an insured was not obliged to wait for a ship to carry insured cargo if the first ship was 
too damaged, so could claim for a total loss. Accordingly Mansfield LCJ considered 
insurance covered the particular voyage contemplated. Implicitly, a late arrival caused by an 
insured peril constituted a loss of that voyage, justifying an abandonment for a total loss. Of 
course, in Goss the fish had also rotted, but it is important that the court noted the limited 
season for the sale of fish at a higher value, which by then was over. So, the particular voyage 
was understood by Mansfield LCJ to refer to the intended market, providing a separate 
ground for abandonment separate from the cargo’s deterioration.  
Anderson v Wallis (the Confiance)(1813)
139
 contradicts this. The policy covered cargo for a 
voyage where ship and cargo were damaged by heavy weather.  The cargo was landed for the 
season, but the ship was repaired and completed the voyage the next year. It was argued that 
the loss of the voyage that season amounted to a loss of the voyage. Ellenborough LCJ held 
that the mere retardation of a voyage could never amount to a total loss, nor could it authorize 
an abandonment, saying; ‘disappointment of arrival was a new head of abandonment in 
                                                     
135
 (1786) 1 T. R 187, (1786) 99 ER 1044. 
136
 (n 49). 
137
 (n 21). 
138
(1782) 3 Dougl. 130; (1782) 99 ER 575 (KB). 
139
 (1813) 2 M. & S. 240, (1813) 105 ER 372. 
35 
 
insurance law’140. This restriction of the ‘loss of the voyage’ doctrine reflected his known 
view doubting the Goodfellow.  
In Falkner and Others v Ritchie (1814)
141
, the policy covered the ship on a voyage from Cadiz 
to ports in Africa and back. The crew seized her in an African port, and sailed her to South 
America, where they plundered the cargo. The following year, she was taken by an American 
ship, itself captured by a British privateer and manned by a British prize crew. The owners 
discovered the loss and the recapture at the same time, and issued proceedings. Ellenborough 
LCJ questioned ‘what has the loss of the voyage to do with the loss of the ship?’ Applying the 
Goodfellow, he ruled that the owner could not recover for a total loss. His reasoning was that 
the vessel was a total loss while captured, but that on recapture it became a partial loss 
(applying the Confiance (n 139) and doubting Goss). He said: 
‘And so in Anderson v. Wallis, the loss of the voyage was as complete as in this case: 
that was an insurance on goods; the ship had been driven by stress of weather into 
Kinsale, and the goods were forced to be relanded, and the voyage was lost for the 
season. The question was, whether the assured could abandon; and it was held that a 
retardation of the voyage was not a ground of abandonment, the goods still subsisting 
in specie. And in Everth v. Smith
142
, to which I at first alluded, the Court recognized 
that decision, and applied it to a case of freight, and held that a loss of the voyage 
contemplated by the assured was not a loss of the freight, freight having been 
afterwards earned. As to Goss v. Withers, there may be some doubt whether it is 
similar to the present case; and I must say that there is a looseness and generality in 
the expressions which have been borrowed in argument from that and the other case, 
that make one inclined to pause upon them. What has a loss of the voyage to do with 
the loss of the ship? On this subject there is so much good sense in the judgment of C. 
J. Willes in [the Goodfellow] that it may be of great use to resort to it in order to 
purify the mind from these generalities’. 
Bayley J. referred to the Little Mary (n 49), but his judgment was not recorded.  
Falkner v Ritchie was later doubted in Hudson and another v Harrison (1824), where Park J, 
said “I think that some of the cases on that subject cannot be supported to their full extent. I, 
for one, have never been able to comprehend the case of Falkner v Ritchie, which I have the 
less hesitation in avowing, inasmuch as the Lord Chancellor and Lord Redesdale have 
expressed themselves to labour under the same difficulty.” Save for being doubted in Hudson, 
Falkner does not seem to have received significant treatment in later authorities. Later, in the 
Friendship (1816)
143
, Ellenborough LCJ noted with regard to the loss of a vessel that the 
voyage had been lost while it was captured, though he did not expressly make that a ground 
for abandonment of the vessel. In Holdsworth v Wise (1828) it was held that ‘…in order to 
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justify an abandonment, there must have been that, in the course of the voyage, which at the 
time constituted a total loss. Thus, capture or the necessary desertion of the ship constitutes a 
total loss
144’. Accordingly, it seems that the presumption of total loss applied equally to the 
loss of the voyage as to the physical loss of the property.  
The separate doctrine of the voyage is difficult to apply practically. It is clearly settled that it 
applies to insurance on goods, but is unlikely to apply to the loss of the voyage on a vessel. It 
applies to a charterparty and to freight, where there is no physical subject matter for insurance 
to cover; loss of the voyage is the ground on which those losses are based. Further difficulties 
arise as to the precise definition of the ‘voyage’. Is the voyage the possibility of the goods 
ever arriving at the named destination? Or is it them arriving within the time contemplated? 
Goss seems to indicate the latter, although there is little authority on the precise meaning (the 
practical consequences of the doctrine in the modern law are considered at 4.2.7). 
 
2.6 REQUIREMENT TO LITIGATE IN A PRIZE COURT 
 
It was observed in Masefield that in Stringer the plaintiff was involved in the litigation in the 
American admiralty court to recover his property, and the English court investigated the 
chances of his success in that litigation. Was there ever a requirement on him to be involved 
in such litigation, and would an English court always assess the likelihood of success of 
possible litigation? Marshall stated otherwise: 
‘In general, whenever a ship is taken by the enemy, the insured may abandon, and 
demand as for a total loss; and he is not bound to make any claim or appeal in the 
enemy’s courts of admiralty, or to litigate there the validity of the capture145.  
  
The point was implicitly anticipated in Goss. An instant right of abandonment upon capture 
had no meaning if the insured was still required to involve himself in a potentially lengthy 
legal process on which the ultimate outcome of the insurance litigation depended. The policy 
of protecting the insured from that litigation uncertainty underpinned the decision to exclude 
property law considerations – including the spes recuperandi - from insurance law. 
  
Litigation requirement arose in Lozano v Janson (1859)
146
, where the court considered 
whether an insured should have provided security to a prize court holding his goods. In the 
circumstances, providing security was ‘un-commercial’, so that no reasonable merchant 
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would have done so. This case is unique in even considering this issue. Other authorities do 
not indicate that the insured ought to have become involved in prize litigation. If Lozano can 
be taken to have established the rule, overturning the law as expressed in Marshall that, so 
that an insured was now required to litigate in a prize court, the test of whether the security 
was a reasonable sum to pay was compared to the overall profit of the venture, rather than to 
the invoice price.  
 
The principle hinted at in Lozano, that an insured was required to consider giving security, 
does not seem to have been followed, not even in Stringer
147
, which influenced Masefield, and 
in which no obligation was imposed on the insured to institute prize proceedings before the 
American court. While the ship was first taken, when it was inevitable it would be taken 
before an American prize court: 
‘At this time, and upon the capture of the ship, it was competent for Walsh, the owner 
of the goods, if he had thought fit so to elect, to treat the case as a total loss (Kelly 
CB)’148 
 
The consideration of whether security should have been given by the insured only applied to 
the period after he had decided to involve himself in the legal process, thereby indicating that 
he wished to treat the property as his own, establishing an estoppel that prevented him from 
claiming for a total loss arising from the capture simpliciter. The court did not place an 
obligation on him to litigate, and the judgment is not authority that changed the established 
position that a notice of abandonment/claim could have been given at once. The number of 
cases where the consideration was not referred to, where the possibility of litigating from the 
captors must surely have existed, is a powerful argument that this was not a consideration 
which the courts ordinarily considered after a capture.  
 
2.7 THE PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS ON CAPTURE IN 1906 
 
There was clear authority from Mansfield LCJ in Goss in 1758 to the Romulus in 1908 
providing that a presumption of total loss arose on capture. The possibility of recapture was 
always recognised. That possibility, on the established authority of Goss, was irrelevant 
between insured and insurer. If the ship remained captured on the date of the action, it was a 
total loss. The only exception, the case of Stringer (see 3.2.8), does not undermine a 
presumption of permanent total loss, if abandonment is given promptly while the capture 
subsisted. Furthermore, no other case of capture considered the spes recuperandi. Tellingly, 
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some of the cases were decided in situations where there was a strong hope of recovery, Goss 
being the leading example. It is, therefore, difficult to reconcile the capture authorities with 
the idea in textbooks that the deprivation of possession had either to appear to be permanent, 
or repossession appear unlikely. Despite the criticism of the approach in Arnould
149
, and 
Michael Kerr QC’s ruling in the Dawson’s field arbitration, where he said ‘it is therefore 
dangerous to treat deprivation of possession simpliciter as a cause of total loss subject only to 
being turned into a partial loss by subsequent recovery
150
, it appears that the approach of the 
courts, including the House of Lords, prior to 1906, was exactly that. In the Friendship, the 
ratio was stated, ‘Capture operates as a total loss, unless it be redeemed by subsequent 
events’151. Arguably, a significant body of authority supported a presumption of total loss, and 
textbooks diluting or modifying this presumption erred.  
 
In Masefield, Steel J said that the context of the dicta in Dean v Hornby was Roux v 
Salvador
152
, a case of seawater damage to cargo. Although Roux is certainly important, the 
most apposite context for Dean was arguably provided by capture authorities surveyed above. 
The factual question that all the capture authorities addressed was whether the ship or cargo 
had been recovered by the date of the action. Of course it was true that if the ship or cargo 
were, and restored to the possession of the insured by that date, the total loss might be 
redeemed to a partial loss. If possession were restored different tests applied, some of which 
looked to future chances of economical repair or restoration. What is important are the 
material facts that the insured had to prove to establish total loss. Simply, an insured only had 
to demonstrate a subsisting capture as at the date of proceedings. An insured did not have to 
disprove a spes recuperandi existed where captors remained in control.  
 
Isolated extracts from the cases cited above support the view that capture might not operate as 
a total loss. In Goss, it was said: 
‘no capture is so total a loss that it is impossible any-thing can be recovered…There 
may be a capture with little or no prejudice, and there may be circumstances that 
make it only an average loss; as if the master immediately ransoms her and proceeds 
on his voyage, here the assured may not elect to abandon’.  
 
However, if quoted to say that capture was not necessarily a total loss, it is only because in 
that extract Mansfield envisaged a situation where there had been a capture which had 
already ended, and not because he considered a situation where the capture might end. The 
possibility of a ransom payment being made was not an issue for consideration, and would 
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only become relevant where the payment had already been made by the time of abandonment. 
Further, in Milles v Fletcher, it was said by Mansfield LCJ: 
 
‘It was not contended, that a capture necessarily amounts to a total loss as between 
insurer and insured; nor, on the other hand, that on a capture and recapture, there 
may not be a total loss, though there remain some material tangible part of the ship 
and cargo’ might undermine the view that a capture was a total loss153.  
 
However, in context, the doubt about whether a capture was a total loss referred to the 
possibility of a recapture actually having occurred by the time notice was given, not whether 
it might occur. The fact that it might not necessarily remain a total loss on restoration refers to 
the possibility that it might be undamaged. Accordingly, while selective quotation might 
produce dicta in support of the contemporary view that the spes recuperandi was always to be 
considered on a subsisting capture, a proper consideration of the pre-1906 cases refutes the 
idea that a capture might be anything other than a total loss while it actually subsisted, even 
where a strong spes recuperandi existed.  
 
Further, the idea that the spes recuperandi had to be considered is incompatible with the idea 
that an insured could abandon immediately. An instant abandonment is opposed to the ‘wait 
and see’ approach. All the academic commentary supported the idea that an abandonment 
could be made instantly, which further supports the rule that the spes was not a requirement of 
a plaintiffs case. For example, in 1787, a textbook endorsed by Mansfield LCJ stated:  
‘[On policies with an interest] …in cases of capture the underwriter is immediately 
responsible to the insured. But if the ship be recovered before a demand for indemnity 
the insurer is only liable for the amount of the loss actually sustained at the time of 
the demand or if the ship be restored at any time subsequent to the payment by the 
underwriter he shall then stand in the place of the insured and receive all the benefits 
and advantages resulting from such restitution. All these regulations certainly have 
their foundation in the great principles of equity and justice, an observation which 
must be obvious to every-one who recollects that a policy of insurance is nothing 
more than a contract of indemnity
154.’ 
 
 
Those pre-1906 Act rules were clear. They allowed an insured to know at all times where he 
stood in relation to his insurance. Although Mansfield LCJ recognised that ransom would end 
a case of total loss by capture, tellingly, not a single subsequent case considers even the 
possibility of a ransom payment being offered. Arguably, that is evidence for the courts not 
only ignoring a physical spes recuperandi, such as recapture, but also a restoration by paying 
ransom, in capture cases. The silence on the issue in the reported cases is a powerful 
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argument that the law, prior to the 1906 Act, never looked to ransom payments to undermine 
a subsisting total loss on capture. After a recapture, it was possible for an insured to pay prize 
to the recaptor, and that was a proper method of regaining possession. However, it is 
dangerous to confuse those two issues. Under the common-law rules, in Masefield, the 
claimant would have been able to claim constructive total loss: capture would be construed to 
be permanent, regardless of the spes recuperandi. That, however, is not how the pre-1906 law 
is recalled in more modern cases including Rix LJ in Masefield. The confusion in recent 
authorities arises: (i) from conflating statements on whether a notice of abandonment was 
necessary with the test of whether a loss had occurred, (ii) from errors citing the earlier law; 
and (iii) pleading without reference to a presumption of total loss at all.  
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CHAPTER III  NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT AND FORESEEABILITY 
 
Chapter II demonstrated that before 1906 the spes recuperandi could not undermine the 
insured’s right to abandon and recover for a total loss where capture subsisted at the date of 
the action. There was a presumption of irretrievable deprivation on capture that even a strong 
spes would not displace. This chapter considers the two contexts in which the spes 
recuperandi was relevant. First, it notes obiter statements and academic commentary stating 
the spes was relevant in a capture context. This was by attempting to formulate a ‘universal’ 
test for total loss covering all perils. These statements had not, by 1906, disturbed the 
presumption on capture – the law applied a different approach to different maritime perils. 
Practically, the spes was only considered in one capture case, where, unusually, the insured 
had not abandoned promptly, but claimed several years after capture. Secondly, it considers in 
what situations a ‘notice of abandonment’ was required, where the spes was relevant.  This 
chapter questions whether these rules undermined the presumption of total loss on a 
subsisting capture, and concludes that they do not. This chapter is necessary to contextualise 
statements which, in isolation, suggest the spes could undermine a total loss claim on capture. 
It demonstrates that these statements went no further than describing when notice was 
required.   
 
3.1 FORESEEABILITY AND THE SPES RECUPERANDI 
3.1.1 EARLY LAW 
The earliest statements on wreck indicated that a vessel’s wreck or submersion established 
total loss, assuming no chance of recovery existed. Submersion was treated as total 
destruction, and in Goss capture was stated as equal to a vessel’s submersion. The reason was 
‘during the submersion the ship ceased to exist for any useful purpose’. In Anderson v Royal 
Exch. Assur. Co
155
, it was held that while hides were submerged, they might have been treated 
as a total loss. The same was stated in The Commerce
156
. There was no investigation into the 
chance of recovery in these cases. The simple issue was whether ship or cargo had in fact 
been raised or recovered by the date of the action. Whether the ship or cargo was submerged 
in deep or shallow water was irrelevant
157
. Accordingly, the early law of capture, submersion, 
and destruction/wreck were identical: the chance of recovery was not investigated. Naturally, 
the courts recognised that a spes recuperandi existed after capture, but this went only to 
whether notice of abandonment was necessary (Chapter 3.2).  
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3.1.2 ‘LOSS IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE PROBABLE’ 
The idea that the court investigate future chances when assessing total loss evolved gradually. 
Ellenborough LCJ innovatively suggested that the court assess future chances in the 
Confiance (1813)
158
; ‘… there is not any case nor principle which authorises an 
abandonment, unless where the loss has been actually a total loss, or in the highest degree 
probable, at the time of abandonment’. The words ‘in the highest degree probable’ indicate 
that an insured might anticipate a total loss. The remark was obiter, and did not derive from 
either judicial or academic authority. It was widely copied in textbooks. 
3.1.3 GENERAL TEST: ‘UNCERTAINTY’ AFTER STRANDING 
Storey J’s judgment in the New York case of Peele (the Argonaut)159 was a landmark in the 
development of the test of total loss. It has been widely cited as defining a constructive total 
loss (then a ‘technical total loss’). The Argonaut stranded and was abandoned by her owners. 
Those present thought her destruction so certain that even her rigging was removed, in 
addition to her cargo. The chances of her disintegrating on rocks were estimated as ‘9 out of 
10’, and ‘certain’. Unexpectedly, the weather eased and she was re-floated by the 
underwriters. They repaired her and denied total loss. Storey surveyed the English cases on 
capture and abandonment after stranding. Having considered the individual examples, and 
noted The Argonaut presented a novel situation, he formulated a general test of total loss 
applicable to novel situations.  
Much of his judgment restated established English rules of total loss on capture. However, 
some passages indicated that Storey assessed the spes recuperandi. First, he restated 
Ellenborough’s dictum that abandonment was justified if the loss was ‘in the highest degree 
probable’160, stating:  
‘I take the language of Lord Ellenborough, in Anderson v. Wallis to convey the 
correct notion of the law on this subject. An absolute total loss is not necessary to 
justify an abandonment. It is sufficient, if at the time it be in the highest degree 
probable, to found judgments acting upon all the facts
161’. 
Next, he stated:  
‘I lay great stress on these last words, because it is manifest from the case, that they 
were used with reference to a technical total loss, and shew that the right of 
abandonment does not always depend upon the certainty, but upon the high 
probability of a total loss either of the property or voyage, or both. And in one of the 
latest cases ever decided by the same learned judge, he uses expressions indicating a 
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perfect coincidence with the opinion of Lord Mansfield. He there observed, "the mere 
restitution of the hull, if the plaintiff may eventually pay more for it than it is worth, is 
not a circumstance by which the totality of the loss is reduced to an average loss’ 162.  
 
So Storey stated three tests justifying a total loss where the loss is prospective, ‘the highest 
degree probable,’ ‘the high probability’ that the loss will be total, and ‘if the insured may’ pay 
too much. The “uncertainty” test in respect of paying too much only applied after restoration 
had in fact occurred. None of these tests applied to capture simpliciter. So far, Storey repeated 
rules from English authorities. He then addressed the novel situation of stranding: 
 
‘What is a total loss in cases of sea damage, stranding and shipwreck? It is stated, 
and the position seems incontrovertible, that the mere stranding of the ship is not of 
itself to be deemed a total loss, so as to entitle the insured immediately to abandon.
163
 
The reason is obvious. It may occasion but a slight injury easily repaired, and the 
vessel may be gotten off with a small expense, and the retardation of the voyage be 
trivial and unimportant. But the stranding may be attended with circumstances which 
would justify an abandonment, even though the hull of the ship should not be 
materially damaged’. 
 
The peril of stranding was treated differently to that of capture. On stranding, as in sea 
damage, the court would not presume a total loss, but would investigate the probability of the 
stranded ship being wrecked or re-floated. This was a new test: stranding had not been tested 
before. Storey formulated a general rule intended to encompass all situations when an insured 
could abandon, justifying his treatment of stranding. Inadvertently, this blurred the distinction 
between the different specific examples of total loss he had previously summarised: 
 
‘We are therefore driven back upon general principles, and must extract them, as we 
may, from the current of authorities, to aid us in the present inquiry. The right of 
abandonment has been admitted to exist where there is a forcible dispossession or 
ouster of the owner of the ship, as in cases of capture; where there is a moral 
restraint or detention, which deprives the owner of the free use of the ship, as in case 
of embargoes, blockades, and arrests by sovereign authority; where there is a present 
total loss of the physical possession and use of the ship, as in case of submersion; 
where there is a total loss of the ship for the voyage, as in case of shipwreck, so that 
the ship cannot be repaired for the voyage in the port, where the disaster happens; 
and, lastly, where the injury is so extensive, that by reason of it the ship is useless, 
and yet the necessary repairs would exceed her present value. None of these cases 
will, I imagine, be disputed’. 
 
 
This accurately reduced the rules expressed in the English authorities. This did not introduce 
any test of the spes into a case of capture or submersion that the subject matter will not be 
restored. However, he continued: 
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‘If there be any general principle, that pervades and governs them, it seems to be this, 
that the right to abandon exists, whenever from the circumstances of the case, the 
ship, for all the useful purposes of a ship for the voyage, is, for the present, gone from 
the control of the owner, and the time when she will be restored to him in a state to 
resume the voyage is uncertain, or unreasonably distant, or the risk and expense are 
disproportionate to the expected benefit and objects of the voyage. In such a case, the 
law deems the ship, though having a physical existence, as ceasing to exist for 
purposes of utility, and therefore subjects her to be treated as lost...
164
 Try the 
Argonaut by the test of such a rule, and it is not difficult to come to the conclusion, 
that the plaintiffs had a good cause of abandonment
165’. 
 
 
This extract was very influential. The 1857 Arnould adopted it as the paradigm definition of 
constructive total loss and it remains in the 17
th
 edition
166
. It must be remembered that Storey 
J stated expressly that he had not desired to change the law, merely apply existing law. 
Innovatively, this states a test based on uncertainty as to the time that the ship might be 
restored. If applied to capture, the test in Peele conflates the rule (an immediate right of 
abandonment) with the justification for the rule (the uncertainty as to restitution). It is 
doubtful that Peele constituted sufficient authority to change the settled law of capture: Peele 
was a case of stranding not capture - accordingly any observations on capture were obiter. If 
it did, it is unclear whether it would have introduced a test of ‘uncertainty’ as to whether 
restoration would occur at all, or of restoration being ‘unreasonably distant’ despite 
restoration appearing probable. While Peele arguably did not change the law on capture, this 
extract attracted significant academic attention during the nineteenth century, to the exclusion 
in academic works of the actual tests from capture cases. 
 
Marshall noted that the policy considerations on abandonment following capture differed 
considerably from those following stranding. He noted that there was no instant right of 
abandonment or a presumption of total loss after stranding, but that there was following 
capture:  
 
‘Where, as in the case of capture, the thing insured, and every part of it, is completely 
gone out of the power of the insured, it is just and proper that he should recover at 
once as for a total loss, and leave the spes recuperandi to the insurer who will have 
the benefit of a recapture, or of any other accident by which the thing may be 
recovered. But it seems, at first sight, impolitic, not to say unreasonable, that the 
owner of a ship which is stranded, (the captain and crew being his servants, on the 
spot, and in possession of the ship and cargo), should be at liberty to abandon there 
to a number of underwriters who sometimes find it difficult to act in concert, and who 
have, perhaps, no means of disposing of the property thus thrown upon their hands, 
but to the greatest disadvantage
167’. 
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The consensus was apparently that, although it was obvious that there remained uncertainty as 
to restoration in both stranding and capture situations, the law treated the perils differently. 
However, the textbooks began to blur the tests applicable to separate classes of factual 
situation. Arnould, citing Peele
168
, but explaining the perils of arrest and/or embargo, not 
stranding (although not yet capture and/or seizure) stated: 
‘There is a right of abandonment in all cases where the is an apparent probability 
that the owner’s loss of the free use and disposal of his ship, once total, by the arrest 
or embargo may be of long, or, at all events, of very uncertain continuance
169’.  
Evidently, academic works began to use the general test formulated by Storey J for novel 
situations to produce a general test covering the established situations. This thesis argues that 
established judicially stated rules in capture and seizure situations could not be changed by 
such a process in textbooks. The requirement for a court to guess how long a capture might 
last was never stated judicially, but was explicitly excluded from Goss and subsequent cases. 
Can an academic statement change established tests endorsed by appellate courts? Arguably, 
it is incorrect to so suggest. 
Later, Brett LJ in Kaltenbach v MacKenzie adopted a similar test for the right of 
abandonment, which might be read as to include an assessment of the ‘chance’ of a loss being 
total: 
‘Now, sometimes the information which he receives discloses at once the imminent 
danger of the subject-matter of insurance becoming and continuing a total loss; as, for 
instance, if he hears his ship is captured in time of war, it must be obvious to everybody, 
unless the ship is re-captured, it would be a total loss
170’. 
However, the better reading is that this does not disturb the rule that a court would presume a 
total loss if the loss in fact subsisted on the date of the writ. It does not insert an assessment of 
that probability into the test of total loss on the date of the writ. ‘The imminent danger’ 
referred to is the chance of the loss ‘continuing’, i.e. that there will not be a restoration 
between abandonment and the date of the writ. 
3.1.4 THE ‘PRUDENT MAN NOT INSURED’ 
Roux v Salvador was the source of a dictum which has been held to define the difference 
between actual and constructive losses, and is used in the 17
th
 edition of Arnould to define an 
actual total loss: 
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‘The underwriter engages that the object of the assurance shall arrive in safety at its 
destined termination. If, in the progress of the voyage, it becomes totally destroyed or 
annihilated, or if it be placed, by reason of the perils against which he insures, in 
such a position, that it is wholly out of the power of the assured or of the underwriter 
to procure its arrival, he is bound by the very letter of his contract to pay the sum 
insured’ 171. 
 
However, this must be considered in the context of an earlier dictum in Roux, ’if, though 
imperishable, they [goods] are in the hands of strangers not under the control of the 
assured... the loss is, in its nature, total to him who has no means of recovering his goods’.  
The definition continues: 
 
‘But there are intermediate cases – there may be a capture, which, though prima 
facie a total loss, may be followed by a recapture, which would revest the property in 
the assured. There may be a forcible detention which may speedily terminate, or may 
last so long as to end in the impossibility of bringing the ship or the goods to their 
destination. There may be some other peril which renders the ship unnavigable, 
without any reasonable hope of repair or by which the goods are partly lost, or so 
damaged, that they are not worth the expense of bringing them, or what remains of 
them, to their destination. In all these or any similar case, if a prudent man not 
insured, would decline any further expense in prosecuting an adventure, the 
termination of which will probably never be successfully accomplished, a party 
may… treat the case as one of a total loss…if he elects to do this… the very principle 
of the indemnity requires that he should make a cession of all his right to the recovery 
of it, and that too, within a reasonable time after he receives the intelligence of the 
accident…’ 
 
 
The relevant question is whether the dicta in Roux were sufficient to change the approach to 
capture cases, by introducing an element of foreseeability as to whether the capture would 
end, or could be brought to an end.  
 
The circumstances in which an insured ‘would decline any further expense’ occurred after 
recapture in Goss, not before. It is difficult to imagine, considering that the court did not 
discuss ransom payments in Goss (despite then being permissible), what expense could arise 
on capture simpliciter. It was not suggested that there was any way of bribing a pirate to obey 
an owner’s orders. The situations where the owner had been held to have had the means of 
recovering his vessel were, until Roux, all situations where the vessel had been in the hands of 
recaptors. Alternatively, one can imagine an insured occasioning extra expense ‘towards 
prosecuting a venture’, by spending money on salvage or on tugs, or any other type of 
assistance on stranding, or indeed after re-capture or salvage, on, for example, repairs, where 
the insured remains in possession/control. It is suggested that it is this meaning that is 
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consistent with the earlier authorities, so is inherently more likely to have been the one 
intended – and this does not disturb the presumption on capture. 
 
Despite its popularity in textbooks, the extract was, strictly, obiter. The ratio in Roux was that 
after a necessary sale of cargo, where the destruction of the goods appeared to be inevitable, it 
was unnecessary to give a notice of abandonment to claim a total loss. Roux does not, 
therefore, quite anticipate the definitions under s 60 of the Act. If the destruction seemed 
inevitable, it would be a case of constructive loss under s 60 and a notice of abandonment 
would be necessary. The ratio was not that the sale had occurred, which would have 
conformed with the then contemporary authority on capture. Further, the dictum in Roux 
contradicts the then established case of the Tartar
172
, which held that capture was akin to 
shipwreck and therefore physical destruction. Arguably, therefore, Roux could not operate to 
change the established rules in capture cases.  
 
3.1.5 CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH RENDERED IT DOUBTFUL WHETHER IT WOULD EVER BE RESTORED 
In Stringer and Others v The English and Scottish Marine Insurance Company (1870)
173
, the 
policy covered goods shipped to America. The vessel was captured by the American navy in 
1863, and was carried to New Orleans where part of the cargo was expected to be 
condemned. The insured did not abandon, as he hoped eventually to recover his goods 
through legal processes, expecting a profitable market if he could recover possession. A prize 
court was convened at New Orleans. The Americans argued that the goods, including the 
insured’s, were a lawful prize as contraband of war. That suit took far longer than the insured 
expected. The insured could have had his goods returned at any time, had he given sufficient 
security to the New Orleans court – but the Exchequer Chamber, and apparently other 
uninsured cargo interests –considered that no sane man would have given security, given the 
value of the greenback at the time, against fluctuations in the value of the dollar. After 18 
months, the goods were held an unlawful seizure and restitution ordered. However, the 
captors appealed. The American court subsequently sold the goods, and ordered the proceeds 
distributed according to prize law. Only then did the insured claim on his insurance policy, 
alleging a total loss. Three factual situations arose from the circumstances at various times: 
initially capture simpliciter, secondly on-going detention after no notice was given; and 
thirdly judicial sale: 
(i) In relation to capture simpliciter, Blackburn J, in the Queen’s Bench Division, said; 
‘It is clear at this time the cargo was, by one of the perils insured against, taken 
                                                     
172
 (n 67) and cf Goss. 
173
 (1870) L R 5 QB 599 
48 
 
entirely out of the control of the assured, under circumstances which rendered it 
doubtful whether it would ever be restored, or if restored, at what period. Under such 
circumstances, the assured has a right to elect whether he will retain the property in 
himself and treat the loss as a partial one, or abandon it to the underwriters and 
claim for a total loss’. On the insured’s appeal, Kelly CB agreed with that assessment 
of the original loss. However, the insured did not abandon then, thereby estopping 
himself from claiming for a total loss on the fact of the capture simpliciter (see 3.2). 
(ii) The court also speculated, obiter in light of its findings that sale justified a claim 
without notice of abandonment, whether the continued detention, where notice of 
abandonment had not been given, justified a total loss claim with a late notice of 
abandonment. Further, it considered whether such a total loss claim would have been 
defeated by the insured’s failure to give security. The factual situation had not 
changed and there was no new fact that could justify a fresh total loss, prior to the 
sale. By considering whether a reasonable party would have paid security, the court 
effectively considered the spes recuperandi in this context. However, Stringer does 
not in fact introduce a consideration of the spes after capture simpliciter. The 
consideration of whether the payment would have been likely to secure the ship 
related rather to the duty on the insured after it had reached the prize court. It 
considered the hope of recovery from an established legal process rather than forceful 
recapture, or ransom, but it stands in stark contrast to other authorities on capture. It 
might be taken, therefore, to introduce a requirement on an insured to stand surety or 
make a payment to a foreign prize or admiralty court in every case of capture or 
seizure by a state. Such a rule would have been innovative,
174
 and this is not what the 
case establishes. Arguably, properly considered, the court’s speculation in Stringer 
was insufficient to found a rule that an insured had to pay prize, or would have to pay 
ransom in similar situations, and that failure to do so would defeat a total loss claim. 
(iii) After the judicial sale, Kelly CB held that the goods were totally lost. Concurring, 
Martin B stated that ‘totally lost… [is an] ambiguous expression – but [by the sale the 
goods] were taken entirely from the owner’s dominion and control, and were 
absolutely taken away from him’. There was, after the sale, no chance of the goods 
being recovered in specie, which was a change of circumstances which justified a 
fresh claim for a total loss. The court did not make any further observations on 
whether the initial capture had justified a total loss. This was simply following the 
decisions in Idle v Royal Exchange Assurance Company (the Ajax) (1819)
175
 and the 
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Martha
176
, that sale justified a total loss claim without notice of abandonment (see 
3.2). 
Effectively, Stringer states that there had been a right of abandonment on the initial capture, 
which in fact supports the presumption of total loss on capture. It should be noted that the 
plaintiff in Stringer was not required to prove that it was unlikely that he would recover his 
goods, only that he was required to prove that it was not commercially sensible for him to 
have paid the surety, a development of the test of mercantile impossibility/the prudent 
insured. The dictum of the court notes that that payment was of course not commercially 
sensible, and it does not disturb the established presumption of total loss. It is not an authority 
that capture was not an actual total loss, but a simple example of the insured failing to give a 
notice of abandonment, and showing by his conduct that he wished to treat the property as his 
own, not the insurer’s. The following situation considers where notice of abandonment was 
necessary.  
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3.2 NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT 
 
A notice of abandonment is an early indication to the insurer - no method of service is fixed 
by law or statute - that the insured intends to claim a total loss. It functioned as an alternative 
to a limitation period, protecting the insurer from late claims and allowing it the opportunity 
to attempt to preserve/recover the property. 
3.2.1 GENERAL RULE: ABANDONMENT ALWAYS NECESSARY 
Notice was given in all the earliest cases on policies for interest. The eighteenth century 
reports indicate that notice was expected. Kulen Kemp v Vigne (The Emanuel) (1786)
177
 
concerned an interruption to the voyage covered by a wagering policy.  The cargo owners 
insured the safe arrival of the vessel, in which they had no interest. She was captured by a 
privateer, but restored, after which she sailed for a different destination port from that named 
in the policy. She was subsequently captured by the Spanish and abandoned while she was 
before a prize court. That court released her on appeal, and she was ultimately lost at sea. The 
ratio in the English court was that the insured could not recover because the loss was by 
deviation, as she was lost on the new voyage. Mansfield held that by insuring the vessel not 
the cargo the policy was effectively a wager and not a policy for interest: ‘A necessary 
consequence of this being a wagering policy is, that the insured cannot abandon: but, even 
supposing it to be a policy on interest, it is enough to say, that in this case the parties never 
did abandon
178’. ‘Abandon’ here means ‘give notice of abandonment’. Notice could not be 
given on a wagering policy, but had to be given on policies for interest. The necessity for a 
notice of abandonment distinguished policies for interest from claims on wagering policies.  
In Kaltenbach v MacKenzie, abandonment was described as the custom of parties to 
insurance, only later becoming a condition precedent to recovery
179
. These authorities suggest 
notice of abandonment was always needed. In Goss, Mansfield LCJ noted that, ‘in all cases 
the insured may chuse not to abandon
180’. Here, ‘abandon’ probably means ‘give notice of 
abandonment’ (mirroring his use of ‘abandon’ in the Selby). Consistently, in the Selby he had 
stated that the: 
‘insured is not obliged to abandon, in any case: he has an election. No right can vest 
as for a total loss, till he has made that election. He can not elect before advice is 
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received of the loss: if that advice shews the peril to be over, and the thing in safety, 
he cannot elect at all; because he has no right to abandon, when the thing is safe
181’. 
In Goss notice of abandonment, expressed within the insured’s ‘election’, was required in all 
circumstances to claim for a total loss. In The Lady Mansfield (1787)
182
 notice of 
abandonment was not served for two or three years after the capture. Buller J explained 
‘Where the voyage is lost, but the property is saved, the owners have an option to abandon; 
but that unless they do elect to abandon, it is only an average loss’183. In Tunno v Edwards184 
the insured cargo was seized by the Dutch government and returned after the insurer had by 
agreement compensated the insured for 50% of his loss. The insurer issued proceedings 
claiming back the money it had paid, arguing that he had been overcompensated for a total 
loss. Lord Ellenborough CJ ruled that ‘…in order to have made it a total loss, there ought to 
have been an abandonment, which there has not been; therefore there is no ground for the 
underwriter's claim’. As there was no abandonment there was no payment for a total loss. 
Later, in Davy and another v Milford, Ellenborough LCJ stated a slightly wider rule that ‘It 
was decided in the case of Anderson v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company
185
, that in 
order to constitute a total loss, where the thing insured subsists in specie, there must be an 
abandonment in time to the underwriters’186. In Holdsworth v Wise (1828), it was restated that 
‘If the subject-matter of insurance ultimately exists in specie, so as to be capable of being 
restored to the hands of the assured, there cannot be a total loss unless there had been an 
abandonment’187. 
Confusingly, ‘abandon’ has another meaning. Mansfield also stated in Goss, ’[t]he 
subsequent title to restitution arising from the recapture, at a great expense of the ship 
disabled to pursue her voyage, cannot take away a right, vested in the insured at the time of 
the capture. But because he cannot recover more than he has suffered, he must abandon what 
may be saved
188’. Here ‘abandon’ refers to the rights that the insurer takes in whatever 
physically remains rather than to the ‘notice’. This alternative use of ‘abandon’ is a source of 
confusion in academic commentary.  
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3.2.2 TIME NOTICE MUST BE GIVEN: 
In The Lady Mansfield, Buller J held that an insured had to serve notice of abandonment in 
order to claim for a total loss on capture ‘within a reasonable time’, that meaning, ‘as soon as 
they were informed of events’. Ashhurst J stated that the assured was bound to decide, and 
signify his election to the underwriters at the ‘first opportunity189’. If the master or recaptor 
continued to act for the insured’s interest after the casualty, and the insured was notified of 
the events, then failure to abandon would be construed as the insured’s adoption of the acts of 
the master or recaptor, effectively estopping abandonment. That was compared to the notice 
which was necessary to be given to the drawer of a bill of exchange, in case of non-payment, 
which if the holder omitted to do, he was considered as giving credit to the acceptor. The case 
established that the ‘sue and labour clause’ did not allow the insured an indefinite time to 
decide whether to abandon, even if that time were within a relevant limitation period: the 
requirement promptly to tender notice of abandonment prevailed. In Davy v Milford the court 
confirmed notice had to be given ‘as soon as the insured was informed of events’.   
In Kaltenbach v MacKenzie
190
 the court found that the insured failed to demonstrate that there 
had been sufficient damage to the vessel to justify the abandonment. Giving a general 
statement of the law, Brett LJ stated that the law gave an opportunity to investigate if the facts 
were not immediately clear to the insured:   
‘… immediately the assured has reliable information of such damage to the subject-
matter of insurance as that there is imminent danger of its becoming a total loss, then 
he must at once, unless there be some reason to the contrary, give notice of 
abandonment; but if the information which he first receives is not sufficient to enable 
him to say whether there is that imminent danger, then he has a reasonable time to 
acquire full information as to the state and nature of the damage done to the ship’191. 
 
This extract refined the requirement; if a reasonable insured party would conclude that there 
was a danger of a total loss, there must be an abandonment then. Although introducing a test 
of foreseeability of total loss, it does not change the test of total loss on capture. This appears 
to remain the contemporary law. Interestingly, in the 1982 arbitration, the Bamruri, the 
learned arbitrator found that there was a valid notice of abandonment even though it was 
served a year after the detention
192
. There appears to be little authority for granting the insured 
this much more time. This is a potential trap for insureds – if ‘wait-and-see’ is the approach 
taken, then they are discouraged from abandoning early, yet are potentially vulnerable to the 
argument that abandonment has not been in time if they do in fact wait.  
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3.2.3 WHERE NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT UNNECESSARY 
 
Exceptions allowing insured to recover without serving notice appear during the first third of 
the nineteenth century. These situations did not precisely correspond with those of statutory 
actual total losses. Interestingly, academic commentary listed more exceptions than are 
recorded in the reported cases. 
 NOTICE NECESSARY AFTER CAPTURE 
The first exception to the general rule that notice was necessary was on the physical 
destruction of the ship: this was settled by the early nineteenth century. By drawing 
comparisons to shipwreck, there were three unsuccessful attempts to allege a total loss after 
capture without abandonment. Counsel for the insurer submitted in Tunno
193
 that  ‘The 
seizure and confiscation by the Dutch Government was in its nature a total loss at the time; 
and though there was in fact no abandonment, yet that is not necessary where the spes 
recuperandi is gone; as where the goods are sunk at sea’194. Ellenborough CJ disagreed, 
oversving: ‘After the seizure it remained contingent whether it would be a total loss or not; 
and in order to make it so, should not the assured have given notice of abandonment? There 
was nothing but the possibility remaining, the spes recuperandi, of getting back the goods, 
which could have prevented the payment of a total loss; for this was a valued policy’. 
Accordingly, Ellenborough LCJ’s obiter opinion was that a notice of abandonment was 
necessary after enemy capture. Importantly, he did not intend to introduce a requirement for 
the insured to plead that recovery was unlikely on a subsisting capture, but simply indicated 
that a notice should be given. In Goldsmid v Gillies
195
 it was argued that there was no need for 
a notice of abandonment on a capture. Gibbs J ruled: ‘I do not state that upon seizure the 
plaintiff might not sue for a total loss without abandonment but after the restoration no 
abandonment having been in the meantime that which was for a time a total loss is an 
average loss and then all that is restored is restored the benefit of the assured not of the 
underwriter.’ However, this statement is isolated, and does not seem to have been followed in 
other authorities. Accordingly, the law appeared settled that after a capture, a notice of 
abandonment had to be given. Importantly, the recognition of the spes recuperandi did not 
mean that hope had to be ‘unlikely’.  
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The Minerva (1812) was eventually resolved as a case of deviation
196
, but in an early hearing, 
it was pleaded as capture
197
. Interestingly, it was submitted that as the spes recuperandi was 
irrelevant to the question of enemy capture, there was no need for a notice of abandonment: 
‘In case of hostile capture, notice of abandonment is not necessary: so if the thing insured 
goes to the bottom of the sea. But here there is no question of hostile seizure; this country was 
not at war with Sweden. This is the case of detention by princes, where abandonment is 
necessary.' Ellenborough LCJ intervened saying ‘Abandonment is only necessary to make a 
constructive total loss’. Possibly Ellenborough LCJ considered the idea that hostile capture 
did not require a notice of abandonment. However, his judgment simply stated; ‘I hope that 
nothing which has been said during the discussion of this day will induce any person to 
forego the practice of abandonment, which is very convenient. But we are clearly of opinion 
in this case, that there should be a new trial’. It records that the practice of the industry was to 
give a notice of abandonment in all cases of loss
198
. It would remain the practice of the 
insurance market to give notice of abandonment in cases of what would be considered actual 
total loss until at least the 1850s
199
.  
 
 JUSTIFIABLE SALE FOLLOWING DAMAGE OR STRANDING 
The justifiable sale of the vessel by the insured following stranding or damage became 
another exception where notice was not required. Idle v Royal Exchange Assurance Company 
(the Ajax) (1819)
200
 concerned a ship damaged by a storm. She grounded on rocks, and the 
captain, fearing she would disintegrate, sold her. No notice of abandonment was given. In 
argument it was said, ‘[in] Hodgson v. Blackiston201 it was held, that although the ship was 
sold, an abandonment was necessary. And in Martin v. Crohatt
202
, Ellenborough CJ said, 
“Where the thing insured subsists in specie, an abandonment is necessary, if it be necessary 
in any case; and if, upon the happening of such a peril, which suspends the voyage and 
induces the necessity of repair, the owners choose to make it a total loss, they ought to give 
notice of abandonment”. Dallas CJ held that a notice of abandonment had not been necessary: 
‘… the assured are entitled to recover, unless in point of form an abandonment of freight was 
necessary. As to this, I shall only say, without meaning to lay down any general rule, and 
confining the judgment of the Court to the facts before us, that we think it was not necessary 
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in this particular case.’ Accordingly, it established a justified sale as another situation where 
notice was not required, although it was stated not to be a general rule.  
In Cambridge v Anderton (The Commerce)
203
 the vessel grounded and was damaged. The 
costs of repair were deemed un-commercial, and it was doubtful that she could be repaired. 
She was sold. The purchaser repaired her, and she performed a voyage. Abbott CJ held that 
the vessel had been a wreck, and a total loss. Bayley J said: ‘if, by means of any of the perils 
insured against, the ship ceases to retain that character and becomes a wreck, that is a total 
loss, and the master may sell her, and the assured may recover for a total loss, without giving 
any notice of abandonment. This was decided in Read v. Bonham
204’. Holroyd J went further, 
and said, ‘Where the damage sustained makes the loss a total loss, it is unnecessary to give 
notice of abandonment’. Accordingly, notice was unnecessary if a vessel were wrecked. 
Interestingly, earlier extracts stated that a ship captured was to be treated like a wreck. The 
early insurance law on wrecks/submersion was not suited to advances in salvage technology: 
and it was then possible for a ‘wreck’ – a total loss by physical destruction, and a ship fully 
submerged – to be repaired. Arguably, the Commerce fell within the Ajax exception as the 
sale appeared to be justified. However, the judgment was expressed in different language. It is 
unclear, however, whether the reason for that abandonment was unnecessary was because she 
was a ‘wreck’, or because she had been sold – in view of her repair it was arguably her sale. 
Damage alone, without sale, remained a situation where notice was required. In Fleming v 
Smith (1848), the House of Lords heard argument on whether a notice of abandonment was 
necessary where a vessel insured on a time policy was damaged by heavy seas. It was said for 
the insurer: 
‘[The law] confines the right so to recover, without first giving notice of 
abandonment, to cases where the ship has been destroyed as a ship, and is a mere 
congeries of planks. The cases of [the Tartar (n 67)], Roux v. Salvador [n 64], and 
[the Friendship (n 109)], are all to the same effect, the reason being that where the 
very form of the ship is destroyed, the underwriter cannot be better or worse for the 
abandonment; but that shews that where it is not so destroyed, he is entitled to notice 
of abandonment. [the Selby]
205
, Martin v. Crokatt (14 East, 465), Irving v. Manning 
in the Court of Common Pleas (1 Com. Bench, 168), Bell v. Nixon (1 Holt, 423), 
Toung v. Turing (2 Man. and Gr. 593 ; 2 Scott, N. R. 752), all tend to the same point, 
and shew the marked distinction which exists between an actual and a constructive 
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total loss, and that notice of abandonment is necessarily incident to the latter class of 
cases
206.’ 
 
Charles Pepys LC, with whom Brougham LJ fully concurred, declined to rule whether a 
notice of abandonment had been necessary but stated ambiguously, ‘If there was any 
necessity for a formal abandonment, and with a full knowledge of the facts they did not make 
that formal abandonment, but took the property instead, they could not afterwards take the 
benefit of the policy, as if there had been a formal abandonment. If, on the other hand, there 
was no necessity for a formal abandonment, still, if they chose to lie by and allow things to go 
on as they did, they could not afterwards upon a change of circumstances, or in consequence 
of a better calculation, turn round and say to the underwriters, “Now we will give you up this 
property, because we find we cannot turn it to the advantage which we expected”207’. 
Campbell also concurred, but stated obiter that as the ship had not been ‘submerged or 
destroyed’, a notice of abandonment had been necessary. All three agreed that the notice of 
abandonment, given several months after information of the damage reached the owners, and 
after the ship had carried a cargo to England, was too late to be effective. 
 FOLLOWING JUDICIAL SALE 
In the Martha
208
 notice of abandonment was unnecessary. The insured cargo of saltpetre was 
seized in the course of the voyage and condemned. It was taken out of the ship and sold for 
the captors’ benefit. The condemnation was reversed on appeal and the value of the property 
paid to the owner, subject to payment of the expenses of the captor and of the Crown in 
Admiralty. Ellenborough LCJ held that the assured might recover for a total loss, without 
notice of abandonment. In the course of the argument he had remarked, ‘The assured stands 
upon the actual destruction as to him of the thing insured, which precludes the necessity of 
any notice to abandon it
209’. In delivering judgment he held, ‘Then, as to the point of 
abandonment, if instead of the saltpetre having been taken out of the ship and sold, and the 
property divested, and the subject-matter lost to the owner, it had remained on board the 
ship, and been restored at last to the owner, I should have thought that there was much in the 
argument that in order to make it a total loss there should have been notice of abandonment, 
and that such notice should have been given sooner; but here the property itself was wholly 
lost to the owner, and therefore the necessity of any abandonment was altogether done away. 
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This case established that where the property had been sold, in this case by a prize court, no 
notice of abandonment was needed.  
Similarly, in Cossman v West; Cossman v British America Assurance Co (Le Cann) (1887)
210
, 
the Privy council held that it was not necessary that a ship should be actually annihilated or 
destroyed for there to be a total loss within the meaning of a policy. It might, as in the case of 
capture and sale on condemnation, remain in its original state and condition; it might be 
capable of being repaired if damaged; it might be actually repaired by the purchaser; or it 
might not require repair. The rule was, ‘if it is lost to the owner by an adverse valid and legal 
transfer of his right of property and possession to a purchaser by a sale under a decree of a 
court of competent jurisdiction in consequence of a peril insured against, it is as much a total 
loss as if it had been annihilated. In such a case no distinction can be drawn between a sale 
upon capture and a sale under the decree of a Court of Admiralty for the expenses of salvage 
services, and there is no need for notice of abandonment’. 
These cases re-introduced property law considerations, which had been excluded in Goss, but 
in a limited context going only to whether a notice of abandonment was necessary. It did not 
change the circumstances in which abandonment could be properly served on the insurer. 
Was there a difference between situations of capture where no formal condemnation had 
occurred, such as piracy, and situations where it had, such as enemy capture? If there were a 
conceptual difference there is apparently no pre-Act judicial authority discussing it.  
Roux v Salvador (1836)
211
 was described as the leading common-law authority on the 
distinction between actual and constructive total losses by the draftsmen of the 1906 Act, and 
in successive editions of Arnould. The definitions at ss 57 and 60 of the Act were drafted to 
codify the definitions expressed in that case. It has been cited frequently as authority for the 
proposition that there need be no notice of abandonment if there is an actual total loss, but 
that there must to claim a constructive total loss. That definition was given in Arnould in 
1857, and remains current. Roux concerned a cargo of hides. A leak in the ship soaked the 
cargo. It was decided that by the time of their arrival in France the hides would have 
putrefied, and the master elected to sell them en route. Later, the owners claimed for a total 
loss. The Court of Common Pleas held that there had been a partial constructive total loss 
only and that notice of abandonment had been necessary. Lord Abinger CB, in the Exchequer, 
held that there had been a total loss. The ratio was that, because by the time the hides would 
have arrived at the destination port they would have rotted and been destroyed there was a 
total loss for which no notice of abandonment was necessary. One passage that has attracted 
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attention is that ‘when the thing insured subsists in specie, and there is a chance of its 
recovery, there must be an abandonment’. That confirmed the earlier statement in Holdsworth 
and another v Wise and another. 
Abinger’s decision is problematic. At the time the cargo was sold it did exist in specie: the 
hides were sold as hides and not as waste. They were sold as damaged goods, not goods that 
would inevitably decay: the purchaser, taking control of the hides quickly, could dry and 
restore them. If the case is put in the language of the 1906 Act their destruction seemed to be 
inevitable (within s 60(1)), so that the loss would have been a constructive total loss only, and 
notice would have been required. Nevertheless, the court decided that there was no need for 
the insured to give a notice of abandonment, by saying that the need for a notice of 
abandonment had been removed by the sale of the goods, that sale being justified, by 
reference to the deterioration of the cargo such that the insured voyage had appeared 
impossible – the hides could not have physically survived the complete journey. Justified sale, 
as well as judicial sale, became a situation where no notice was necessary. In commentary it 
is often incorrectly suggested that the hides were destroyed. 
 
 ACADEMIC COMMENTARY ON WHETHER NOTICE OF ABANDONMENT NECESSARY 
Early nineteenth century authorities record submissions that no notice was required where the 
spes recuperandi was gone, as in Tunno. Those submissions apparently derive from then 
contemporary academic commentary, unsupported by judicial statements. Some textbooks 
followed the law accurately as it appeared in the reports. In Smith's Compendium of 
Mercantile Law it was said: ‘Total loss is of two sorts: it is either total per se, or that which 
may be rendered so by abandonment
212’, and further: 
‘Hughes on Insurance says the same thing. A total loss occurs either when the 
property insured is totally lost to the owner, or when, though not in fact wholly lost, 
the damage sustained is of such a nature that the owner is entitled to recover to the 
amount of the insurance, on making an abandonment. The use of an abandonment, in 
such cases, is to enable the underwriters to take measures for the preservation of the 
property, and to exclude any inference that the insured still intend to adhere to it as 
their own." Tunno v. Edwards
213
 laid down the doctrine distinctly, that wherever the 
thing insured subsists in specie, and there is a chance of its recovery, there must be 
an abandonment. And wherever this doctrine has been held, no distinction has been 
made between the case of capture and sea damage’214. 
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Other textbooks went further than the reported authorities. The 2
nd
 edition of Arnould 
stated:‘If the privation exists as at the time the action is brought, the assured may recover for 
an actual total loss, even though he has given no notice of abandonment
215’. The case cited as 
authority for that rule, M’Iver v Henderson216, does not support that proposition. In that case 
the ship had been captured, damaged, eventually brought to a port in England and 
proceedings were instituted before a prize court. The plaintiff had, in fact, served a notice of 
abandonment, which was held to be made in time. 
 
3.2.4 CONCLUSION: WHEN ABANDONMENT UNNECESSARY 
By 1906 notice of abandonment was necessary after capture, unless insured property were 
sold by a court or actually physically destroyed. In capture, without more, there was a need 
for a notice of abandonment. The state of the law was not uniform. Isolated extracts from 
textbooks such as Arnould gave the opinion that a notice was unnecessary on capture. These 
were presumably were the foundation for the submissions in Goldsmid
217
. It is essential to 
note that a procedural requirement to give a notice of abandonment did not disturb the 
presumption of irretrievable loss on capture. Although that seems obvious the result of a 
notice of abandonment being seen to be necessary, and the fact that the spes recuperandi was 
mentioned in this context, possibly led to confusion of the two separate issues.  
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CHAPTER IV  LAW FOLLOWING CODIFICATION 
 
The 1906 Act marked an abrupt departure from the prior law on capture. The draftsmen did 
not intend this. It was a codifying statute. Section 91(2) provides: 
 
‘[t]he rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to 
contracts of marine insurance’. 
 
The correct approach to capture, suggested in the Polurrian
218
, was therefore first to identify 
applicable common-law rules, and then to question whether they survived. The first issue is 
whether the statutory definitions of total loss are ‘complete’, or ‘incomplete’ so as to admit a 
common-law rule to supplement them (4.1 below). Arguably, the presumption survives in the 
modern law by s 91(2) of the Act because: (i) the presumption is compatible with the test in s 
60(1); and (ii) the common law presumption of total loss has been applied the House of Lords 
subsequent to the Act
219
 (not cited in Masefield). Secondly, the ‘contemporary’ law, the 
‘unlikelihood’ test of constructive total loss originating in Polurrian, is doubted, as it derives 
from two errors of law. Consequently, it arguably ought not to be followed (4.2 below). 
Finally, certain factual situations following capture which will be actual total losses within s 
57 are considered and the ‘wait-and-see’ approach is discussed. (4.3 below).  
 
4.1 THE STATUTE 
4.1.1 ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS  
Section 57 of the 1906 Act provides an actual total loss occurs: 
‘(1) Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a 
thing of the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof’220. 
As s 57 lists destruction and damage as the first two possibilities, the latter clause - expressio 
unus exclusio alterius est - must include situations where the subject matter survives in 
specie, possibly even undamaged, as commonly in capture. Section 57 further provides that 
‘(2) In the case of an actual total loss no notice of abandonment need be given’. However, a 
policy may require notice (e.g. ICC policies) to claim actual total loss. Masefield indicates 
that even a sale of a vessel by a prize court might establish a constructive total loss only. 
Arguably, for ‘irretrievably deprived’ in s 57 to retain any meaning in a capture context, on-
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sale following capture must fall within this section, alongside where it is not technically 
possible to rescue a stranded ship or raise a wreck (outside the scope of this thesis). 
4.1.3 CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS  
Section 60 of the 1906 Act defines a constructive total loss, so far as material: 
‘(1) where the subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its 
actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved 
from actual total loss without an expenditure which would exceed its value when the 
expenditure had been incurred. 
 
(2) In particular, there is a constructive total loss: (i) Where the assured is deprived 
of the possession of his ship or goods by a peril insured against, and (a) it is unlikely 
that he can recover the ship or goods, … , or (b) the cost of recovering the ship or 
goods, … , would exceed their value when recovered;’ 
 
Where the insured claims under s 60, s 61 of the Act gives the insured a choice;  
‘Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a 
partial loss, or abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as 
if it were an actual total loss’.  
 
Notice of abandonment is treated by s 62: 
 
‘(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where the assured elects to abandon the 
subject-matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice of abandonment. If he fails 
to do so the loss can only be treated as a partial loss. (2)Notice of abandonment may 
be given in writing, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by word of 
mouth, and may be given in any terms which indicate the intention of the assured to 
abandon his insured interest in the subject-matter insured unconditionally to the 
insurer…. (7) Notice of abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the 
assured receives information of the loss, there would be no possibility of benefit to the 
insurer if notice were given to him’. 
 
The Court Line Co Ltd v R (the Lavington Court)
221
 indicates that ‘abandonment’ has a 
different meaning in s 60 to its use in ss 61, 62 and 63. This was adopted by Steel J in 
Masefield, but this suggestion is doubted (see below). 
 
4.1.4 COMPARISON BETWEEN S 57 AND S 60 
The two main distinctions between actual and constructive total losses are (i) the test of 
whether a loss has occurred; and (ii) whether the procedural requirement to give a notice of 
abandonment is necessary. The test of ‘irretrievable deprivation’ under s 57 appears a higher 
bar than ‘unlikelihood of recovery’ under 60(2)(i)(a). To fall within s 57 the loss must have 
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already occurred, whereas a claim under s 60 can be made where a loss appears unavoidable 
or likely. 
 
The draftsmen’s guidance notes explained that the sections enshrined the definitions of actual 
and constructive total loss made in Roux v Salvador
222
: 
 
‘In the majority of cases, the distinction between actual total loss and constructive 
total loss corresponds with the distinction which has been drawn between physical 
impossibility and mercantile impossibility. A merchant trades for profit, not for 
pleasure, and the law will not compel him to carry on business at a loss. A 
commercial operation is regarded as impracticable, from the mercantile point of 
view, when the cost of performing it is prohibitive.’ 
 
That guidance indicates physical impossibility of restoration to the insured as the main type of 
actual total loss. It does not explain the meaning of irretrievable deprivation in s 57, or 
elaborate on the test in s 60(1) or (2)(i). Clearly this guidance was not intended to assist on 
situations of capture or related perils but referred primarily to constructive total loss arising 
from sea-damage.  
 
4.1.5 CASES DISCUSSING THE TESTS FOR CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS 
 
 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TESTS IN S 60(1) AND 60(2)  
Section 60 appears to contain two separate tests; s 60(1) is a general test, s 60(2) contains 
specific examples. Which must the insured satisfy to establish a total loss following capture? 
Arguably, an insured is not limited to s 60(2) but can rely on the general wording in s 60(1). 
In Robertson v Petros M. Nomikos Ltd (Robertson) (1939)
223
, concerning a policy on freight, 
Wright LJ observed: 
‘…Some difficulty has been found in interpreting that section because it consists of 
two parts. Sub-s. 2 is purely objective; it gives the two cases of constructive total loss 
of ship, the first being deprivation of possession, the second the cost of repairs. This 
is completely consistent with s. 61. But s. 60, sub-s. 1, is said to be inconsistent, 
because it makes the constructive total loss depend on the condition that the subject-
matter is reasonably abandoned for either of the reasons stated. This, I think, does 
not qualify the definition in sub-s. 2. The two sub-sections contain two separate 
definitions, applicable to different conditions of circumstances…’224 
 
                                                     
222
 Chalmers M.D.E.S. and Owen, D; Digest of the Law of Marine Insurance (1901 William Clowes & Sons 
Ltd, London) and also Chalmers, M.D.E.S; The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (1st edn 1907 William Clowes & 
Sons Ltd, London). 
223
 [1939] A.C. 371. 
224 [1939] A.C. 371. 
63 
 
This was echoed in Rickards v Forestal Land, Timber and Railways Co Ltd (the Minden); 
Robertson v Middows Ltd (the Wangoni); Kann v W W Howard Brothers & Co Ltd (the 
Halle)225  The Minden; Wangoni; and Halle (Wright LJ):  
 
‘It has been observed that this section raises great difficulties of construction. That is 
perhaps inevitable, and it is certainly excusable when it is sought in a brief section, 
supplemented though it is by ss. 61 to 63, to embody the complicated problems of law 
and fact which experience has shown to arise in the case of a constructive total loss. 
Some aspects of the section have been recently discussed in this House in 
[Robertson]. In particular, the difficulty of fitting together the two sub-sections of s. 
60, and reading them together with s. 61 was there considered. I think the view which 
this House arrived at was that the two sub-sections contain two separate definitions 
which may be applied to different conditions of fact. Thus an assured can base his 
claim on the terms of sub-s. 2, which give an objective criterion in each case, ship, 
goods or freight, not only more precise but substantially different from that in sub-s. 
1. Sub-sect. 2, as compared with sub-s. 1 is thus cumulative, not merely 
illustrative
226’. 
 
Accordingly, the law appeared settled that an insured can claim by various different routes 
under s 60. The cases are permissive: the insured can claim under s 60(2) if unable to claim 
under s 60(1). Importantly, there is no statement, except Steel J’s judgment in Masefield, 
restricting an insured from claiming under s 60(1)(which is doubted, see Conclusions). 
Therefore, it is probable that there is no reason why an insured must, on capture, claim under 
s 60(2) rather than s 60 (1). 
 
 
WHETHER THE TEST IN S 60 IS EXHAUSTIVE 
 
A second issue with the interpretation of s 60 considered in Robertson was whether the tests 
in s 60 were exhaustive or whether prior established common-law rules supplemented them. 
Two earlier cases touched on the issue. In the Polurrian
227
 the test under s 60(2)(i) had been 
embellished to by the inclusion of the words ‘within a reasonable time’ to the test of 
deprivation of possession (see 4.2.1ff). Contrastingly, in Hall v Hayman (1912)
228
, Bray J 
held that a common law rule was excluded by the new wording. Porter LJ in Robertson 
addressed the issue of the completeness of s 60 directly, saying: 
 
‘That s. 60 is intended to be a complete and not a partial definition appears to follow 
from the wording of s. 56 when it says: "Any loss other than a total loss, as 
hereinafter defined, is a partial loss." But it does not follow that the first sub-section 
lays down the general rule, whereas the second gives certain particular instances 
already covered by the general rule. Indeed, whatever may be the case with regard to 
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sub-s. 2 (i.), sub-sub-ss. (ii.) and (iii.) do not appear to be covered in terms by the 
definition in sub-s. 1. 
 
But in any case, unless there is some reason to the contrary, a definition must be held 
to include the whole of its wording, and if particular instances are given which 
include matters which are outside the more general definition, that is no reason for 
supposing that their application is limited by the more general words. They do not 
merely illustrate - they add to the terms of the definition. Sect. 60 does not confine 
constructive total loss to cases where the subject-matter of insurance has been 
abandoned, though in some instances there may be no constructive total loss unless 
abandonment has taken place.’229 
 
This indicates that s 60 was a fairly complete test, making it difficult to supplement with 
common-law rules. In Irvine v Hine (1949)
230
, the insured trawler was damaged during the 
Second World War, and not repaired because government permission was required before 
scarce resources could be obtained.  The owner claimed a constructive total loss, on the basis 
that at all material times he was unlikely to have obtained a licence to repair the vessel within 
a reasonable time. It was conceded that the claim was not tenable under any of the heads 
specified in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 60. However, it was contended that the claim 
was justified at common law, was not inconsistent with s 60, and accordingly was valid by 
virtue of s 91(2)
231
. Devlin J addressed whether s 60 could be qualified by adding the extra 
test. He said: 
‘Section 56(1) provides: 
“… Any loss other than a total loss, as hereinafter defined, is a partial loss.” 
That seems, as Lord Porter pointed out in Robertson v Nomikos … to mean that the 
definition of constructive total loss in s 60 must be complete. If any loss outside s 57 
(which defines actual total loss) and s 60 were to be held to be a total loss, it could 
not be a partial loss, as that would be inconsistent with the express provision of s 56.’ 
Accordingly, he ruled that the common-law rule was excluded. However, Devlin J had to deal 
with the precedent of the Polurrian, which added the requirement of ‘within a reasonable 
time’ to s 60: 
‘I have arrived at my conclusion without relying on the authority of the dictum by 
Lord Porter to that effect in Robertson v Nomikos, to which I have referred. I have 
approached the matter in this way because counsel for the plaintiff may be right in 
saying that it is obiter dictum. The conclusion I have reached is greatly strengthened 
by the high persuasive authority of such a dictum. This appears to be the only place 
in the authorities in which the point has been considered. Counsel for the plaintiff 
claimed that in 1913 Pickford J in Polurrian Steamship Co v Young had, in effect, 
treated s 60 as incomplete by adding the qualification “within a reasonable time” to 
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the provision about recovery of the ship or goods in sub-s (2)(i). It seems to be clear 
from the passage referred to that Pickford J was doing no more than to give the 
provision what he thought was its right construction. The sub-section is silent as to 
whether the deprivation of possession has to be perpetual or not, and so is open to 
either construction. Even if the right construction of the language, taken by itself, is 
that the deprivation of possession is to be perpetual, it is clear that the Act does not 
textually cover the point, and accordingly there would be a lacuna which the common 
law could fill without inconsistency with any express provision. I hold, therefore, that 
the claim for constructive total loss based on this ground is bad in law
232’. 
Accordingly, he held that in Polurrian the court had been able to supplement the words of the 
statute in relation to s 60(2)(i), but that he was not able to repeat the exercise to the much 
greater extent of adding a wholly separate ground of abandonment. The difference between 
the two cases is significant. In Irvin, the plaintiff effectively argued for another ground to be 
added to s 60.  Chapter II demonstrates a common-law presumption of total loss on capture. 
Arguably, this falls within the rule in s 60(1) as the loss appears to be permanent, and 
therefore it does not fall foul of Hall v Heyman or Irvin v Hine. 
 
 
4.1.5.3 Whether ‘abandonment’ has the same meaning in s 60(1) and 60(2) 
 
The issue of whether ‘abandonment’ had identical meaning in s 60(1) as in s 60(2) arose in 
Robertson. Wright J stated: 
 
‘…I do not find any inconsistency between s. 60,  sub-s.1. and s. 61. Sect. 60, sub-s. 1, 
deals with actual abandonment, which is also an objective fact, not notice of 
abandonment, which may be necessary for a claim for a constructive total loss even 
after actual abandonment of the subject-matter insured. But if there is any 
inconsistency between s. 61 and s. 60, sub-s. 1, there is, in my opinion, no 
inconsistency at all between s. 61 and s. 60, sub-s. 2, which latter is the definition 
material in the present case
233’. 
 
This is relevant to the discussion of Court Line Co Ltd v R (the Lavington Court)
234
 in Steel 
J’s judgment in Masefield (see 4.4.1 below). The Lavington Court, in so far as it relates to 
whether ‘abandonment’ in s 60(1) can be an act of the insurer, rather than the master, is silent 
on the point; any discussion would in the circumstances have been obiter. Nothing in the 
guidance notes indicated that the draftsmen had that intention; rather they intended 
abandonment to be understood throughout as the act of ceding the interest to the insurer 
(rather than either notice of abandonment or physical abandonment)(see 4.1.8).  
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4.1.6 PRESUMPTIONS OF TOTAL LOSS 
The Act includes one situation where an actual total loss can be presumed, without any 
physical destruction being proved. Section 58 of the Act provides ‘Where the ship concerned 
in the adventure is missing, and after the lapse of a reasonable time no news of her has been 
received, an actual total loss may be presumed’. That section codified the rule on missing 
ships, established at least by 1816
235
, and supports the proposition that a presumption, rather 
than a proven fact, can found a claim for an actual, and by extension, constructive total loss.  
 
4.1.7 DRAFTSMEN’S GUIDANCE NOTES ON CAPTURE 
Neither the Act nor the draftsman’s guidance notes to ss 57 or 60 state whether capture 
simpliciter is an actual or constructive loss. However, the guidance notes on s 61 provide that 
where a ship is captured, the insured will have to give a notice of abandonment
236
. That 
indicates that the draftsmen recognised that the authorities generally required the insured to 
give a notice of abandonment. It was the opinion of the courts after the 1906 Act that the 
capture cases were cases of constructive total loss where the issue of likelihood of recovery 
was relevant. This retrospective reading of the statutory provision into earlier cases was an 
instance of the logical fallacy of the undistributed middle. Was the presumption of total loss 
in the contemplation of the draftsmen? In Le Cann, cited in the guidance notes to s 57, Sir 
Barnes Peacock stated: 
‘In De Mattos v Saunders… it was held that a partial loss of cargo caused by perils of 
the sea was not converted into a total loss by a sale under a decree of a Court of 
Admiralty, in a suit instituted by salvors against the ship and cargo for the recovery 
of sums claimed for salvage services. The case was decided upon the ground that the 
acts and proceedings in the Admiralty Court were not, under the circumstances in 
that case, the natural consequence of a peril insured against. WILLES, J, in 
delivering the judgment of the court, observed (LR 7 CP at p 579):  
 
"The contention that the loss, partial at the time it was incurred, was 
converted into a total loss by the acts of the salvors, and the seizure and sale 
under the orders of the Court of Admiralty must fail, because those acts and 
proceedings were not the natural and necessary consequence of a peril 
insured against. … it is not a proximate consequence of sea damage in 
general that there should be proceedings in a Court of Admiralty. A link is 
wanting. As well might it be said that a proceeding by salvors setting up a 
false claim would convert a partial into a total loss, which would be absurd. 
There was no natural connection between the sea damage here and the sale 
under the decree of the Court of Admiralty. The cases cited of hostile seizure 
and condemnation by a prize court have no application. In such a case, the 
                                                     
235
 E.g. Houstman v Thornton (1816) Holt NP 242 
236
 P89-80, to the effect that if an abandonment is given after restoration, it is out of time, citing the Mary (n 
104) and Dean v Hornby (n 9) at 190, if it is given before restoration, it is in time, citing Ruys v Royal Exchange 
(1897) 2 QB 135. 
67 
 
original seizure is prima facie a total loss; all that follows is only the 
necessary consequence of the seizure”’ 237. 
 
The indication was that hostile seizure (so also capture) established a prima facie total loss. 
Does this indicate that it is a potential constructive total loss before the sale? In the guidance 
notes to the Act on s 60, it was stated: 
‘Insurance on goods from Bombay to London with liberty to send them through 
France. On arrival in Paris they are detained in consequence of the siege, and it is 
uncertain what will become of them. The assured may treat this as a constructive 
total loss
238
.  
First, this demonstrates the draftsmen’s intention to leave the test under s 60(2)(i) as 
‘uncertainty’. However, the courts in Polurrian referred to test being changed to 
‘unlikelihood’, and imposed a stricter test. If Polurrian was right a clear error in the statutory 
drafting occurred. It is settled that only if the statute is unclear can reference be made to 
supporting materials. However, it is striking that the draftsmen published, in leading 
practitioner works on insurance law, a clear statement of the law opposed to the construction 
in Polurrian. Where there was evidently uncertainty as to the meaning of the words, it is 
puzzling that no submission was made in Polurrian referring to the draftsmen’s intention 
clearly expressed in the guidance notes and textbook.  
Secondly, the guidance notes clarified the draftsmen’s intended meaning of ‘abandonment’ in 
the ss 60 to 62. It was not to mean ‘notice of abandonment’, but rather ‘it denotes the 
voluntary cession by the insured to the insurer of whatever remains of the subject matter 
insured’. Where the court had difficulty understanding the meaning of ‘abandonment’, again, 
it is unclear why no reference was made to the draftsmen’s guidance. The draftsmen’s notes 
and textbook undermines Steel J’s gloss on the meaning of ‘abandonment’ in s 60(1) as 
derived from the Lavington Court
239
.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the guidance notes establish: (i) that the test under s 60 was 
intended to remain as ‘uncertainty’, not ‘unlikelihood’ as applied in The Polurrian; and (ii) 
that the meaning of ‘abandonment’ was not an act of the master as Steel J concluded, but 
meant instead the actual abandonment of property saved to the insurer.  
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4.1.8 DEFINITION OF CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS MODIFIED BY MODERN POLICIES 
 
The statutory definition of a constructive total loss may be modified by the terms of the policy 
itself; specific terms override the statutory definitions. 
 
STATUTORY DEFINITION RESTRICTED BY TERMS OF POLICY 
Section 56(3) of the 1906 Act provides that, unless expressly stated, a policy will cover actual 
and constructive total losses. In Masefield, Rix LJ stated that the exclusion of constructive 
total loss in the policy was a ‘special term’. The exclusion of liability for a constructive total 
loss, however, has been a standard term since at least the Revised Institute Cargo Clauses 
1982, and has been commonplace since.  The Institute Cargo Clauses (A)
240
, cl 13 provides 
that: 
‘no claim for Constructive Total Loss shall be recoverable hereunder unless the 
subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned either on account of its actual loss 
appearing to be unavoidable or because the cost of recovering, reconditioning and 
forwarding the subject-matter to the destination to which it is insured would exceed 
its value on arrival’. 
 
That term excludes the additional category of constructive total loss provided for by s 60(2)(i) 
of the 1906 Act, relating to deprivation of the assured’s possession in circumstances where it 
was ‘unlikely’ they could recover the subject matter, and ensures that the s 60(1) test is 
applied
241
.  
 
Consequently, Masefield, or claimants in similar circumstances insured on a policy containing 
a similar clause, could only recover for a total loss in three ways: (i) if the cost of recovering 
was very high (within s 60(2)(i)(b)), or (ii) if an actual total loss appeared unavoidable (within 
s 60(1)), or (iii) the insured had been irretrievably deprived (an actual total loss under s 57). In 
Masefield, it was not sustainable on the facts that the cost of recovering was very high, i.e. 
more than its value on arrival. The Court of Appeal in Masefield addressed whether the test in 
s 57 was satisfied. Surprisingly, it arguably would have been successful, the s 60(1) claim was 
dropped on appeal.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that despite the terms of the 1906 Act providing that no notice of 
abandonment has to be given for an actual total loss, the ICC state: 
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‘ It is necessary for the Assured when they become aware of an event which is "held 
covered" under this insurance to give prompt notice to the Underwriters and the right 
to such cover is dependent upon compliance with this obligation’. 
. 
On the ICC form, notice of abandonment was necessary in any event, regardless of the default 
position under the Act. The giving by the insured of a notice of abandonment was not, 
therefore, in itself an indication that it had to be a constructive total loss – it was consistent 
with the terms of the policy that notice had to be given to recover even for an actual total loss. 
However, arguably, the underlying law is that capture creates a presumption of constructive 
total loss only. Therefore the requirement for a notice of abandonment for actual total loss 
claims ought not to allow a claim for actual total loss to succeed, applying the presumption, 
where the claim was in fact for a constructive loss.  
 
 
CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS BY DEPRIVATION SPECIFICALLY DEFINED IN SOME POLICIES 
Other policies contain relevant terms which define a loss by depravation of possession with 
more precision than the statute. The Institute War and Strike Clause (Hulls-Time) of 1 
October 1983 contains a clause on detainment. It reads: 
 
‘In the event that the Vessel shall have been the subject of capture seizure arrest 
restraint detainment confiscation or expropriation, and the Assured shall thereby 
have lost the free use and disposal of the Vessel for a continuous period of 6 months 
then for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Vessel is a constructive total loss the 
Assured shall be deemed to have been deprived of the possession without any 
likelihood of recovery.’ 
 
While that sort of clause provides some certainty in a total loss claim, it is not incorporated 
into every policy. It requires the insured to wait a period of 6 months, which is a significant 
delay in the context of modern commerce. Further, it reveals confusion about the definition of 
actual or constructive total loss. It is apparent that where that clause applies, the presumption 
of irretrievable deprivation it establishes would be sufficient to claim an actual loss of the 
vessel under s 57, and goes well beyond what is required to allege a constructive total loss. 
Yet the clause is drafted to establish a constructive total loss: a belt-and-braces approach, or 
drafting a clause in an area of uncertainty as to how the courts will interpret capture cases? 
 
“FRUSTRATION CLAUSES” EXCLUDING ‘LOSS OF THE VOYAGE’ CLAIMS 
A policy of marine insurance is not only on the physical subject matter, but on that subject 
matter for either a voyage, or, more unusually, for a time. Some policies post 1918 contained 
‘frustration clauses’, which limit recovery for the loss of the voyage, as opposed to the loss of 
the property, such as this policy from 1939: 
70 
 
'… warranted free of any claim based upon loss of, or frustration  of, the insured 
voyage or venture caused by arrests, restraints or detainments of kings, princes, 
peoples, usurpers or persons attempting to usurp power.'
242’  
 
The ICC policy in Masefield did not exclude claims based on the loss of the voyage. This 
term does not appear to be commonly found in contemporary policies. Where such a clause is 
included, it only operates to exclude claims based on lost or interrupted voyages where the 
casualty was caused by the actions of a sovereign people: the clause does not cover actions of 
pirates. It was drafted with the interruptions to commerce caused by the Spanish Civil War, 
and mindful of the possibilities of a general European war. The actions of ‘non-state’ parties 
do not fall within the exclusion. Had it been in Masefield’s policy, it would not have taken 
effect.  
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4.2 CAPTURE AND CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS 
 
Capture cases decided post-1906 usually treated captures as potential constructive, not actual 
total losses. The court addressed ‘… the less severe test of the right to treat a capture as 
constituting a constructive total loss’243 first, and if that test was not satisfied, the court did 
not then consider actual total loss. Judges construed the statute with little reference to the 
established cases, and following Polurrian found that the Act imposed a new test. 
4.2.1 POLURRIAN V YOUNG 
The reasoning underpinning the construction of s 60 of the Act in Polurrian establishing a 
new statutory test contained errors of law. In Polurrian, the policy covered a ship carrying 
coal. She was seised in 1912 by the Greek Navy, then at war with Turkey. The Greeks 
appropriated the coal to supply their fleet, and stated that the vessel would be put before a 
prize court. The owners abandoned on 26 October, which was taken as the date of issue of the 
writ, following then accepted industry practice. She was released on 8 December. The owners 
claimed for total loss. They argued she was constructively lost, citing Goss v Withers and The 
Romulus. At first instance and on appeal, it was held that the likelihood of recovery was a 
relevant consideration. Kennedy LJ held that, before the 1906 Act, she would have been 
found to be a constructive total loss: 
 
‘According to the law as it stood before … that Act, the seizure or arrest or detention 
of a vessel for that which was either avowedly or obviously a temporary purpose, 
which will end within a period not, from the commercial standpoint, unreasonably 
long, as in the case cited by Arnould on Marine Insurance, 9
th
 ed., vol ii s.1108, from 
Emerigon, gives no ground of abandonment. But if the taking of the vessel, lawful or 
unlawful, out of the possession of the owner was, at the date of the commencement of 
the owner’s action to enforce his notice of abandonment, a taking which still 
continued in operation, and the owner’s loss of the use and disposal of the ship, once 
total, was at that date one which might be permanent, and was, at any rate, of 
uncertain continuance, the owner who had duly given notice of abandonment was 
held by English law entitled to recover upon his insurance for a constructive total 
loss
244’. 
 
This contains two serious errors of law:  
 
First, the extract repeats an error in Arnould. The case cited by Arnould from Emerigon was 
not authority for the rule that an apparently temporary capture gives no ground of 
abandonment. Emerigon’s outline of the case was: 
‘Thus where, on the occasion of a famine at Corfu, some Venetian cruisers, meeting 
at sea a Genoese ship laden with corn, carried her into Corfu, and after taking out 
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and paying for the corn let the ship go free, this was decided in the Rota Court of 
Genoa to give no ground of abandonment to the assured on ship’245. 
 
Clearly, detention was over by the date of the action; this was a factual situation akin to the 
Little Mary (see 2.3) distinguishable from Polurrian. Accordingly, the Genoese case was 
cited for a rule it did not support. Further, Emerigon elsewhere states the English law to be the 
opposite of that stated in Arnould and in Polurrian. Having stated the French law that an 
insured must wait six months following a capture to claim a total loss, Emerigon wrote: 
 
‘In England, the rule is more just, for there, from the moment of a capture or arrest, 
the owners are considered as having lost their power over the ship and cargo and are 
deprived of the free disposal of them; because, in the opinion of the merchant, his 
right of disposal being suspended or rendered uncertain, it is equivalent to total 
deprivation; it is therefore unreasonable to oblige the insured to wait the event of a 
capture, detention, or embargo
246’.  
 
Emerigon, therefore, documented the ‘instant right of abandonment’ in English law, i.e. the 
presumption of total loss. He does not record any investigation into the spes. Emerigon is in 
similar terms to Marshall in that capture gives an ‘instant right to abandon’. It is vital to 
separate the rule from its justification. Capture justified the instant right of abandonment 
because of the uncertainty, but that reason does not suggest that there is an investigation of 
the spes. In Pollulrian the case from Emerigon was applied, where it should have been 
distinguished, and the spurious conclusion in Arnould copied. This was a clear error of law. 
 
As Emerigon was cited in Arnould and in Polurrian as the ultimate authority for the current 
law, it is worth noting Emerigon’s only other material statement on piracy, supporting the 
presumption: ‘Piracy is presumed to be fatal. The insurer is liable for it247’. This concludes a 
long discussion on the property law relating to piratical not enemy capture, concerning where 
the owner could recover from a recaptor without paying salvage. Equally, this does not 
support either a consideration of the spes or a ‘wait-and-see’ approach. It is consistent with a 
right of instant abandonment. Further, Emerigon stated: 
‘The insurer is responsible for captures made by friends or by enemies not declared, 
just as they are for open and declared enemies; for whoever commits depredation 
upon another is a pirate and becomes an enemy’248.  
 
Incidentally, nothing in his extensive discussion on whether ransom agreed by the master to a 
pirate was part of general average indicates that a master was ever required to seek to 
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negotiate for or agree to pay ransom
249
. Emerigon, therefore, supports the immediate right of 
abandonment or presumption of total loss. This treatise, despite its early date, remains a direct 
source for the contemporary law
250
. An error citing it creates an error in the modern law. 
 
Secondly, Kennedy LJ conflated dicta from ‘arrest’ and ‘detention’ cases, which were distinct 
maritime perils treated separately in academic texts (a full analysis is outside this MJur 
Thesis) from capture. A court might investigate the likely length of detention or arrest, but not 
seizure or capture, since the spes recuperandi was not assessed in pre-act capture/seizure 
cases in any way. The wording ‘might be permanent…uncertain continuence’ was taken from 
Marshall, copied in other academic authorities, but was not any judicial statement in a case of 
capture. The words related to the justification for the presumption of total loss stated in 
Marshall were not part of the rule itself, and should not have been cited as the rule. 
Ultimately, they derived from Storey J’s judgment in Peele, which itself did not change the 
law on capture. There was no judicial authority for that proposition that the peril of capture 
must appear temporary, despite its appearance as a general rule in textbooks. So the Kennedy 
LJ quoted academic speculation, not the actual authorities, in stating the law.  
 
Consequently, the paragraph from Arnould cited by the Court of Appeal was unsound law. 
The extract from Polurrian is almost an exact paraphrase of the contemporary Arnould
251
, so 
it arguably reflects the opinion of the profession. However, as it ostensibly derives its 
authority from Emerigon, who instead had confirmed a rule providing for an instant 
abandonment under English law, Arnould contains a serious error of law. Arguably, any 
statement relying on this error in Arnould, even by the Court of Appeal in an authority which 
has come to be the standard test for the post-Act law, was and remains per incuriam.  
 
Having considered the prior law, Kennedy LJ addressed whether the seizure fell within s 60 
of the Act. Here, the errors stating the earlier law matter resulted in his finding that the s 60 
test had changed:  
‘I think that the statute has modified the pre-existing law to the disadvantage of the 
assured. One is always properly afraid of incompleteness in attempting a definition, 
but I venture to say that the test of "unlikelihood of recovery" has now been 
substituted for "uncertainty of recovery." The assured must now show two things - the 
first, that he has been deprived of the possession of his ship; the second, that it is 
unlikely that he can recover it. Whence the statute derived the phrase "unlikely that 
he can recover" as expressing a necessary condition of the assured's right to recover 
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for a constructive total loss by capture I do not know. I have referred to many of the 
reported capture cases and have been unable to find it used judicially in any of them. 
But there it stands in the section of the Act of Parliament; its meaning is quite clear’. 
 
He made no reference to the presumption of total loss, or instant right to abandonment, which 
was the actual prior law. The reports contained no case of capture besides Stringer where the 
test was whether it was ‘doubtful whether it would ever be restored, or if restored, at what 
period,’ and Stringer was not a case of capture simpliciter with prompt abandonment. The 
spes recuperandi was not assessed in capture cases, either as ‘uncertainty’ or ‘unlikelihood’ 
of recovery. It was precisely Mansfield LCJ’s desire to prevent investigations into that spes 
which underpinned the ratio in Goss. In capture cases, therefore, there was no test of 
‘unlikelihood’ to be modified by s 60. Kennedy LJ would have found discussions of the 
likelihood of the recovery of ‘possession’ in stranding cases, and the likelihood of recovery in 
detention and embargo cases, in which possession was not interrupted. The Act’s guidance 
notes clearly indicated the draftsmen’s intention that the insured be able to claim for 
constructive total loss in capture situations where there was ‘uncertainty’. This must have 
been possible only by a presumption of total loss. The Act allowed for the survival of this 
presumption, and the draftsmen had evidently envisaged that it would survive. This was 
clearly illustrated in the examples within their guidance notes. Nonetheless, Kennedy LJ 
stated that if he found that in plain and unambiguous language the 1906 Act had altered pre-
existing law, his duty was to decide in accordance with the change: 
‘… and therefore in the present case, to enable the plaintiffs to succeed, they must 
establish fully (1.) that at the date of the commencement of this action they were 
deprived of the possession of the Polurrian; and (2.) that it was not merely quite 
uncertain whether they would recover her within a reasonable time, but that the 
balance of probability was that they could not do so. 
 
..the crucial date, because the date of the commencement of the plaintiffs' action - the 
recovery of the Polurrian by her owners was quite uncertain, I do not feel myself 
justified in holding that the balance of probabilities has been proved to me so clearly 
against her recovery that I can say that such recovery was "unlikely." This being so, 
the plaintiffs must be held to have failed to make out their case, and this appeal must 
be dismissed. 
 
Accordingly, Polurrian, the first case after the Act, which set the framework for all 
subsequent cases, was decided essentially on the natural wording of the statute. In doing so 
the Court ignored 150 years of established cases establishing a presumption of a total loss on 
a capture. These were not distinguished or even considered. Kennedy’s decision was based on 
a new rule, introduced via an obvious error in Arnould, that the court would consider the 
length that any detention or capture would last. Arguably, therefore, Polurrian was per 
incuriam. 
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Was the court bound to apply the test of ‘actual unlikelihood’? It is strongly arguable that it 
was not, and did so in error. The established common-law then applied a legal presumption 
that following capture, deprivation was deemed irretrievable. The reason was that as the 
ultimate result was uncertain, but unlikehood of recovery need not be proved. Accordingly, 
the facts in Polurrian fell within the ordinary meaning of the words of s 60(1) as a loss which 
‘appeared to be unavoidable’. The court was arguably bound to consider all the different 
constructions of s 60(i), and in light of s 92, to come to the one which preserved the common 
law. In focusing on the word ‘irretrievable’ in s 60(1), Kennedy LJ ignored the word 
‘appeared’ and did not consider whether this section  could be construed to support the legal 
presumption of irretrievable deprivation, rather than a fact-sensitive test of unlikelihood. It is 
suggested that his exposition of the law was unsound, and undermined by his omission to 
consider the established authorities. Although it has been followed in subsequent cases, and 
approved by the learned authors of Arnould, Polurrian should not be seen as correct merely 
because it has become a ‘classic’ judgment. Arguably, the test in Polurrian should be 
doubted, in light of the errors stating the pre-Act law, the clear intention of the draftsmen, and 
the omission to deal with the possibility of a presumption of or an actual loss within s 60(1). 
 
4.2.2 TEST IN POLURRIAN APPLIED 
In Roura & Forgas v Townend and Other (the Igotz Mendi)
252
 the policy covered a 
charterparty for goods sold under contracts containing cancellation clauses if the goods were 
not delivered by January 1918. It covered vessel’s loss. The vessel was uninsured. She was 
captured by the Germans in 1917 in the Indian Ocean, disguised and grounded off the coast of 
Denmark while under control of the prize crew, who deserted her. Her Spanish crew raised 
the Spanish flag then abandoned her. She was salvaged in March 1918. The insured 
subsequently claimed on the policy. Roche J said: ‘[h]ere I have decided that the Igotz Mendi 
was not merely delayed but was captured and lost, although she was afterwards found and 
recovered
253
,’ In doing so, Roche J applied the test in Polurrian, and found that the recovery 
had been unlikely. He said: 
‘In Polurrian Steamship Co. v. Young  the Court of Appeal decided that this provision 
imposed a more onerous proof upon the assured than the case law on the subject had 
imposed, and that the test of "unlikelihood of recovery" had now been substituted for 
"uncertainty of recovery." I, of course, act upon that decision. It was conceded that in 
this case the ship was out of the owners' possession for 3½ months, but it was 
contended that it was never securely in the possession of the Germans. It was 
asserted, I hope and believe with truth, that the squadrons and patrols of the navies of 
Great Britain, her allies and associates, were numerous and vigilant, and that 
recapture was probable or not unlikely. On the other hand, it is to be remembered 
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that the seas are wide and the nights were dark and long during the critical stages of 
this voyage, and apart from any knowledge which may be permitted to a Court with 
regard to German practice in the destruction of merchant shipping, the evidence as to 
the sinking of all other prizes by the Wolf and as to the placing of bombs on board of 
the Igotz Mendi convinces me that the Igotz Mendi would not, save by some 
unexpected accident, have survived to be recaptured. I regard her actual recovery as 
due to a somewhat surprising combination of circumstances, and I find that the test 
laid down by Kennedy L.J. in Polurrian Steamship Co. v. Young is satisfied; and I 
hold that it was not merely uncertain whether her owners would recover her in a 
reasonable time, but that the balance of probability was that they would never 
recover her at all
254’. 
 
Further, the insured was able to make a claim on the policy where there had been no notice of 
abandonment. The vessel owner was uninsured, so could not make such declaration. It was 
held that, nonetheless, there was still a constructive total loss of the charters. The ship had 
been restored before the action had been commenced by the insured. It was held that the 
restoration had not defeated the claim: 
‘I have already held that there was a constructive total loss of the Igotz Mendi by her 
capture, and before the ship was restored to the owners such capture resulted in a 
total loss to the plaintiffs of their rights and profit under the charter. In short, the 
event agreed upon as necessary to give a right to indemnity had happened, and had 
irrevocably caused the loss of the subject-matter of the insurance.’255 
 
The judgment adequately reflects the nature of insurance of a charterparty, rather than ship or 
cargo. It was specifically held that the loss was not caused by a delay, but by the capture. 
While the capture subsisted, itself causing a constructive total loss of the vessel and cargo, the 
charter came to an end. This decision has attracted relatively little attention, probably because 
the majority of policies cover physical subject matter, rather than a charter. It should be noted 
that the language used, that of ‘irrevocable’ loss, is closer to the language of s 57 or s 60(1), 
than of s 60(2)(i). Naturally, the judgment would have been different had the subject matter 
been the ship/cargo. It is suggested that a better approach was to have held that the vessel was 
a constructive total loss during the capture, and Roche J’s language supports this, but was 
potentially restored after its salvage. In the circumstances, the abandonment of the vessel by 
the prize crew would probably not have amounted to a ‘restoration of possession’, without 
more.  
 
4.2.3 BAR OF ‘UNLIKELIHOOD’ RAISED: 
In Marstrand Fishing Co Ltd v Beer (the Girl Pat)
256
 the policy covered a fishing vessel. Her 
owner intended her to fish in the North Sea near her home port in March 1936. The captain 
had other ideas. When proceedings were issued, the fishing ship had been last sighted at 
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Dover, and missing for over a month. The claim was initially for a missing ship rather than a 
total loss by barratry. Subsequently it emerged that she was in Spain, the captain having 
forged her log. She had been disguised - repainted and rigging altered. She reached Dakar in 
West Africa, but the authorities let her escape, when the captain was permitted to test her 
engines. She was ultimately recovered in June, having reached British Guiana. Porter J 
dismissed the owners’ claim, applying the test in Polurrian. 
 
It is difficult to imagine a more concerted attempt to steal a ship. It is implausible that a small 
Scottish fishing vessel could be stolen, disguised, and sailed to South America via Africa, yet 
still be ‘more likely than not’ to be recovered. Arguably, the test for constructive total loss 
was set too high. If the judge was correct that there was no constructive total loss on those 
facts, it is difficult to conceive any claim ever succeeding for deprivation of possession, short 
of an actual sale (unless a policy contained an express ‘frustration clause’). Arguably, the Girl 
Pat deprives the Act of its intended force, since circumstances short of ultimate sale or 
destruction would not suffice for a successful claim for constructive total loss on capture. 
Since those circumstances would be actual total loss, it is difficult to see, if the Girl Pat was 
correctly decided, that s 60 retained any application to capture cases. 
 
4.2.4 WARTIME CASES: MORE LENIENT TEST APPLIED; WHETHER PRESUMPTION OF TOTAL LOSS 
RESTATED BY HOUSE OF LORDS 
Two cases during the Second World War apparently mitigated the stringent test of a 
constructive total loss as stated in the Girl Pat, although these have been cited less frequently 
subsequently than Porter J’s earlier judgment.  
 
The Minden; Wangoni; and Halle
257
 concerned three joined appeals by British cargo-owners 
whose goods were loaded on German flagged vessels at the start of the War. German captains 
had orders to put into a neutral port, then return to Germany. If caught by the British blockade 
of Germany, they were to scuttle their vessels. Two ships were scuttled. The third reached a 
German port. In each case, the policy contained a frustration clause, which excluded claims 
for loss of the voyage. In the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, it was held that the loss 
of the voyage was independent to the loss of the subject matter. Where the subject matter was 
physically destroyed, the frustration clause would not operate to defeat the claim for a total 
loss. When did a total loss occur? 
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In the Court of Appeal, Scott LJ held that: 
 
‘When each ship sailed from its port of refuge for Germany, in my opinion, there was 
at that moment such ‘deprivation of the goods without likelihood of recovery’ as to 
constitute a constructive total loss within s 60. Whether it amounted to an 
‘irretrievable deprivation’ so as to constitute an actual total loss within s 57, it is 
unnecessary to decide, or even consider.’258  
 
So the general approach in Polurrian was followed in considering constructive losses before 
actual losses. In relation to whether the loss was actual or constructive, he said: 
 
 ‘It can hardly be doubted that a constructive total loss of the goods themselves may 
arise when they are taken wholly out of the possession of the assured and his bailee – 
for example, pirates, rovers or thieves. If there can be an actual total loss in such 
cases through ‘irretrievable deprivation’ under s 57, I can see no reason why the law 
should not recognise a constructive total loss under s 60(1)…’259  
 
Accordingly, he stated that it was possible for a capture to be an actual total loss pursuant to s 
57, although under his approach, it was sufficient to address the lesser question of s 60(1). In 
the circumstances, he considered: 
 
‘… if those orders compelled the masters at any time finally to abandon the 
commercial voyages, it is, I think, a necessary inference from the facts that the 
German government then ipso facto took absolute, and not conditional, possession of 
the goods, and thereafter deprived the appellants of their possession continuously 
until, in two cases, they went to the bottom, and, in the third, the cargo reached the 
hands of the German government in Hamburg.’260 
 
That statement of the rule in the case was that there was at least a constructive, if not an 
actual, total loss from an early moment, namely the moment the proper commercial voyage 
was abandoned. Mackinnon LJ gave a slightly different rule, and held instead that there was a 
constructive total loss when the German captain determined to obey the instructions of his 
government, hold the goods as the subject and servant of that government (thereby ceasing to 
hold them as the bailee of the assured) and carry them, if he could, to a German port. That 
rule also presumed the loss to exist from an early moment. 
 
The House of Lords affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal. Viscount Simon LC noted 
that where the ships were scuttled the losses became actual total losses by the scuttling. He 
said,  ‘…the owners were unlikely to recover the goods after the time when the orders of the 
German government were acted on and that the goods then became constructive total losses 
and might have been reasonably abandoned’. Wright LJ further stated that ‘…the master, 
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being in possession of the goods as a carrier for the assured, seized them in the same that he 
ceased to hold them as carrier and changed the character of his possession by taking and 
controlling them as agent for the German government… In doing so he deprived the assured 
of them
261’. He noted that: 
 
‘Prima facie, when once it is accepted that there has been a seizure or capture of the 
goods, there is ‘the right of abandoning immediately’ and this right subsists so long 
as the property is detained by the captors or by their government, whether in port or 
at sea’262.  
 
This ‘right of abandoning immediately’ must be the presumption of irretrievable deprivation: 
the insured can abandon immediately, which will be taken as the date of issue of the writ, if 
the peril then subsisted, and he will succeed on his claim. It is suggested that the rule in this 
case was the correct law and that this extract conforms to the pre-Act authorities (chapters II-
III). Arguably, this statement by the House of Lords should have been binding upon Steel J 
and Rix LJ, and the fact that they did not consider this case in their judgments supports the 
contention of this thesis that their decisions on constructive total loss were per incuriam. 
However, Wright J then went on to say that the test had become one of unlikelihood of 
recovery, following the test in Polurrian. That approach is, strictly, incompatible with the 
instant right of abandonment. Either there is an instant right of abandonment or there is an 
investigation into the parties’ rights, which potentially invites a ‘wait-and-see’ approach.  
 
In the second wartime case C Czarnikow Ltd v Java Sea and Fire Insurance Co Ltd; Leslie & 
Anderson Ltd v Java Sea and Fire Insurance Co Ltd (The Oder; the Lichtenfels)
263
 the first 
plaintiffs were interested as buyers in a cargo of copra (a perishable cargo if detained in a hot 
climate for any length of time) loaded on a German ship which, just before the outbreak of 
war, put into Massawa, Italy. The second plaintiffs held a cargo of oilcake expeller, which 
was also a perishable cargo, with a storage-life of about 12 months in a hot climate. Early in 
October 1939, negotiations were made to obtain the release and transhipment of the cargo, but 
both the captain of the vessel, acting apparently upon the instruction of the German owners, 
and the port authorities, who, although Italy was officially neutral, were not disposed to help 
English interests, opposed them, stating that transshipment was only allowed where the 
destination was neutral. It was proved that on 11 October the German captain was claiming to 
hold the cargo as prize, but that by 16 October instructions had been issued by the German 
Foreign Office that the interests of the cargo were to be protected and that delivery or 
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transshipment could not be refused. However, no conditions for release or transshipment were 
ever agreed. In 1941, the ship left Massawa and was captured by the Royal Navy. On 16 
October 1939, when the cargo had deteriorated, the plaintiffs gave notice of abandonment. 
The defendants declined notice and on 30 October the plaintiffs claimed a total loss. Further 
efforts were made after the issue of the writ for release of the cargoes, but, although these 
seemed to be progressing, they ultimately failed. Apparently, from 25 August 1939, German 
shipping was under the control of the German Government and, if, after the ship had taken 
refuge in a neutral port, she had attempted to leave, she would probably have been intercepted 
by English warships. It was found that the captain was bound to remain at Massawa until he 
received fresh instructions from the German Government: Viscount Caldercote LCJ asked, 
’…whether the circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that there was a 
constructive total loss. The Marine Insurance Act 1906, s 60, declares that there is a 
constructive total loss where the subject-matter (in this case, the goods) is reasonably 
abandoned on account of its total loss appearing to be unavoidable. …The proper 
approach to the question of fact which arises as the result of the last words quoted 
from sub-s (2) has been laid down in two cases. According the Polurrian SS Co Ltd v 
Young the assured must show that the balance of probability is that they cannot 
recover their goods within a reasonable time. In other words, they must show that it 
is more likely than unlikely. Kennedy LJ, in his judgment, which was taken as the 
judgment of the court, also stated as indisputable the proposition that matters must be 
considered as they stood at the date of the commencement of the action. The second 
case is [the Girl Pat], where Porter J, who, following [the Polurrian], took the 
material date to be that of the issue of the writ, said that the facts to be considered 
were the true facts as existing on that date, and not merely the facts as then known. I 
propose to apply these decisions in considering the question I have to decide. As far 
as the definition in sub-s (1) is concerned, I should again adopt the view held by 
Porter J that it is the true facts which have to be considered in deciding whether the 
subject-matter was reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss 
appearing to be inevitable. However, the view I have formed in applying the 
definition in sub-s (2) disposes of the question. The question is one which, as Kennedy 
LJ said in [the Polurrian], necessarily involves conjecture and speculation, and it is 
not altogether easy.  
In this extract, it is easy to discern the two well established common-law rules, first, that the 
true facts had to assessed as of the date of the writ, and secondly, that the true facts at that 
date, rather than only those known to the assured, had to be assessed. However, it is masked 
by the gloss, decided (arguably per incuriam) in Pollurrian that the test had been modified so 
that the spes had to be considered on the balance of probabilities. The difficulties of that 
approach, in considering ‘conjecture and speculation’ had been anticipated in Goss.  
Caldercote LCJ found both cargoes had been constructively totally lost. This finding was 
despite assurances given that the state authorities would respect the neutrality of the owners, 
engaging the well-established rule that the English courts do not assume foreign courts will 
breach their own laws (which a taking of that property would have required). Although The 
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Oder; the Lichtenfels
264
 did not refer to the presumption of total loss, both it and the Minden; 
Wangoni; and Halle show the test for constructive total loss applied at a much lower level 
than in the Girl Pat, and as later applied in Masefield. Importantly, Viscount Simon LC 
articulated the common law presumption of a prima facie total loss on capture (the 
‘immediate right of abandonment’). Arguably, this should have bound the courts in Masefield, 
which erred in not following this statement, incorporating the pre-Act law into a modern 
context. 
 
4.2.5 CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS ON THE PERIL OF DETENTION/RESTRAINT OF PRINCES 
In the Bamburi, the arbitrator awarded the claimant shipowners damages for a constructive 
total loss by restraint of princes. In September 1980, the ship was detained in Shatt-al-Arab 
during the war between Iraq and Iran. State authorities ordered that the vessel not be moved. 
The claimant served a notice of abandonment a year later and issued arbitral proceedings 
seeking damages for a total loss. Strictly, the arbitral award does not provide binding 
authority
265
, but unusually the decision was published as it raised issues common to about 70 
other vessels similarly detained. 
In The Bamburi the arbitrator first found that the loss fell within the peril of ‘restraint of 
princes or peoples’ clause and that it was not a loss by detention or any other peril. The next 
issue was whether there was a total loss by that peril within the meaning of the 1906 Act. The 
test of unlikelihood of recovery was applied. ‘Possession’ was not lost, as in a case of capture. 
Accordingly, it should not be considered an authority on ‘capture’, despite its consideration of 
total loss
266
. The relevant part of the judgment concerned whether there could be a loss by a 
‘restraint of princes’ within s 60 of the Act. The arbitrator held that there could be a ‘loss of 
possession’ within the meaning of the Act where there was a ‘loss of free use and disposal267’.  
When considering the likelihood of recovery, there was some discussion as to whether the 
time ran from the moment of the casualty, or from the issue of the notice of abandonment
268
. 
Expressing no conclusive view, the arbitrator held that the time to be considered was after the 
notice of abandonment – yet this view appears to be without authority. It was held that ‘within 
a reasonable time’ meant 12 months, not counting time that had run before the notice. Again, 
it is unclear what authority that relied upon, other than ‘bidding’ between the counsel. In the 
circumstances, it was held unlikely that the vessel would be recovered.  
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4.2.6 INVESTIGATION OF SITUATION AFTER WRIT 
The pre-Act cases did not consider events after the writ. Assessing the chance of recovery on 
a subsisting capture involves speculation on future events. As stated in 1954: 
 
‘Rights ought not to be left in suspense or to hang on the chances of subsequent 
events. The contract binds or it does not bind, and the law ought to be that the parties 
can gather their fate then and there. What happens afterwards may assist in showing 
what the probabilities really were, if they had been reasonably forecasted, but when 
the causes of frustration have operated so long or under such circumstances as to 
raise a presumption of inordinate delay, the time has arrived at which the fate of the 
contract falls to be decided
’269
.  
 
This general approach was followed by the arbitrator’s assessment of delay in The Bamburi. 
There is a tension between the law’s desire for certainty and its desire to use all the 
information to inform a decision. Where vessel is captured and the insured abandons and 
claims on the policy in time, but the vessel is released before trial, the court knows what the 
ultimate consequence of the capture has been: the property has been returned. Applying the 
strict doctrine of that the rights are to be assessed at the date of the writ, and the presumption 
of irretrievable deprivation, might be seen to produce an unfairness on the insurer, who will 
have to pay for a total loss where the loss has ended. A similar tension was noted in the 
context of anticipatory breach of contract in The Golden Victory
270
. There, the court did use 
knowledge gained between the date at which the parties’ rights were finalised and the start of 
the trial in considering their judgment, and in so doing, the House of Lords overruled a former 
doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract which had excluded such discussion. Although 
interesting comparisons can be drawn, it is not suggested that there should be consistency 
between that part of contract law and insurance law. 
 
4.2.7  CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS OF VOYAGE 
The previous chapters have primarily addressed whether the physical subject matter of the 
insurance has been lost. However, since the wagering policies (see 2.5), marine insurance has 
had a dual nature, and is also an insurance on the voyage (or for the time in a time policy). 
This section considers claims based on the ‘loss of the voyage’ subsequent to the Act. 
 
The loss of the voyage was rarely discussed in capture cases. Consequently, this section 
considers cases where there was found or alleged to be a total loss where the owner had not 
been dispossessed (by a capture or seizure), but nonetheless his free use and disposal over his 
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property had been interfered with. More frequently, loss of the voyage arose following the 
unrelated situations of blockade, or siege, which interrupt the voyage, amounting to ‘restraint 
of princes’, ‘detention’ or ‘embargo’ (where there is no intention to take the property). 
Although these are not perils of capture or seizure, several authorities were considered by Rix 
LJ in Masefield. Do these authorities modify the law on capture or seizure? 
 
 
4.2.7.1 LOSS OF VOYAGE FORMERLY COVERED BOTH VESSEL AND CARGO 
Early statements doubted the insurance on the voyage at all, e.g.: ‘The notion of an insurance 
on a voyage is absurd… in the first place it would be a double insurance, both on the ship and 
the voyage; for if the ship were lost before the end of the four months to be sure the voyage is 
lost; and if the voyage be lost, according to the plaintiff’s construction, though the ship… be 
in good safety at the end of the four months, yet the insurance must be forfeited (Willes LCJ 
CB)
 271’. However, the wagering policies clearly introduced the notion of the loss of the 
voyage into all policies. In Goss, Mansfield LCJ applied the doctrine to both ship and cargo. 
Subsequently, it was accepted that the ‘loss of the voyage’ applied equally to vessel and 
cargo. 
 
4.2.7.2 ‘LOSS OF VOYAGE’ NO LONGER APPLIES TO VESSEL 
The question of whether the loss of the voyage applied equally to the vessel and to the cargo 
was disputed. However, in 1942 it was held that the law had probably ceased to apply the 
doctrine of the loss of the voyage to a vessel: 
‘The primary subject of the insurance is the goods as physical things, but there is 
superimposed an interest in the safe arrival of the goods. This is very old law. Lord 
Mansfield insisted on applying the same rule to an insurance on the ship, but his view 
was rejected and it was said that the loss of the voyage has nothing to do with the loss 
of the ship. The ship is a vehicle employed in general trading, not wedded to any 
particular adventure. Freight is regarded in ordinary practice as a separate interest 
capable of being separately insured in addition. As to goods, it is indeed true that 
profits can be separately insured by an appropriate policy, and also that the 
insurable value on goods under an open policy is their value, plus charges on 
shipment, not their arrived value; s. 16, sub-s. 3, of the Marine Insurance Act, 1906. 
But it has long been recognized that in a valued policy on goods it is permissible and 
indeed usual to value the goods so as to exceed their value on shipment’.272  
 
In The Bamburi, where it was found that 1 year’s continued deprivation was a constructive 
total loss, this distinction between ship and cargo was noted. The Minden; Wangoni; and 
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Halle was quoted: ‘in the case of a policy on goods in normal form the owner can claim 
either for loss of goods or loss of adventure, while in the case of a policy on the ship the 
underwriters are liable only on loss of ship and are not liable in respect of loss of adventure 
(Viscount Maugham)’273. The Bamburi questioned whether the distinction was in fact 
logically sensible; why is a ship less of a loss than the cargo? However, the arbitrator 
concluded that the distinction was too entrenched to change: ‘In any case, if loss of the 
adventure did still give rise to a claim under a voyage policy on ship, it would remain 
doubtful whether it gave rise to a claim on a time policy
274’. The law on hulls is ostensibly 
that there is no possibility of loss of voyage claims for total loss on a time policy. However, it 
remains a moot point whether it would be successful on a voyage policy – there is no recent 
authority on this point. A dispute on time or voyage policy would fall to be argued on the 
authorities pre 1830 (see 2.6 above), against an apparently entrenched opinion in the 
profession (but not fully supported on the authorities) that the law had changed on one and 
possibly both type of policy. The outcome of a dispute on this point appears unclear.  
Nonetheless, it is clear that in theory a constructive total loss on the voyage can be made on a 
policy covering goods. In Sanaday, it was said: 
‘…then if the loss of the voyage, the loss of the chance of arriving at the port of 
destination, and the consequent loss of the market appear to be unavoidable, there 
would be a constructive total loss of the subject-matter. I am, therefore, of opinion 
that, in the insurance of goods, the law as it stood before the Act of 1906, in reference 
to the subject of constructive total loss, remains unchanged
275
. 
 
The draftsmen’s guidance notes to s 60 specifically indicate that the doctrine of the loss of the 
voyage on goods survives into the post-Act law; ‘It is well established…that there may be a 
loss of the goods by a loss of the voyage in which the goods are being transported, if it 
amounts, to use the words of Lord Ellenborough, to a destruction of the contemplated 
adventure
276’. What practical consequences follow from this in the contemporary law are 
unclear. In Masefield, this aspect of the insurance on cargo was not considered, and not 
apparently argued. Arguably, the claimant could have relied on earlier dicta in support of its 
case: 
LOSS OF VOYAGE CLAIMS IN PRACTICE 
What are the practical consequences of that dictum in Sanaday, in the context of a voyage of 
three months? Three viable interpretations of the meaning of ‘loss of the market’ exist; (i) the 
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possibility of the goods ever arriving at the destination port; and (ii) the possibility of the 
goods arriving within the timescale of the contemplated voyage; or (iii) more flexibly, within 
a reasonable time.  
 
i) Support for the idea that test is whether goods can never arrive can be derived from cases 
on the peril of ‘restraint’ and ‘detention’. This is a strong argument for a similar test being 
applied on perils of capture and seizure. However, if this test is applied, then the ‘loss of 
the voyage’ will exactly duplicate the test of a physical loss of the property. This 
construction is undermined by Manning v Newnham
277
, (the Confiance)(1813)
278
 
(discussed at Chapter 2.5), which both provide that an arrival of goods the following 
season (where the probability of their eventual arrival existed) amounted to loss of the 
voyage. The later authorities on ‘restraint’ and ‘detention’ do not adequately distinguish 
these authorities on capture.  
 
ii) Support for the idea that if capture prevents goods arriving within the timescale of the 
contemplated voyage there is a total loss derives from Goss, which referred to the lent-
season for the sale of fish. This is supported by Manning v Newnham, the Confiance, and 
the guidance notes to the Act. It appears the most logical construction of the phrase ‘loss 
of the voyage’, and is particularly appropriate for a voyage policy. Arguably, this 
construction conflicts with the delay clause, excluding losses flowing from delay, but if 
the delay clause, expressing established common-law rules which co-existed with the 
loss-of-the-voyage doctrine, is allowed to defeat the claim, it deprives the element of 
insurance on the voyage of meaning. This construction is, however, incompatible with the 
restraint and detention cases, defining this as a 6-month period, if a consistent meaning to 
‘loss of the voyage’ is to apply across the different perils.  
 
iii) There is some support for the idea that the court would imply a ‘reasonable’ meaning. 
The test for a constructive total loss following a seizure is whether the subject matter is 
likely to be returned within a reasonable time, and for this purpose market practice 
accepts that the relevant period is 12 months from the date of seizure, assessed at the date 
when legal proceedings are commenced
279
. However, it appears from the Bamburi that a 
6-month delay amounts to a loss of the physical property.  
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What construction should be preferred? Given that a six-month delay amounts to a deemed 
loss of the physical property, arguably, for the loss of the voyage to retain meaning, it cannot 
be for a longer time than for the loss of the physical subject matter. The most natural meaning 
is the second option above. However, there is no authority clarifying how a loss of the voyage 
claim would actually operate in the modern law. Masefield did not address the doctrine of the 
loss of the voyage in any way.  
 
4.2.8 CONCLUSION ON CONSTRUCTIVE TOTAL LOSS 
Polurrian established that the Act established a new test of ‘unlikelihood’ of recovery for 
total loss claims on capture, where there was no actual total loss. The bar for recovery under s 
60 has been set very high indeed. Arguably, Polurrian was decided in error. The ‘uncertainty’ 
test, presumed to have been modified by the Act had never been applied in capture cases. 
Polurrian ignored the settled presumption of total loss, which must have been in the 
contemplation of the draftsmen of the Act. The Minden; Wangoni; Halle, a House of Lords 
case, applied the presumption post-Act by applying the ‘instant right of abandonment’. 
Accordingly, it is arguable that the presumption should continue to apply: there was no reason 
to depart from the common-law presumption; and it has been applied by the House of Lords 
in 1942. Arguably, it remains the contemporary law.  
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4.3 CAPTURE AND ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS 
After Polurrian
280
 the primary test applied by the courts in capture cases was that under s 60, 
so that the test under s 57 was seldom considered. Consequently, fewer statements exist 
concerning actual total loss following capture. One might reasonably assume that the law 
would treat common-law situations justifying total loss without abandonment as s 57 actual 
total losses. The law has not developed as simply.  
Commentators suggest that capture might establish an actual total loss under the modern law: 
‘It is far from unknown for a court to adjudge that a vessel was a CTL even though, 
by the time of trial, the vessel had been repaired and was again trading… Indeed, in 
seizure cases this may apply also to an ATL. See Scott v Copenhagen Reinsurance Co 
(UK) Ltd
281
, where aircraft seized by Iraq on the invasion of Kuwait were held to 
have been lost on the date of seizure even though by the time of trial some of them 
had been safely retrieved from custody in Iran’282. 
The situations in contemporary cases concern the sale following capture, and the application 
of ‘wait-and-see’ to actual total losses. This chapter aims to place ideas these in context.   
 
4.3.1 WHETHER SALE AFTER CAPTURE CONSTITUTES NOVUS ACTUS INTERVENIENS 
Sale following capture or seizure justified a total loss claim without abandonment pre-1906. 
The draftsmen’s guidance notes stated that judicial sale following a vessel’s desertion on a 
sinking condition was an actual total loss, despite subsequent salvage, citing Le Cann 
(1887)
283
. Interestingly, the Privy Council stated therein: 
‘… after the sale under the decree of the Court of Admiralty there was an actual total 
loss. By that sale, the property in the vessel and cargo was transferred to the 
purchaser, and the vessel and cargo ceased to be the property of and were wholly lost 
to the original owners thereof. To constitute a total loss within the meaning of a 
policy of marine insurance it is not necessary that a ship should be actually 
annihilated or destroyed. It may, as in the case of capture and sale upon 
condemnation, remain in its original state and condition; it may be capable of being 
repaired if damaged; it may be actually repaired by the purchaser; or it may not even 
require repairs. If it is lost to the owner by an adverse valid and legal transfer of his 
right of property and possession to a purchaser by a sale under a decree of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in consequence of a peril insured against, it is as much a total 
loss as if it had been totally annihilated’284. 
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Accordingly, it was directly in the contemplation of the draftsmen that a judicially ordered 
sale following capture was an actual total loss. At common-law, sale would have justified a 
total loss without abandonment (see 3.2.3). This contrasts with dicta in Masefield, where this 
proposition is doubted. Arguably, judicial sale after capture or seizure remains an actual total 
loss. A sale following the perils ‘restraint’ or ‘detention’ may not justify actual total loss. In 
Fookes v Smith, (the Stambul) (1924)
285
, the court held that where restraint of princes was 
followed by sale, the sale was a novus actus interveniens. So, the test of actual total loss does 
not appear identical across the different perils, since The Stambul conflicts with the Romulus 
on the issue of whether a later sale breaks the chain of causation. Instead, the Stanbul 
illustrates that the different perils fall to be treated differently for the tests of total loss in a 
wider sense. A uniform test will not lead to logical results, and the courts have not applied a 
consistent approach over these different perils. Accordingly, authorities on the perils 
‘detention’ and ‘embargo’ are not persuasive guides on situations on capture.  
 
4.3.2 CAPTURE BY AN ENEMY WITH INTENT TO DEPRIVE 
It might be thought, from Masefield, and given the extensive authorities in chapter II, that a 
capture, made with an intention to permanently deprive, would be a loss within s 57, 
following Dean v Hornby. In the Girl Pat, Porter J assumed that the courts had always 
considered the two types of loss separately. He followed the error in Polurrian in thinking 
that a test of ‘unlikelihood’ was applied: 
‘First of all, with regard to an actual total loss, it is said that barratry is analogous to 
capture, and that capture is an actual total loss, though that loss may be redeemed by 
a recapture. I doubt if this ever was the true question. I think it was always a question 
of fact whether capture was an actual total loss or merely a possible constructive 
total loss. Capture followed by condemnation no doubt was an actual total loss, but 
that was because the vessel had been condemned; the war was supposed to last 
indefinitely, and, therefore, there was no chance within any reasonable time of the 
ship being restored. The capture alone I do not think was ever necessarily an actual 
total loss. It is possible that if the vessel had been carrying contraband and that 
condemnation was certain, she might be held to be an actual total loss, but I do not 
think it is certain, even then, that that result would follow. Normally, I think capture 
is a constructive total loss, and the confusion which has arisen, with regard to 
whether it is an actual or a constructive total loss, arose merely because, in the 
earlier cases, the distinction between those two classes of loss was not kept clear. In 
the same way, damage may amount to a constructive total loss, but I think will not 
amount to an actual total loss, though it may amount to an actual total loss if it has 
been followed by a sale so as to make the position one in which the vessel was lost to 
her owners by the proper sale after sufficient damage to justify it. The class of case I 
am referring to is Dean v Hornby and Stringer v English & Scottish Marine 
Insurance Co. However, that may be, whether under the old law capture was or was 
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not an actual or constructive total loss, the case is now governed by the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, ss 56 to 60. That Act provides in s 57, amongst its definitions of 
'actual total loss', 'if the vessel be irretrievably lost'. In my view, no one could here 
say that the vessel was irretrievably lost to her owners.” 
 
As a summary of the common-law, this was flawed. First, it wrongly assumed that the courts 
ever investigated the spes recuperandi. Secondly, the treatment of prize law is confused. A 
valid judicial condemnation would not be reversed if a war later ended; his summary for the 
presumption which he assumed existed is therefore demonstrably unsafe. 
 
Properly viewed in context, however, Porter J recognised that capture may be a constructive 
total loss. It ignores the situation where an enemy did not formally condemn property, but 
where the presumption applied nevertheless applied, and a constructive total loss allowed. His 
statement was made without reference to Goss, which would have demonstrated, in any event, 
that it was incorrect to rely on property law considerations when deciding whether a total loss 
occurred. The spes only determined whether notice of abandonment was necessary. However, 
it was said in the Minden; the Wangoni; the Halle that capture without condemnation with an 
intent to deprive could be an actual total loss: ‘It can hardly be doubted that a constructive 
total loss of the goods themselves may arise when they are taken wholly out of the possession 
of the assured and his bailee – for example, pirates, rovers or thieves. If there can be an 
actual total loss in such cases through ‘irretrievable deprivation’ under s 57, I can see no 
reason why the law should not recognise a constructive total loss under s 60(1)…’ Arguably, 
however, this overstates the case. Ordinarily, a notice of abandonment would be required at 
common-law, so the loss would be constructive. Significantly, the words used set the stage for 
the courts considering ‘deprivation of possession’ as a separate peril. 
 
4.3.3 WHETHER CAPTURE FOLLOWED BY CONDEMNATION ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS 
In Forestal Land, in the House of Lords, it was said: 
 
‘in the present case, in my opinion, it was unlikely that the goods would be recovered. 
…. If she had been captured it was, no doubt, likely that the assured would have 
regained possession of their goods, but the orders of the German government had 
provided against that contingency by requiring the master to scuttle the ship…if, on 
the other hand, she ran the blockade and reached a German port, the assured would 
presumably be irretrievably deprived of his goods, which is an actual total loss’286. 
 
This obiter statement reintroduces the sort of consideration based on the Roman law of 
capture that Mansfield was keen to distinguish in Goss. Effectively, this stated was that the 
bringing infra praesidia that effectively transferred the property. Apparently, Goss was not 
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remembered in this respect. This is directly opposed to the stated rules, and the spirit, of the 
established nineteenth century authorities. If the doctrine of constructive total loss operated to 
allow an instant right of abandonment, there is no injustice; this rule only applies where there 
has been condemnation, which allows a total loss without abandonment, if abandonment had 
not been given between capture and condemnation.  
 
However, subsequently, capture followed by condemnation was held not to be an actual total 
loss. In Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright (1970)
287
, Mocatta J held that 
a vessel detained by Vietnamese customs officials, and subsequently confiscated by a military 
tribunal convened outside the ordinary judicial system, was not an actual total loss. In an 
extract quoted by Rix LJ in Masefield, Mocatta J said: 
 
“[The] claim for an actual total loss on the basis that the plaintiffs were irretrievably 
deprived of the Anita is somewhat academic. The question has to be answered as at 
the date of the writ. It may be true that the order of confiscation divested the plaintiffs 
of the legal ownership as is the case of a ship by a Prize Court. But the test of 
irretrievable deprivation is clearly far more severe than the test of unlikelihood of 
recovery of possession, and despite the gloomy prospects for the future as of Aug 29, 
1967, I feel unable to find that the plaintiffs were at the date irretrievably deprived of 
their vessel’288. 
This passage betrays a disregard for the prior authorities on capture throughout the previous 
two centuries of English and international law. The termination of legal entitlement to recover 
property was the basis of earlier decisions that no notice of abandonment need be given. An 
order for confiscation by a prize court ought arguably to be an actual total loss, in that pre-Act 
there was never a requirement to plead that there was no hope of recovery, and no notice of 
abandonment need be given. That the court would impose a more stringent test on a plaintiff 
is problematic; short of total physical destruction of the property, what could satisfy the test 
for irretrievable deprivation? It is impossible to devise a stronger form of deprivation of 
ownership than an order for confiscation under a prize court (usually leading to its on-sale). If 
this statement is followed literally it is impossible to understand what the test under s 57 
could cover other than physical destruction. It would remove all additional meaning from the 
section. It cannot have been the intention of the draftsmen that s 57 only covered physical 
destruction. Therefore, it is argued that Mocatta J over-stated the stringency of the test. 
However, as he found a constructive total loss, his remarks on actual total loss are obiter. 
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4.3.4 WHETHER HOSTAGE AND RANSOM FOLLOWED BY DESTRUCTION IS ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS 
In the Dawson’s Field arbitration, aircraft were hijacked in 1970 by the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine and were later destroyed – one in Cairo and the other three in Jordan at 
a later date. The issue was whether the loss of all four aircraft arose out of ‘one event’. It was 
held that the planes were not lost when hijacked but when destroyed, since ‘wait and see’ was 
an essential ingredient in a ransom situation
289. Dawson’s Field distinguished Dean v Hornby 
and the other capture cases because: 
‘… the persons who deprived the owners of possession clearly intended there and 
then to deprive him of possession and ownership forever, if they could. ”Deprivation 
of possession” as such was not an insured peril… It is therefore dangerous to treat 
deprivation of possession simpliciter as a cause of total loss subject only to being 
turned into a partial loss by subsequent recovery….’ 
 
Dawson’s Field imported a test of the captor’s intention into the law. Effectively, it held that 
there had not been a ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’, but a depravation of possession only. In this 
situation, there was a factual situation to which a ‘wait-and-see’ approach was appropriate.  
 
In KAC v KIC, aircraft captured when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 were later destroyed. Rix 
J (as he then was) noted that: 
 
‘In Rodocanachi v Elliott290, (p 670) Brett J described capture as 'the hostile seizure 
of goods with intent to deprive the owner of them. In case of capture, because the 
intent is from the first to take dominion over a ship, there is an actual total loss 
straightaway, even though there later be a recovery: see Dean v Hornby (n 9) (a case 
of piratical seizure), and [the Romulus (n 79)]’291.  
 
In that case Rix J, relying on observations in Dean v Hornby, and the definition of capture 
given in Rodocanachi
292
, stated that there was an actual total loss where there was a capture 
with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Although Dean was in fact a 
situation of judicial sale before the action, not capture simpliciter, see 2.1, Rix LJ appeared in 
KAC v KIC to observe that the spes recuperandi had not been tested on capture simpliciter. 
However, he followed the new, innovative test proposed by Kerr in Dawson’s Field, which 
was that a ransom situation was a case of ‘wait and see’, which was not to be considered as 
capture in the true sense.  
 
‘Wait-and-see’ is a further, innovative, permutation of the test for actual total losses. If it is to 
be taken as the test to be applied, it conflicts with Panamanian Oriental Steamship
293
, since, 
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on any view, a tribunal ruling that divests the owners of legal ownership is plain evidence of a 
capture with an intention to permanently deprive the owner of possession. Arguably, KAC v 
KIC suggests the correct approach, conforming to the older authorities, that legal 
dispossession will be an actual total loss.  
 
Rix J did not address one obvious difficulty with the ‘wait-and-see’ test, in that a test of the 
captor’s intention had been absent from all earlier cases of maritime capture. It is unclear 
from where Rix J derived that test into the captor’s intention, since the definition in 
Rodocanachi
294
 was much later than established authorities for capture, in which an insured 
was never required to prove the intention of the captors. The test based on the captor’s 
intention creates difficulties in practice. In Johnston & co v Hogg and others (the Cypriot)
295
, 
the ship was captured by “natives” in the Brass River. These intended to plunder the ship’s 
cargo. Although they intended to abandon the ship, they certainly did not intend to return it to 
its owner. Was there a deprivation of possession? Certainly, the case would not have allowed 
a total loss had ‘wait-and-see’ been applied as set out by Rix J. The court simply held that the 
events fell within the terms of the policy, so the case provides little clarification of the law. It 
does illustrate the difficulties that a test based on the postulated intention of pirates or captors 
might produce. The law was more efficient and certain where intention was not investigated. 
 
In Scott v Copenhagen, arising from the same facts as KAC v KIC
296
, the aircraft was 
eventually destroyed by allied bombing where it had been parked. Rix J reverted to the ‘wait-
and-see’ analysis proposed by Kerr J in the Dawson’s Field arbitration. Accordingly, the 
‘wait and see’ test has been introduced into the law comparatively recently, albeit by the 
considerable authority of Rix LJ. 
 
4.3.4 CONCLUSION ON ACTUAL TOTAL LOSS 
 
Effectively, ‘wait-and-see’ is not part of the long law of capture in English law. It is an 
attempt to define a new peril, ‘deprivation of possession’. Its origin is in non-maritime cases. 
However, is hostage and ransom a new factual situation requiring  a new ‘wait-and-see’ 
approach, or is it rather a well-known factual permutation of capture and seizure? Arguably, 
as hostage-and-ransom has always been a part of piracy, and ransom was long an accepted 
practice in prize law, it is a mistake to say that deprivation of possession is a wholly new 
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peril, justifying a new approach. There are comparatively few statements clarifying actual 
total losses after capture in post 1906 cases. Capture simpliciter was akin to actual total loss in 
that the spes recuperandi was never investigated. However, the procedural requirement for 
the insured to give a notice of abandonment makes capture simpliciter sit more comfortably 
within the definition of constructive loss. However, a judicial sale, or later destruction, is 
arguably an actual total loss, because then there is no requirement to give notice (argument 
developed out at 3.2). 
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CHAPTER V  CONCLUSIONS: THE JUDGMENTS IN MASEFIELD 
 
5.1 PER STEEL J 
 
Steel J’s judgment contains two difficulties. The first is that he relied on definitions of total 
loss from textbooks which ultimately derived from stranding and damage cases. Consequently 
he did not refer to the tests of total loss expressed in capture cases, so did not appreciate the 
presumption of total loss on capture. This approach raises issues concerning the status of 
academic commentary in relation to older judicial authorities (3.1.3-3.1.4). The second 
difficulty is that he reintroduced property law considerations into the test of total loss by his 
‘fact sensitive’ approach, without reference to the 150 years of binding authority that 
explicitly excluded property law. Innovatively, he ruled that captures are ‘fact sensitive’ 
cases, which understanding is arguably inconsistent with the established prior law.  
 
First, when addressing the issue of actual total loss, he held that ‘an assured is not 
irretrievably deprived of property if it is legally and physically possible to recover it (and 
even if such recovery can only be achieved by disproportionate effort and expense)
297’.  
 
That correctly stated the test of actual total loss, but arguably cases of capture simpliciter 
were never considered actual total losses. As authority, Steel J cited three cases. Two were of 
stranding. In George Cohen, Sons & Co v Standard Marine Insurance Co (1925)
298
, an 
obsolete warship under tow that grounded on the Dutch coast was held not to be an actual 
total loss as it could physically be removed, although at un-commercially great expense. In 
Fraser Shipping Ltd v Colton (1997)
299
 a vessel under tow stranded on a Chinese island. 
Again, it could physically be salved, but only at great expense. The third case was 
Panamanian Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright
300
 (see 4.3.3), where Mocatta J held 
that the order of confiscation by the irregular Vietnamese military court did not establish 
actual total loss. Arguably, Mocatta J’s statement was doubtful authority, as it was obiter, 
conflicted directly with the pre-Act law which was clear that a notice of abandonment was not 
necessary in such situations, and was not supported by any authority.  
 
Steel J’s finding that to establish ‘irretrievable deprivation’, an insured had to establish that 
the recovery was impossible ([31], [35]) was arguably an oversimplification. The law 
provides presumptions of impossibility, one of which is an order of a court divesting the 
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property, another, a court order for sale. These presumptions were so well-established that a 
notice of abandonment was deemed unnecessary and arguably both situations should be 
interpreted as situations of actual total loss. Additionally, on capture, the law pre-1906 did not 
require an investigation into the spes. However, the presumption established was not so strong 
as to remove the requirement of a notice of abandonment. Contrastingly, on stranding, or after 
damage, the insured always had to show physical impossibility of the subject matter being 
recovered, or that it is capable of surviving to the destination port. The situations were 
factually distinct and arguably are not governed by a single legal test. In stranding or damage, 
the owner retains control over the property. In capture, he does not have either physical 
possession or control. Steel J confused the law by blurring the two parallel strands of legal 
authority into a single test. The statement of actual total loss means that the presumption of 
constructive total loss was ignored. .  
 
Steel J’s reliance of authorities on damage or stranding, rather than authorities on capture, is 
illustrated by his reliance on Roux v Salvador
301
. Relying on that case, he stated that: 
‘[t]he need to draw a distinction between a claim for an ATL where property is 
beyond recovery and a claim for a CTL with an associated requirement for notice of 
abandonment where recovery is uncertain was well established in the early 19
th
 
century
302’.  
 
This distorts the law. Roux was a case of sea-damage to cargo, and any observations on 
capture cases were obiter. Capture cases contemporary to Roux do require the insured to give 
a notice of abandonment, but there is no suggestion that this procedural requirement ever 
implied that the insured had to prove an unfavourable spes in relation to a subsisting capture 
(see chapters 1-2). Simply, just because a notice of abandonment was required, it did not 
mean that the test had become one of ‘unlikelihood’, overturning the presumption. The error 
was that, seeing that capture did not fall within actual total loss, he distorted the established 
test of constructive total loss with a presumption.  
 
The second difficulty with Steel J’s  judgement is that his finding that the legal consequences 
of a capture is very fact sensitive is based on property law considerations, contra Goss and 
The Romulus. He said: 
‘(i) Where a vessel is seized as a prize and condemned in a prize court, property is 
transferred and on any view the former owner is irretrievably deprived of the vessel. 
Mere seizure by pirates without more has no impact on the proprietary interests in 
the vessel. The suggestion in regard to the present case that in demanding a ransom 
the pirates were requiring the owners to repurchase the vessel and cargo is a 
felicitous but inaccurate summary of the situation. What has been transferred is 
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possession and not title and the question thus arises, in my judgment, as to whether 
recovery of possession is legally or physically impossible.  
 
(ii) of course, where possession is lost, recovery will often be unlikely… whereby the 
threshold requirement for a CTL claim may be established though in these 
circumstances the assured must elect to treat it as such by service of a notice of 
abandonment, a step not applicable in cases of ATL.
303’ 
 
 
The first error in this is the consideration of property law which is a clear error of law in light 
of Goss v Withers, and the Romulus. Material earlier cases (chapters 1-2) were not challenged 
or even cited. Furthermore, the extract conflicts with his citation taken from Panamanian 
Oriental Steamship Corporation v Wright (supra)
304
, where the court did not treat judicial 
condemnation as irretrievable deprivation. However, five paragraphs after citing Panamanian 
Oriental, Steel J concludes that it would be actual total loss, on the same hypothetical facts 
(neither Steel J nor Mocatta J referred to earlier reported authorities on capture). This serious 
inconsistency in the modern law undermines the authority of the rule from Panamanian. If 
neither judge was clear of the position on actual total loss after condemnation, their 
conclusions on constructive total loss, relying on that understanding, are open to doubt.  
 
The second part extract at (ii) also blurs the issue of the notice of abandonment. Despite the 
terms of the Act, the policy takes priority: on the ICC clauses, a notice of abandonment would 
still be required for an actual total loss, a procedural point which appears to have been 
overlooked. 
 
As a result of his importing a distinction between actual and constructive total losses which 
did not exist at the time, Steel J’s interpretation of Dean v Hornby was flawed. His 
interpretation was that as a result of the notice of abandonment being served, it must have 
been put as a constructive total loss, and a test of ‘unlikelihood’ implied into it, and satisfied 
on those facts. Chapter II demonstrated that was not the way capture claims operated, Dean 
included. Chapter III demonstrated that not only was notice considered good practice, but 
that, following the sale by the prize master, it was not strictly necessary. Steel J missed, 
therefore, that the court in Dean ought properly to have held that the loss was a total loss 
where abandonment was unnecessary, in a similar situation to the Martha and Le Cann (see 
3.1.3), or even Stringer. It was wrong to simply look at the fact that notice was given, and 
then conclude that a test of ‘unlikelihood’ had been imported into that case.   
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Steel J considered the constructive total loss claim under the contemporary law very briefly. 
He noted that the property had to be abandoned on account of an actual total loss appearing 
unavoidable. He held that s 60(1)‘abandonment’ meant not ‘notice of abandonment’, but 
rather abandonment of any spes recuperandi
305
. As authority for that proposition he cited the 
Lavington Court
 306
, which he held was authority that the phrase ‘abandoned on account of its 
actual total loss appearing to be unavoidable’ meant the same as abandoned by a master so 
leaving it to be derelict – i.e. the physical desertion of the vessel by the crew and not the 
service of a notice of abandonment.  He observed that such abandonment by the crew never 
occurred
307
. 
 
This interpretation was erroneous. The natural meaning of the words, considering the prior 
authorities, is that a ‘notice of abandonment’ was meant in s 60308. There was no suggestion 
of the distinction made in the Lavington Court either in the draftsmen’s guide to the Act309 or 
in the 6
th
 edition of Arnould, cited as source for the drafting of s 60
310
. Instead, the references 
throughout these are to the actual giving of notice of abandonment. Further, the Lavington 
Court does not go so far as to say that abandonment under s 60 has to have that meaning, only 
that the decision to abandon pursuant to s 60: 
‘may and very often must be by the master in exercise of his authority express or 
implied, but usually pursuant to his general powers of agency for his owner
311
. 
 
These extracts must be understood in the context of the Crown’s submissions in that case. It 
had submitted that abandonment under s 60 could only ever be made by the insured, and 
never by the master. That was rejected. The ratio was permissive of the master being able to 
physically abandon a vessel with the accompanying legal consequence of abandoning the 
vessel to the insurer, but the case does not go so far as to exclude the insurer from exercising 
that same function. The master is merely the insured’s agent, and it is trite law that whatever 
an agent can do, their power to act derives from the master. Accordingly it is suggested that 
Steel J misinterpreted the Lavington Court.  Further, in Masefield, it was physically 
impossible for the master and crew to desert the vessel upon the capture with the legal effect 
in s 60, even if they had wanted to do so, and there is a rule of law that leaving a vessel under 
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compulsion or violence cannot have that effect
312
. However, the position of the master and 
crew should not prevent the insured from deciding to abandon the vessel. Furthermore, 
reported cases show insureds recovering for total losses where the insured had given notice 
under s 60, where the point is not controverted
313
. Additionally, the judgment of Viscount 
Simon LC in the Minden; Wangoni; and Halle permits the insured to abandon the vessel, 
within the language of s60(1). Finally, the claimant in Masefield, as a cargo interest, did not 
have an agent on the vessel to physically abandon the parcels of biofuel. Accordingly, the 
Lavington Court does not support Steel J’s interpretation that ‘abandonment’ within s 60(1) 
must be the act of the master, and thus the rule that he stated was incorrect. 
 
Finally, Steel J held that his findings that an actual total loss had not been unavoidable applied 
equally to the constructive total loss claims
314
. While clearly the spes remained, once again, 
Steel J did not deal with the presumption. Accordingly, Steel J’s judgment on constructive 
total loss is arguably open to doubt. 
 
5.2 PER RIX LJ 
 
On appeal, Rix LJ did not revisit Steel J’s findings on constructive total loss. He simply 
concluded that, under the terms of the policy, ‘deprivation of possession was only covered in 
the case of an ATL, ie in the case of irretrievable deprivation
315’. It is suggested that that 
statement incorporates the error identified in Steel J’s approach to the Lavington Court, and 
this author suggests that the policy also covered deprivation of possession within s60(1) of the 
Act (appearing to be unavoidable). 
 
Rix LJ’s remaining findings addressed actual total loss. He repeated in substance Steel J’s 
assessment of Mocatta J’s obiter statement in Panamanian Oriental316, although he did 
concede that the statement was not necessary very helpful to the insured, as the ‘facts were 
obscure and the matter was treated lightly’317. 
 
Guided by Masefield’s counsel, Rix LJ relied primarily on Dean v Hornby as the most 
relevant authority. He stated that no reported authority found a total loss where the insured 
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could have paid ransom
318
, and distinguished the cases on that ground. The reference to the 
possibility of ransom payments in submissions in Goss v Withers was ignored – even though 
by their exclusion from the judgment where ransom payments were lawful and common-
place, Mansfield LCJ had dismissed that consideration. Rix LJ held that Dean v Hornby was 
inconclusive
319
, and referred to several cases concerning capture. The first case he referred to 
was, however, not a capture case, but Roux v Salvador, a sea-damage case. The general test he 
cited from Roux has been examined above (see 3.1.4). This thesis argues that this test, 
formulated later than the test in capture cases, could not have changed the established rules 
for capture cases. Consequently, it is per incuriam in suggesting that there was in capture 
cases an investigation of the spes. 
 
Next, Rix LJ considered Stringer
320
. He did not fully articulate the significance of the 
insured’s choice not to abandon. If the plaintiff had chosen to abandon at first, then the loss 
would unquestionably have been total. The paragraphs that he cites refer to the situation 
where the insured had chosen to hang onto the spes in the property for very many months. 
(Further, he noted that the sale by the Prize Court in Stringer was a situation of actual total 
loss [at 37] – so undermined the authority of Mocatta’s dicta in Panamanian Oriental321). 
However, Rix LJ did not himself state the fact that the plaintiff in Stringer could have 
successfully abandoned and claimed for a constructive total loss with a reasonable time of the 
capture. 
 
A further distinction between Stringer and Masefield was that the claimant in Masefield was 
essentially passive. Cargo interests do not play a part in the negotiation process, which is 
almost always conducted by the hull owner. Consequently, the insured was only as well 
informed of the negotiations as the general public, and had no say in or control over the 
ransom process. The position of the shipowner, however, would have been quite different. 
The shipowner had decided, after the capture, to instigate the process of negotiation, after the 
pirates had identified themselves. After that process had started, therefore, the shipowner had 
put himself in a position very much like the plaintiff in Stringer, who involved himself in the 
litigation in the American prize court. However, Masefield concerned a cargo interest, whose 
interests were different to the ship-owner, and whose place in the ransom negotiations was 
utterly dissimilar.   
 
                                                     
318
 Ibid. At 26. 
319
 Ibid at 32-33. 
320
 See 3.1.5 ;Masefield 2011 at 36. 
321
 (n 287). 
100 
 
He noted that in Cory & Sons v Burr (1883)
322
 the test for a total loss was whether the assured 
‘but for their own fault’ might get the property back. The issue arising from this - whether the 
insured would be at fault in not making a ransom payment - is addressed in the next chapter. 
He noted a statement of the law in Arnould 17
th
 ed – in which the capture results in most 
circumstances in an constructive total loss.  Having surveyed the dicta from the authorities 
cited, in particular Dean v Hornby, the Romulus, and the Girl Pat, Rix LJ concluded, on the 
issue of a total loss: 
 
‘In the light of all this material, I conclude that, subject to … the public policy of 
paying a ransom, piratical seizure in the circumstances of this case, where there was 
not only a chance, but a strong likelihood, that payment of a ransom of a 
comparatively small sum, relative to the value of the vessel and her cargo, would 
secure recovery of both, was not an actual total loss. It was not an irretrievable 
deprivation of property. It was a typical “wait and see” situation. The facts would not 
even have supported a claim for a CTL, for the test of that is no longer uncertainty of 
recovery, but unlikelihood of recovery. That is itself recognised by the insured's 
dropping of its CTL claim. There is no rule of law that capture or seizure is an ATL. 
The subject-matter is not amenable to a rule of law at all: it is all ultimately a 
question of fact. The prize, is not an ATL, although it may mature into one. Piratical 
seizure, in the absence of a policy of ransom, may amount to an ATL, where the 
pirates escape with their prize for their own use and there is no prospect whatever of 
finding or recovering vessel or cargo: but where a chance of recapture remains even 
such a seizure will not give rise to an immediate ATL, and in any event that is very far 
from this case. In the circumstances, Dean v Hornby, is best explained as a case 
concerning CTL, which in any event reference there to the assured's notice of 
abandonment strongly suggests. Similarly, [the Romulus], where there was on any 
view an ATL, is probably best explained as suggested above, i.e. as a case on 
proximate cause (and possibly where the ATL of condemnation relates back to the 
time of capture). Although Mr Kerr appears to have left the point open in Dawson's 
Field, I think I was therefore wrong to suggest, in KAC v KIC
323
, that those cases 
showed that the mere intention to exercise dominion over seized property constitutes 
an ATL.’ 
 
Rix LJ concluded that there was no actual total loss, because, in the circumstances, there was 
a hope of recovery. The result in Masefield is thus directly at odds with Goss v Withers, the 
first case on a policy for interest. In Masefield the claimant failed because of the investigation 
into the hope of recovery. In Goss the plaintiff succeeded for a total loss claim despite there 
being a strong hope of recovery. The dicta by which Rix LJ held the law to have changed 
have been fully set out in this and the preceding chapter. 
 
Consequently, Rix LJ reached the right result on the appeal for an actual total loss, as even 
under the pre-Act law the insured would have been required to serve a notice of abandonment 
and it is difficult to class a simple subsisting capture under the pre-Act law as an ‘actual total 
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loss’. However, it is suggested that the investigation into the hope of recovery, as in all post 
1906 Act cases, has been contrary to the rules established in Goss v Withers, and the Romulus. 
As the former case was decided by Mansfield LCJ, and was settled law for over 150 years, 
and was confirmed by the House of Lords in the latter case, it is suggested that this authority 
ought to have been especially persuasive, and so considered in the case, and binding, on the 
Court of Appeal, and that both cases ought to have been binding on Steel J at first instance. 
The post-Act authorities, especially Polurrian, have failed to address adequately the prior 
cases, so that it is difficult to say that the court had consciously overruled the ‘old’ law in 
favour of a completely new test. In particular, it was nowhere considered whether the old law 
was consistent with a claim under s 60(1), and this failure means that the court’s approach, in 
making a ‘new’ test, is inconsistent with s 90(1) of the Act which preserved the common law.  
 
The argument that there should have been found a total loss under s 60(1) is supported by the 
observation of the House of Lords in the Minden; Wangoni; and Halle: 
‘If there can be an actual total loss in such cases through ‘irretrievable deprivation’ 
under s 57, I can see no reason why the law should not recognise a constructive total 
loss under s 60(1)…’324 
 
This extract ought to have been considered by Steel J, when he ruled that there could not be 
such a loss, as ‘abandonment’ in s 60(1) had to be an act by the master. This House of Lords 
dictum overrules his judgment, and makes it per incuriam. It was in fact perfectly possible for 
the loss to have been pleaded under s 60(1).  
 
The finding that there ought to have been a constructive total loss would be subject to a 
finding not made in the case, namely whether the insured’s notice of abandonment had been 
in time. This is a question of fact. It is observed that it falls within the range of notices 
accepted at common law, as set out the table in Appendix B. It would further be subject to a 
court adopting a slightly different stance on the public policy as to ransom payments, in 
which a ransom payment should not be considered as undermining the presumption of total 
loss. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION ON JUDGMENTS IN MASEFIELD 
 LAW  
Many authorities material to constructive total loss were not cited in Masefield. Masefield 
relied primarily on Dean v Hornby (the Eliza Cornish)
325
, which was not the most persuasive 
authority. Arguably, Goss v Withers (the David and Rebeccah)
326
, and the line of derivative 
authority culminating in Andersen v Marten (the Romulus)
327
 and Rickards v Forestal Land, 
Timber and Railways Co Ltd; Robertson v Middows Ltd; Kann v W W Howard Brothers & 
Co Ltd (the Minden; Wangoni; Halle)
328
 was both more appropriate and persuasive. A legal 
presumption
329
 of total loss was applied in these cases, and all but one pre-1906 case of 
capture or seizure, and appears in all pre-Act insurance textbooks. A test of ‘uncertainty’, as 
erroneously stated in Polurrian v Young (the Polurrian)
330
, was never applied. Though 
Polurrian is considered a leading case, it adopted a material error in Arnould, which 
incorrectly paraphrased and misunderstood Emerigon, an important renaissance treatise on 
mercantile law
331
, which remains the ultimate authority for contemporary law. Arguably, 
therefore, the authorities cited by both Steel J and Rix LJ, deriving from Polurrian are per 
incuriam. It will be shown that Masefield’s claim for constructive total loss would have 
succeeded under the pre-1906 common law, applying the then settled presumption of total 
loss. 
Steel J’s construction of s 60 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (the Act) governing the test 
for constructive total loss is problematic. Arguably, his treatment of Court Line Co Ltd v R 
(the Lavington Court)
332
 caused him to misconstrue s 60(1) of the Act, so that he did not 
consider a presumption of constructive total loss, but erroneously adopted the 
‘uncertainty/unlikelihood’ test incorrectly applied in the Polurrian. Arguably, the Act has not 
abolished the common-law presumption of total loss. Consequently, Masefield ought to have 
recovered for a constructive total loss, subject only to Steel J finding that ‘notice of 
abandonment’ was given in good time333. While, arguably, the Act abolished the common-law 
presumption, as stated in the Polurrian and subsequent authorities, it is possible the legal 
presumption of constructive total loss survives as it: (i) was founded on and supported by 
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higher authority than subsequent contrary decisions
334
, (ii) is fully consistent with the 
statutory language, (iii) is a common-law rule preserved by s 91(2) of the Act, which (iv) 
remains more appropriate to the facts of capture than more recent approaches ignoring the 
presumption. Consequently, it is suggested that Masefield provides dangerous authority for 
future cases of piracy.  
The common-law, the presumption of total loss justifying an immediate right of abandonment 
on capture was preserved by the House of Lords in the Minden; Wangoni; and Halle. The 
statutory test in s 60(2)(i) has been interpreted by Polurrian in a way that is inconsistent with 
the draftsmen’s intention for s 60 as a whole in relation to cases of capture. The cases 
deciding that ‘abandonment’ means that an insured cannot claim under s 60(1) for a loss 
following a capture are doubted, and appear contrary to the draftsmen’s express intentions. 
The post-Act authorities have not addressed whether a claim for total loss on capture could 
succeed under s 60(1), preserving the common-law presumption. That omission means the 
test in Polurrian is per incuriam. Arguably, the presumption should have survived the 
passage of the Act. Arguably, too, the presumption should apply to piratical capture; that 
conclusion being subject to the idea that a ransom payment is not a proper means which an 
insured must use if the option is available to him, although the law now permits him to do so. 
 POLICY 
What was the real cause of the loss in Masefield delay or capture? In assessing the justice of 
the result, it is relevant that insurance covers more than the physical goods at shipment. On 
valued policies, it is usual to value goods so as to exceed their value on shipment. Goods are 
generally sent to a profitable market. Consequently, the valued policy on goods is, in part, 
insurance against loss of the market. However, the advantage gained by the insured from the 
voyage might be some other purpose than immediate on-sale, for instance where a 
manufacturer transports materials to its own factory or into storage. Clearly, however, the 
insurance on goods covers more than the physical interest; it includes an element of insurance 
on the expected benefit from their arrival
335
. If the loss suffered by the insured in Masefield 
was properly classified as loss by delay, it could be said that Masefield was right to protect 
the insurer from that part of the insurance which was against loss of the market. That policy 
certainly has a long standing in English law.  
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However, from the insured’s perspective, its insurance was ineffective. In fixing the policy 
under the ICC(A) clauses, they had specifically sought piracy cover; there was a major loss 
consequent on the piracy, and they were not compensated because ‘delay’ was excluded. The 
background to Somali piracy was well known. If the loss was indeed by ‘delay’, they were 
unable to obtain cover for the sort of loss they knew to be predictable, and sought cover 
against. 
Arguably, the loss was more properly characterised as a loss by ‘pirates’ (not ‘delay’), leading 
to a loss by either ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’, which was, at one point in English law, sufficient to 
establish a ‘total loss’. It is argued that the laws establishing this loss have not been changed 
by the passage of the 1906 Act. This seems to be consistent with the common sense analysis 
of the situation – if at any time the insured had been asked the cause of their loss, the answer, 
it can be surmised, would be a loss by piratical attack, not delay to the voyage. Just as in 
Roura & Forgas v Townend and Others (the Igotz Mendi)
336
: ‘[h]ere I have decided that the 
Igotz Mendi was not merely delayed but was captured and lost, although she was afterwards 
found and recovered (Roche J)
337,’ it is arguable that in Masefield, the cargo was captured and 
lost (and while lost, abandoned), but afterwards ransomed and recovered. Alternatively, if it 
should not have been deemed a physical loss, which is the primary argument of this thesis, it 
remains arguable that there was a loss of the intended voyage.  
When questing the commercial consequences of the result in Masefield, it is helpful to 
compare to the length of detention in capture cases (Appendix II). In the earliest cases, where 
voyage durations were slower, dependent on the wind and altogether less predictable, total 
loss claims were allowed after captures lasting days only. In Masefield, the interruption of 
almost two months did not allow justify a total loss claim. If the Bamburi is followed, it 
would suggest a year’s deprivation would be required to claim constructive total loss, and 
actual total loss might never occur. On a common-sense evaluation, this change in the law 
encourages uncertainty, does not meet the reasonable expectations of insureds, and supports 
the conclusion that the law has erred.  
 
 
  
                                                     
336
 [1919] 1 KB 189 (Comm List), [1918-19] All ER Rep 341. 
337
 Although Roche J applied the test of unlikelihood from Polurrian (n 13), which is doubted, this doubt does 
not undermine that aspect of the decision. 
105 
 
5.4 RECOMMENDATION 
 
Consequently, it is suggested that works on insurance contain a modest amendment in the 
following or similar terms:  
“It was recognised in English common-law from at least 1758, when policies for interest 
superseded wagers in the English market, that ‘A capture by a pirate, or under a commission, 
when there is no war, does not change the property; and yet, as between the insurer and the 
insured, it is just upon the same footing as a capture by an enemy in open and declared 
hostilities’ (Goss v Withers, (1758) 2 Keny 325 at 342 (Mansfield LCJ); Marshall (1802)): 
‘…no capture is so total a loss that it is impossible any-thing can be recovered; she may be 
re-taken, and, be it at ever so great a distance, a right accrues to the owner, paying salvage… 
this possibility shall not suspend the right the assured had to recover on the contract, but he 
might abandon his interest in such possibility to the insurer’ (Goss; applied e.g. Dean v 
Hornby). There was a presumption of total loss on capture. It was assumed that when the 
property was taken out of the control of the insured or his agents, that amounted to a total 
loss. This justified an instant right of abandonment (Emerigon; Marshall; early Arnould; The 
Minden; Wangoni; Halle). The parties’ rights settled on the date of issue of the writ, and it 
was possible that return by that date reduced the presumed total loss into a partial loss (where 
there was damage), or no loss at all (if undamaged, there being no compensation for any 
delay). Other perils, such as stranding or seizure, prompted an investigation into the chances 
of the property’s recovery. There was never such investigation in a case of capture that 
subsisted on the date of the issue of the writ. Cases of embargo, where there was no loss of 
possession, were treated as stranding. To claim for a total loss on capture, notice of 
abandonment was required, unless there had been subsequent destruction or on-sale, via-
judicial condemnation or otherwise. The draftsmen intended to preserve this in the 1906 Act. 
The leading post-Act authority on constructive total loss after capture (Polurrian) was per 
incuriam. First, the prior law was misstated; the court assumed a test of unlikelihood was 
previously applied in capture when in fact it applied only after stranding or damage. 
Secondly, Polurrian, quoting an error in contemporary Arnould, stated that Emerigon 
provided that a capture avowedly for a temporary purpose gave no ground for abandonment; 
in fact the authority referenced was on different facts, where possession had already been 
restored, and Emerigon actually clearly recorded the presumption of total loss in English law. 
The presumption was subsequently applied in one House of Lords case in 1942 (the Minden; 
Wangoni; Halle). Masefield relied on considering cases of embargo, as well as Polurrian. 
Additionally, Steel J’s discussion of constructive total loss showed a misunderstanding of the 
meaning of ‘abandonment’ in the context of the cases cited. This mistake misled him as to its 
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meaning in s 60 of the Act, and accordingly to discount the constructive total loss argument 
without considering the presumption of total loss. Therefore, Masefield is a dangerous 
authority for the idea that a constructive total loss does not arise on capture. The argument 
that hostage-and-ransom is a new type of peril, falling without ‘capture’ or ‘seizure’ 
(Dawson’s Field; KAC v KIC; Scott v Copenhagen) is doubted. Hostage and ransom has 
always accompanied piracy; two centuries of precedent suggest that capture, even absent an 
intent to permanently deprive, justifies instant abandonment. KAC v KIC and Scott v 
Copenhagen further were not marine insurance authorities. The better view must be that 
capture or seizure, which includes hostage-and-ransom, justifies an instant claim for 
constructive total loss, and that the common-law presumption of constructive total loss on 
capture survives.” 
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APPENDIX I   MARINE INSURANCE ACT 1906 (EXTRACTS) 
 
56 Partial and total loss. 
(1)A loss may be either total or partial. Any loss other than a total loss, as hereinafter defined, 
is a partial loss. 
(2)A total loss may be either an actual total loss, or a constructive total loss. 
(3)Unless a different intention appears from the terms of the policy, an insurance against total 
loss includes a constructive, as well as an actual, total loss. 
(4)Where the assured brings an action for a total loss and the evidence proves only a partial 
loss, he may, unless the policy otherwise provides, recover for a partial loss. 
(5)Where goods reach their destination in specie, but by reason of obliteration of marks, or 
otherwise, they are incapable of identification, the loss, if any, is partial, and not total. 
 
57 Actual total loss. 
(1)Where the subject-matter insured is destroyed, or so damaged as to cease to be a thing of 
the kind insured, or where the assured is irretrievably deprived thereof, there is an actual total 
loss.  
(2)In the case of an actual total loss no notice of abandonment need be given. 
 
58 Missing ship. 
Where the ship concerned in the adventure is missing, and after the lapse of a reasonable time 
no news of her has been received, an actual total loss may be presumed. 
 
60 Constructive total loss defined. 
(1)Subject to any express provision in the policy, there is a constructive total loss where the 
subject-matter insured is reasonably abandoned on account of its actual total loss appearing to 
be unavoidable, or because it could not be preserved from actual total loss without an 
expenditure which would exceed its value when the expenditure had been incurred. 
(2)In particular, there is a constructive total loss— 
(i)Where the assured is deprived of the possession of his ship or goods by a peril insured 
against, and (a) it is unlikely that he can recover the ship or goods, as the case may be, or (b) 
the cost of recovering the ship or goods, as the case may be, would exceed their value when 
recovered; or 
(ii)In the case of damage to a ship, where she is so damaged by a peril insured against that the 
cost of repairing the damage would exceed the value of the ship when repaired. 
In estimating the cost of repairs, no deduction is to be made in respect of general average 
contributions to those repairs payable by other interests, but account is to be taken of the 
expense of future salvage operations and of any future general average contributions to which 
the ship would be liable if repaired; or 
(iii)In the case of damage to goods, where the cost of repairing the damage and forwarding 
the goods to their destination would exceed their value on arrival. 
 
61 Effect of constructive total loss. 
Where there is a constructive total loss the assured may either treat the loss as a partial loss, or 
abandon the subject-matter insured to the insurer and treat the loss as if it were an actual total 
loss. 
 
62 Notice of abandonment. 
(1)Subject to the provisions of this section, where the assured elects to abandon the subject-
matter insured to the insurer, he must give notice of abandonment. If he fails to do so the loss 
can only be treated as a partial loss. 
(2)Notice of abandonment may be given in writing, or by word of mouth, or partly in writing 
and partly by word of mouth, and may be given in any terms which indicate the intention of 
the assured to abandon his insured interest in the subject-matter insured unconditionally to the 
insurer. 
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(3)Notice of abandonment must be given with reasonable diligence after the receipt of reliable 
information of the loss, but where the information is of a doubtful character the assured is 
entitled to a reasonable time to make inquiry. 
(4)Where notice of abandonment is properly given, the rights of the assured are not 
prejudiced by the fact that the insurer refuses to accept the abandonment. 
(5)The acceptance of an abandonment may be either express or implied from the conduct of 
the insurer. The mere silence of the insurer after notice is not an acceptance. 
(6)Where notice of abandonment is accepted the abandonment is irrevocable. The acceptance 
of the notice conclusively admits liability for the loss and the sufficiency of the notice. 
(7)Notice of abandonment is unnecessary where, at the time when the assured receives 
information of the loss, there would be no possibility of benefit to the insurer if notice were 
given to him. 
(8)Notice of abandonment may be waived by the insurer. 
(9)Where an insurer has re-insured his risk, no notice of abandonment need be given by him. 
 
63 Effect of abandonment. 
(1)Where there is a valid abandonment the insurer is entitled to take over the interest of the 
assured in whatever may remain of the subject-matter insured, and all proprietary rights 
incidental thereto. 
(2)Upon the abandonment of a ship, the insurer thereof is entitled to any freight in course of 
being earned, and which is earned by her subsequent to the casualty causing the loss, less the 
expenses of earning it incurred after the casualty; and, where the ship is carrying the owner’s 
goods, the insurer is entitled to a reasonable remuneration for the carriage of them subsequent 
to the casualty causing the loss. 
 
91 Savings. 
(2)The rules of the common law including the law merchant, save in so far as they are 
inconsistent with the express provisions of this Act, shall continue to apply to contracts of 
marine insurance. 
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APPENDIX II  CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE OF CAPTURE CASES  
 
Noting time in captivity, time before abandonment, and the court’s judgment on the issue of total loss.  
 
 
CASE PERIL SUBSEQUENT  
EVENT 
TIME OF ABANDONMENT TIME IN 
CAPTIVITY 
RESULT 
Wagering Policies/ early policies: 
 
 
East-India Company v. 
Sands 
enemy capture Sold, resold, recapture, 
Restoration to original 
owner 
Unrecorded 4 years  
(1691-
1695) 
No change of 
property 
Assievedo v Cambridge 
(the Ruth) 
Enemy capture recapture unrecorded 9 days No change of 
property (no decision 
on the wagering 
policy) 
Berkley v Cullen Requisition by government none unrecorded Until after 
end of 
voyage 
Voyage lost (total 
loss on a wager) 
Dapaba v Ludlow  Piratical Capture recapture unrecorded 9 days Voyage lost; (total 
loss on  a wager) 
Pond v King (the 
Salamander) 
Piratical capture Recapture before taken 
into enemy port 
Unrecorded 1 day Voyage (of 3 months) 
interrupted; total loss 
established. 
Whitehead v Bance 
 
Enemy capture (French 
Privateer) 
recapture unrecorded 12 days 
(and 
carried into 
port) 
Voyage interrupted – 
total loss of the 
voyage established. 
Dean v Dicker (the 
Dursley) 
Enemy capture (Spanish 
Privateer) 
recapture unrecorded 8 days Voyage lost – total 
loss. 
Pole v Fitzgerald (the 
Goodfellow) 
    No loss of the 
voyage – loss of 
voyage not 
applicable to vessel 
Valued Policies (Policies for interest ) 
Goss v Withers (the 
David and Rebeccah 
Enemy Capture (French 
vessel) on 23 December 
1756 
Recapture on 31 
December 1756, returned 
to England 18 January 
1757 
Abandoned 18 January  8 days No change in 
property. 
Total loss of vessel 
Total loss of cargo 
(& Total loss of 
voyage) 
Hamilton v Mendes (The 
Selby) 
Enemy Capture Recapture Abandoned 1 month 
after return to England 
17 days Partial loss only – 
abandonment out of 
time. 
Milles v Fletcher (the 
Hope) 
Capture American 
Privateers on 23 May 
(1778?) 
Recaptured. Taken to New 
York by  23 June. Voyage 
to London intended to be 
by July. Embargo at New 
York until December. 
Captain sold vessel. 
Insured informed in 
February following year. 
Insured abandoned in 
February.  
unclear Total loss.  
Primarily, decided on 
ground of loss of the 
voyage.  
(also, damage to ship 
extensive). 
Mitchell and Others v 
Edie (the Lady 
Mansfield) 
Insurance on goods. 
Capture by American 
Privateer, early 1782 
Stores, rigging and part 
crew removed. 
Vessel set at liberty. 
Impossible to complete 
intended voyage, deviation 
to nearer port. 
Insured goods sold by part-
owner of vessel, who later 
became insolvent.  
Abandoned after 3 
years 
A few days Not a total loss.  
Abandonment out of 
time. 
Bainbridge v Neilson 
(the Mary) 
Enemy capture 21 
September 1807. 
Recapture 25 September. 
Insured informed of capture 
on 30 September. 
Informed of recapture on 6 
October. 
Abandoned on 1 
October. 
4 days Partial loss. Ship 
recaptured at time of 
abandonment.  
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Parsons v Scott (the 
Little Mary) 
Insurance on ship. Enemy 
Capture 29 March 1809.  
Master made contract to 
sail as a cartel ship, and 
paid ransom for its 
liberation. Released on 19 
April.  Arrived on 13 May in 
England. 
Insured voyage (deliver a 
cargo salt within fishing 
season, not possible that 
year) 
Abandoned on 1 May. 
Insured refused to 
reimburse master the 
ransom.  
 Owner entitled to 
retake ship, already 
safe in English port.  
No loss of the 
voyage on the ship.  
(obiter – may be loss 
of voyage on cargo?) 
 
McIver v Henderson Capture recapture Restoration after 
abandonment but 
before action 
 Total loss – 
possibility that 
repairs might be 
prohibitively 
expensive sufficient 
for constructive total 
loss. 
Mullett v Sheddon (the 
Martha) 
Insured cargo captured. Condemned by prize court 
and sold. 
unrecorded months Total loss.  
Abandonment 
unnecessary 
following sale. 
Brotherston and Another 
v Barber (the Fanny) 
Capture American 
Privateer 19 April 1814 
Recapture by Royal Navy 
on 12 May 1814. Reached 
destination port on 26 
September.   
Abandoned 25 April 
1814. Proceedings 
issued in Michaelmas 
1814 
24 days No total loss. 
Restoration before 
issue of proceedings.  
Falkner and others v 
Ritchie 
Insured ship victim of 
barratry of crew. 
Recaptured by Royal Navy 
the following year. 
Owner hear d of loss 
and recapture at same 
time. Abandoned. 
months No total loss. 
Loss of the voyage 
does not apply to 
ship. 
Cologan and another v 
London Insurance (the 
Friendship) 
Insured cargo on vessel 
captured by American 
Privateer 22 October 1812 
Recaptured by Royal Navy 
on 6 November 1812. 
Taken to Bermuda, where 
damaged part of cargo 
destroyed, and remainder 
held under embargo.  
Abandoned on hearing 
news of part 
destruction and 
embargo. 
16 days Total loss. Cargo not 
restored at time 
proceedings brought.  
Dean v Hornby Insured vessel captured by 
Pirates in December 1851 
Recapture by Royal Navy 
in January 1852. Taken 
back to load port. 
Afterwards,  
Vessel sold by Prize 
master in August.  
Owner abandoned in 
April, on hearing of 
capture and recapture 
at same time. Action 
commenced in 
December for total 
loss. 
c. 1 month Total loss. 
Total loss while 
captured. 
Total loss on sale. 
Andersen v Marten (the 
Romulus) 
Insured neutral German 
vessel captured by 
Japanese – intending to 
condemn contraband cargo 
(and vessel by alleging 
forged papers) 
Wrecked while in control of 
captors. 
Japanese prize court 
condemned vessel and 
cargo. 
Abandonment after 
condemnation 
Not in 
issue 
Total loss arises 
immediately on 
capture. (capture not 
covered by policy, so 
owner could not 
recover). 
Post-Act Decisions 
Polurrian v Young (the 
Polurrian) 
Insured ship seised by 
Greek navy on 25 October 
1912, intending to 
requisition cargo and 
possibly seize ship also. 
Ship released on 8 
December. 
Owners abandoned on 
26 October (taken as 
date of issue of writ). 
 No total loss.  
Could not show 
unlikelihood of 
recovery on balance 
of probabilities.  
Actual total loss not 
considered. 
Roura and Forgas v 
Townend (the Igotz 
Mendi) 
 
Cargo interest insured 
charterparty on vessel 
captured in autumn 1917 
by German ship. 
Ship sailed to Denmark 
where it grounded. German 
crew abandoned her. 
Salvaged in March 1918. 
Claim made on 14 
March after vessel 
salvaged. Parties 
agreed that insured 
need not serve notice 
of abandonment. 
3 ½ 
months. 
Total Loss.  
Test on balance of 
probability as stated 
in Polurrian satisfied. 
Marstrand Fishing Co 
Ltd v Beer (the Girl Pat) 
Barratry of master in March 
1936, taking vessel on 
local cruise in North Sea. 
Sailed to Dover, Spain, 
Dakar, and reached British 
Guiana, where arrested on 
19 June. 
Proceedings issued 
when missing for a 
month,  
3 months. No total loss. 
Balance of 
probabilities unclear, 
so case for 
constructive total loss 
not made out. 
Rickards v Forestal 
Land, Timber and 
Railways Co Ltd (the 
Minden); Robertson v 
Middows Ltd (the 
Insured goods laden on 
three German vessels in 
1939. Masters received 
orders on 3 September to 
put into neutral port and 
Two ships scuttled. Third 
reached German port.  
Requirement to give 
notice of abandonment 
waived by insurers. 
Frustration clause 
prevented loss of 
Various. Constructive total 
loss as of 3 
September.  
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Wangoni); Kann v W W 
Howard Brothers & Co 
Ltd (the Halle) 
head back to Germany. If 
intercepted by Royal Navy, 
had orders to scuttle. 
voyage claims.  
C Czarnikow Ltd v Java 
Sea and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd; Leslie & 
Anderson Ltd v Java 
Sea and Fire Insurance 
Co Ltd (The Oder; the 
Lichtenfels) 
Perishable goods on 
German ships in Italian 
ports in August 1939.  
One ship captured by 
British in 1941. Other 
vessel remained in Italian 
port. 
October 1939 3 months Constructive total 
loss on outbreak of 
war, abandonment in 
time.  
Panamanian Oriental 
Steamship Corporation v 
Wright (1970) 
Ship condemned following 
infringement of Vietnamese 
customs regulations. 
   No total loss (obiter?) 
Masefield v Amlin 
Corporate Member 
Vessel captured by Somali 
Pirates 19 August. 
Released after ransom 
negotiations on 28 
September 
18 September 41 days No total loss. 
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